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ABSTRACT 
THE CAREERS OF TEACH FOR AMERICA CORPS MEMBERS:   
A SAMPLE FROM NEW YORK CITY 
 
Daniel A. Stuckey 
Richard M. Ingersoll 
 
The careers of Teach For America (TFA) corps members are much discussed but less 
often analyzed.  Critics of TFA suggest that corps members remain teachers for too short a time, 
while supporters suggest the program bolsters education reform even if corps members leave 
teaching.  In this paper, I analyze the employment of TFA corps members who begin their 
careers in NYC.  To do this, I first combine data from TFA, NY State, NY City, and charter 
management organizations to generate a dataset superior to prior datasets used to explore 
corps member employment.  Second, I use the Kaplan-Meier survival method to estimate how 
long corps members remain in the teaching profession.   Third, I use logistic regression to 
identify predictors associated with corps member attrition from teaching.  Fourth, I use survey 
weights and raking to track the employment of TFA alumni and adjust for non-response bias.   
I find that corps members remain teachers longer than is commonly reported.  Roughly 
90% of corps members remain teachers for a second year, 57 to 61% remain for a third, 42 to 
45% remain for a fourth, and 32 to 36% remain for a fifth.  Further, many corps members who 
leave teaching remain educators.  In year 10, 61% of TFA alumni remain employed in the 
education sector, including 43% employed in preK-12.  Finally, I identify several strong 
predictors of TFA attrition.  Corps members have the lowest odds of attrition in year 1 and the 
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highest odds in year 2.  Adjusted for other covariates, corps members are less likely to leave 
teaching if Hispanic, an education major, a special education teacher, or a teacher at a school 
with higher test scores.  Corps members are more likely to leave if Asian, male, or a teacher at a 
charter school, and corps members are also more likely to leave if their college GPA was high, 
they attended a selective college, or they majored in a subject with high potential earnings. 
Older corps members and corps members from lower-income backgrounds are more likely to 
leave teaching in their first year, but less likely to leave teaching thereafter.    
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Teach For America (TFA) is often described as a “two-year commitment” to teach in a 
low-income environment (Birnbaum, 2010; Winerip, 2010; Houston Independent School District 
Department of Research and Accountability, 2011, p. 1; Teach For America, 2010, p. 36).  Critics 
of the program say the two-year commitment is inadequate, arguing that teacher turnover adds 
instability to already struggling schools and pointing to research that suggests teachers are least 
effective in their first two years of teaching (Darling-Hammond, 1994; Laczko-Kerr & Berliner, 
2002, p. 13).  In contrast, TFA defends the effectiveness of its program, presenting data that 63% 
of TFA alumni continue to work in the education sector and highlighting research that suggests 
TFA corps members outperform non-TFA teachers working in the same schools (Teach For 
America, 2013a, 2014a, 2014b).   
Given the vociferousness of this debate, the empirical literature on TFA retention is 
inadequate.  Much of the so-called “evidence” presented in mainstream media is highly 
anecdotal.  Other “evidence” is published by an interested party:  either TFA publishing its own 
findings or a vocal critic of TFA publishing work of questionable integrity.  Most independent 
studies on the topic use local datasets and therefore lose track of TFA teachers as they switch 
districts and careers.  The notable exception is a nationwide survey conducted by Donaldson 
(2012), but data from that survey are nearly a decade old.  The policy community and general 
public deserve a current, large-sample, independent investigation into the rates of and reasons 
for TFA teacher retention and turnover.   
A richer, older, and more sophisticated body of literature examines retention across the 
teaching profession.  That literature examines patterns and rates of teacher turnover, and it 
uses various statistical models to examine associated teacher and school factors.  This paper 
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attempts to apply the lessons and rigor of the empirical literature on teacher retention writ 
large to the specific question of teacher retention among Teach For America corps members and 
alumni, wherein corps members refers to TFA teachers during their two-year commitment and 
alumni refers to TFA teachers (or former teachers) after their two-year commitment ends.  In 
short, the paper attempts to understand both the when and the why of turnover patterns 
among TFA teachers as well as the occupations of alumni who no longer teach. 
For those purposes, administrative files and alumni survey results from Teach For 
America were combined with human resource files from the New York City Department of 
Education (NYCDOE), from many of New York City’s charter management organizations (CMOs), 
and from the New York State Education Department (NYSED).  The combined dataset includes 
the full population of corps members who started teaching through Teach For America in NYC 
between 2004 and 2010, and it keeps track of corps members as they become alumni and move 
from job to job.  The dataset is rich in covariates and relatively unburdened by the missing data 
issues and selective sampling problems of other, similar datasets.  This richness allows me to 
investigate the career trajectories of TFA corps members in NYC, focusing on three interrelated 
questions: 
1. What are the occupations of alumni over time?   
2. What are the annual retention rates of corps members?   
3. What factors are related to corps member retention? 
Methodologically, the first question is simplest to answer.  The occupations of alumni 
can be represented using tables that display the percentage of alumni still employed in the 
education sector, tables that distinguish between alumni still working in their initial district, 
alumni working in a new district, and alumni working in the education sector but no longer 
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working in a school district.   The tables can also display the percentage of alumni who are 
employed outside the education sector, who are attending graduate school, who are 
unemployed, and whose employment is unknown. 
The second question, concerning retention rates, can be answered using Kaplan and 
Meier survival functions (1958).  Kaplan-Meier survival functions leverage conditional 
probabilities to estimate the percentage of subjects who “survive” until a given point in time.  
What percentage of corps members are teaching after x number of years?  What is the median 
number of years corps members teach?  These and other questions can be answered, and 
annual retention rates can also be calculated. 
The third research question asks whether any teacher-level or school-level factors are 
associated with longer (or shorter) corps member retention.  What factors are associated with 
longer corps member retention at their initial schools and/or in the teaching profession?  This 
question can be answered using discrete time survival analysis.   
I begin with a review of prior literature. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review consists of three parts.  First, I focus on the concerns of 
policymakers, practitioners and the public.  I consider why we might care about teacher 
retention in general and the retention of Teach for America teachers in particular.  We should 
worry about turnover if it exacts fiscal or educational costs, either draining districts of money or 
reducing the achievement of students, and we should worry about TFA turnover if employing 
TFA teachers magnifies fiscal or educational costs.  Second, I dive deeper into the empirical 
literature on teacher retention in general and TFA retention in particular.  What does past 
research say about patterns of retention and turnover?  Third, I argue that new research is 
necessary, that the policy community demands superior research on the career trajectories of 
TFA teachers, career trajectories that are often discussed but seldom understood.  What are the 
occupations of TFA alumni?  What are corps member retention rates?  What factors are related 
to corps member retention?  The strong research on retention in general demonstrates how to 
approach TFA retention in particular.  Strong research can help inform policy debates about 
TFA’s role in the education workforce, and strong research can guide relevant stakeholders 
including policymakers, philanthropists, school districts, and TFA itself.   
Some dissertations solve problems of their own invention, addressing research 
questions born in their own introductory paragraphs.  Other dissertations leap past Robert 
Merton’s “theory of the middle range” (1949), aspiring to revise theory on the grand scale.  This 
dissertation walks the middle path, asking an applied question that others have asked but failed 
to answer well, a question that researchers, policymakers, and educators would clearly like 
answered.     
Teacher Turnover Writ Large:  Why We Might Care 
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Teaching is one of the largest occupations in the U.S., employing roughly 2.7 percent of 
America’s working adults (BLS, 2014; NCES, 2013b).  The NCES (2013b) estimates that during the 
2011-12 school year, 3,385,000 adults worked as public school teachers and received base 
salaries totaling 178 billion dollars (according to my estimates from the 2011-12 SASS restricted 
data file, NCES, 2013a).  Given these large numbers and the important work that teachers do, it 
should not surprise us that researchers closely monitor the teacher labor market and patterns of 
teacher turnover.  Researchers and policymakers express concern, first that turnover is too high, 
second that turnover impacts student achievement, and third that turnover is costly.   
How high is turnover? 
For the past twenty-five years, teacher turnover rates have been remarkably stable.  
According to figures from the NCES, annual turnover rates have ranged from 12.4% to 16.5%, 
which means that 83.5% to 87.6% of teachers remain in the same school from year to year 
(Goldring, Taie, Soheyla, & Minsun, 2014, p. 6).  These estimates are based on the Teacher 
Follow-Up Survey (TFS), a nationally representative survey conducted by the Census Bureau.  
Importantly, the TFS estimates both the number of teacher “movers” (who leave one school to 
work in another) and the number of teacher “leavers” (who exit the teaching profession, at least 
temporarily).  In Table 1 estimates are provided for all years the TFS was conducted. 
Table 1.  Percentage of Public School Teacher Stayers, Movers, and Leavers:  Selected School 
Years 1988-89 through 2009-09 
 
Stayers Movers Leavers 
From 1987-1988 to 1988-1989 86.5 7.9 5.6 
From 1990-1991 to 1991-1992 87.6 7.3 5.1 
From 1993-1994 to 1994-1995 86.3 7.2 6.6 
From 1999-2000 to 2000-2001 84.9 7.7 7.4 
From 2003-2004 to 2004-2005 83.5 8.1 8.4 
From 2007-2008 to 2008-2009 84.5 7.6 8.0 
Note: Adapted from Goldring et al. (2014, p. 6) 
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These figures have helped shift the conversation about problems in the teacher 
pipeline.  As recently as the 1990s, many educational researchers wrote of looming teacher 
shortages or pointed out the failure of teacher education programs to graduate enough 
qualified teachers to fill all open teaching positions (Boe & Gilford, 1992).  Then, in the early 
2000s, Ingersoll (2001, 2003) used raw data from the TFS to suggest that prior literature on 
teacher shortages was misguided, that the real problem with the teacher pipeline was the high 
rate of teacher turnover.  Ingersoll called this the “revolving door” or “leaky bucket” problem, 
arguing that retirees constituted only a small percentage of the people leaving the teaching 
profession.  Ingersoll’s analyses were widely cited, and many of his figures were republished in a 
report by the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future (NCTAF), a report that 
argued that “[t]he real school staffing problem is teacher retention.  Our inability to support 
high quality teaching in many of our schools is driven not by too few teachers entering the 
profession, but by too many leaving it for other jobs” (NCTAF, 2003, p. 6).   
For Ingersoll, high turnover underscores two other properties of the teaching 
profession, its low status and low pay, properties likely to drive capable people out of teaching 
or keep them from becoming teachers in the first place.  Ingersoll (2003) finds that both salary 
and working conditions are correlated with turnover, and in Who Controls Teachers’ Work, 
Ingersoll (2006) details the semi-professional status of teachers, a group of workers who find 
themselves “short on power, long on responsibility” (2007, p. 20).  Ingersoll (2003) also 
compares teacher turnover to annual turnover in other occupations: 
teaching has higher turnover than some higher-status professions (professors at 9.3%; 
technology and scientific professionals from 3.6% to 9.2%), about the same as other 
female semi-professions (nurses at 18%) and less turnover than some lower-status, 
lower-skill occupations (federal clerical workers at 30%). (p. 9)  
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These figures, however, are somewhat disputed.  Using data from the Current Population 
Survey, Harris and Adams (2007) argue that teacher turnover is similar to turnover among other 
professionals, namely nurses, social workers, and accountants.  If Harris and Adams are correct, 
there might be less reason to worry about the costs of teacher turnover or the possibility that 
teaching is attracting and retaining mediocre candidates. 
But regardless of who has the better numbers—Ingersoll (2003) reminds us that teacher 
turnover is both a national and local phenomenon (p. 9).  For local schools, teacher attrition 
(from the profession) and teacher mobility (from one school to another) have similar 
consequences.  When a teacher leaves P.S. #1, the principal of P.S. #1 needs to hire a 
replacement and the other teachers at P.S. #1 need to adjust to a new colleague, regardless of 
whether the departed teacher has stopped teaching altogether or has just moved to a school in 
a neighboring district.   
Another concern for Ingersoll and others is the seemingly high rate of turnover among 
novice teachers.  Using the TFS, Ingersoll (2003) estimates that 46% of teachers leave the 
profession within their first five years, an estimate that others have paraphrased as “nearly half” 
(Alliance for Excellent Education, 2005, p. 2).  Because the TFS provides only a single year of 
data—it is not a longitudinal study—Ingersoll reaches his estimate by leveraging joint 
probabilities.  He finds that teachers with zero, one, two, three, and four years of experience are 
likely to remain teachers the following year at probabilities of .86, .86, .88, .90, and .90 
respectively.  By multiplying these five probabilities together, Ingersoll estimates that 54% of 
teachers last through their first five years and 46% leave the profession sometime earlier.  As 
caveats, Ingersoll notes both the crudeness of his estimation method and the body of prior 
research finding that approximately 25% of leavers return to teaching (p. 23).  Sure enough, 
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using longitudinal data from Illinois, DeAngelis and Presley (2011) find somewhat lower rates of 
attrition, estimating that 40% of teachers leave the profession within the first five years.  
Because many of these so-called leavers will actually return to teaching, DeAngelis and Presley 
estimate that the true rate of five-year attrition from the profession is closer to 27% (p. 609). 
The NCES also provides its own numbers on novice teacher turnover.  Based on the past 
three iterations of the TFS, 23 to 24% of novice teachers either leave teaching or switch schools 
each year.  Among mid-career teachers, the percentages are much lower, with only 13 to 14% of 
teachers leaving or switching schools annually: 
Figure 1.  Percentage of Public School Teacher Movers and Leavers by Experience Level:  Selected 
School Years 2004-05 through 2012-13 
  
Note:  Adapted from Keigher (2010, p. 7), Marvel, Lyter, Peltola, Strizek, and Morton (2007, p. 8), and Goldring et al. 
(2014, p. 6) 
 
In addition, the NCES provides estimates based on a longitudinal survey of teachers who 
began their careers in 2007 or 2008.  After three years, 58.7% of these teachers continue to 
work in the same school, and 83.3% continue to be employed as teachers (Gray & Brauen, 2013, 
p. 22).  These retention figures are significantly higher than Ingersoll’s estimate that only 67% of 
teachers remain in the profession after three years (Ingersoll, 2003, p. 14).  We might think that 
Gray and Brauen’s estimates are better, since they come from longitudinal data—but we might 
also wonder whether retention patterns have changed in recent years, with more teachers 
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remaining in the profession due to the recession.  If current retention rates are abnormally high, 
then they are likely to drop again in the coming years as the economy picks back up.  
Policymakers will want to keep abreast of these fluctuations while also addressing other 
concerns about teacher turnover. 
How does turnover affect student achievement? 
The most obvious reason for concern is the possibility that teacher turnover impacts 
student achievement.  We know that teachers have large effects on student achievement and 
also that effectiveness varies among teachers (Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2005, p. 13).  
Teachers have the largest impact of any within-grade factor (Sanders, Wright, & Horn, 1997), 
and according to Staiger and Rockoff  (2010), 
teachers display considerable heterogeneity in their effects on student achievement 
gains. The standard deviation across teachers in their impact on student achievement 
gains is on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 student-level standard deviations, which would 
improve the median student’s test score 4 to 8 percentiles in a single year. (pp. 97-98) 
 
Given the large and varying impacts that teachers have on student achievement, we might 
worry about whether the wrong teachers are leaving the profession.  
One potential worry is the high rate of attrition among novices.  A large body of 
research suggests that teachers improve with experience, especially in their first few years 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005, p. 447).  But if teachers leave 
the profession as novices, they never accrue experience, and their students never reap the 
benefits.  That said, fears that teaching is losing its best novices and suspicions that ineffective 
novices exit teaching at higher rates might both be unfounded.  Some research suggests that 
novice stayers and leavers have indistinguishable value-added scores (Rivkin et al., 2005, p. 448).   
Still, we should be wary of studies that claim teacher turnover is without negative 
impacts or even has positive impacts on student achievement.  The presence of high attrition 
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among novices can lead to spurious findings.  If leavers are more likely to be novices, and if 
novices have significantly lower impacts on student achievement, then schools might appear to 
benefit from high turnover.  All else being equal, the stayers (who are more experienced) will 
have higher predicted value-added scores than the leavers (who are less experienced)—but 
students would be ill-served nonetheless, deprived of a rising tide of teacher experience (and 
potentially effectiveness).  Researchers are misguided to compare the value-added of leavers to 
stayers.  A better strategy, though more difficult to estimate, is to compare the value-added of 
leavers to the value-added of their replacements. 
As recently as 2004, few studies estimated the effects of turnover on student 
achievement (Guin, 2004, p. 1).  Rather, studies hypothesized effects based on research findings 
that turnover undermines organizational trust, inhibits teamwork among colleagues, and 
disrupts a school’s ability to maintain a coherent curriculum (Guin, 2004, pp. 2–3).  Since 2004, 
several studies have tried to estimate the causal impacts of teacher turnover—though frequent 
comparisons between leavers and stayers, rather than between leavers and replacements, make 
some comparisons inappropriate.  In North Carolina, researchers found that more effective 
teachers stay in the profession longer (Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2007, p. 22).  Similarly, in 
Texas, researchers found that stayers are more effective than leavers (Hanushek et al., 2005, p. 
18; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010, pp. 21–22), and in New York City researchers found that less 
effective first year teachers are more likely to leave (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & 
Wyckoff, 2009).   
These findings support the view that turnover is beneficial, though other evidence from 
the same papers suggests otherwise.  Among second and third year teachers, leavers and 
stayers are equally effective (Boyd et al., 2009, p. 10).  Further, leavers are generally less 
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effective in their final year of teaching than they were in their penultimate year.  Perhaps, in 
that final year, a teacher already has one foot out the door, or perhaps, a single ineffective 
school year drives her out the door.  Either way, her final year’s value-added score is a dubious 
measure of her longer-term effectiveness.  Studies finding that stayers are more effective than 
leavers probably overstate the magnitude of the effect: 
[teacher] performance during the exit year is noticeably worse than in the previous 
year. This strongly suggests that those who exit are not systematically worse in a longer 
term sense but only in the year in question. Whether this reflects a reduction in effort or 
particular difficulties in that year (that might contribute to an exit decision) cannot be 
fully ascertained at this time. (Hanushek et al., 2005, p. 26) 
 
Also unresolved is the effectiveness of leavers relative to replacements.  Hanushek and Rivkin 
(2010) argue that leavers are replaced by novices who are equally effective: “If these exiting 
teachers are replaced with rookie teachers, the expected net effect is close to zero” (p. 23)—but 
five years earlier Hanushek et al. (2005) suggested otherwise, claiming that the lower average 
effectiveness of novice teachers translated into negative impacts: “experience effects indicate 
that the high turnover among U.S. teachers…has detrimental effects on student achievement” 
(p. 17).  In sum, the impact of teacher turnover remains unclear.  Estimates shift depending on 
whether leavers are compared to stayers, replacements, or themselves from prior years. 
One study stands out for its clarity.  Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2013) find that 
turnover has a small but detrimental effect on students, and further, that turnover hurts all 
students, not just the students of teachers new to a school.  The authors begin by discussing two 
theories for how turnover might impact student achievement.  “Compositional” theories 
suggest that turnover changes the distribution of teachers.  Leavers are replaced with either 
more or less effective teachers, thereby yielding either positive or negative effects (p. 6).  
“Disruptive” theories suggest that turnover can lower student achievement by negatively 
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impacting the organization:  undermining trust, diminishing institutional knowledge, or shifting 
resources from instruction to human resources (p. 6).  To test both theories, Ronfeldt et al. 
(2013) estimate within-school, grade-level effectiveness, holding everything constant except for 
the percent of teachers who turn over in a given year.  The researchers find that turnover has 
both compositional and disruptive impacts on student achievement.  In years when within-
school, grade-level turnover is high, students do worse.  Part of the effect is due to 
compositional changes:  replacement teachers are less effective than leavers, and the students 
of the replacements suffer.  And part of the effect is due to disruptive changes:  all students in 
the grade-level suffer, regardless of whether they are taught by a teacher new to the school or 
not (pp. 31-32). 
Interestingly, teacher attrition, not teacher mobility, seems to drive compositional 
harms.  Jackson (2012a) identifies substantial “match” effects among teachers who switch 
schools.  In general, switchers are more effective at improving their students’ math and reading 
scores in the years immediately after a move than they were in the years immediately before.  
In other words, teachers tend to move to schools where they are individually more effective: 
certain teachers may be good at teaching certain types of students (perhaps same race, 
high motivation) who attend certain schools. Alternatively, certain schools may have a 
work culture in which certain teachers thrive and others do not. There may be 
differences due to differential responses to the characteristics of other employees (for 
example, experienced teachers, high-value-added teachers). In sum, match quality 
captures systematic complementarities between particular teachers and particular 
schools.  (Jackson, 2012a, p. 1099)   
 
Jackson’s findings bolster theoretical literature on the benefits of employment match and labor 
force mobility (Jovanovic, 1979), and the findings underscore everyone’s naïve theory of human 
resources:  namely, that losing talent is terrible, but poaching talent from your competitors is 
awesome. 
13 
 
In short, the literature on the effects of turnover has only recently moved from 
hypotheses to testing, from theory to empiricism.  In general, turnover seems to have negative 
effects on student achievement, though teacher mobility may be net positive.  
How costly is turnover? 
The fiscal costs are also unclear.  Few papers examine turnover costs, and among those 
that do, accounting methods vary enormously.  Some papers report the total of all recruiting, 
processing, and training costs spent on teachers new to a district.  Other papers calculate that 
same total, but then subtract the cost savings of hiring less-experienced, lower-salaried 
replacement teachers.  Still other papers attempt to calculate the present value of student 
learning, arguing that the most expensive cost of teacher turnover is the lower lifetime earnings 
of students harmed. 
One frequently cited report comes from the Alliance for Excellent Education (2005).  
Using NCES figures from the 2000-2001 school year, the Alliance estimates that turnover costs 
roughly 4.9 billion dollars each year, a sum that includes 2.2 billion dollars for teacher attrition 
from the profession and another 2.7 billion dollars for teacher mobility from school to school.  
On average, the Alliance estimates that turnover costs $12,546 per leaver (p. 6).  Of course, 
these numbers are very rough.  They were estimated based on a Department of Labor finding 
that employee turnover costs organizations roughly 30% of an employee’s salary (p. 6).  The 
Alliance made no attempt to investigate whether teacher turnover costs diverged from turnover 
costs in other professions.  Rather, to reach the 4.9 billion dollar total cost estimate, the Alliance 
simply multiplied the average teacher salary ($41,820) by the Department of Labor’s cost-per-
turnover estimate (30%) by the number of 2000-2001 leavers (173,439) and movers (220,700).   
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More sophisticated figures come from two NCTAF reports authored by Barnes, Crowe 
and Schaefer (2007a, 2007b).  The reports estimate that turnover costs 7.34 billion dollars 
annually, or approximately $17,035 per leaver.  In 2014 dollars, the total cost becomes 9.21 
billion dollars, and the per-leaver cost becomes $21,379, although these estimates ignore 
changes in turnover rates since 2004. For seemingly good reason, the reports take an alarmist 
tone, noting that “America’s teacher dropout problem is spiraling out of control.”  America 
continues “to engage in a costly annual recruitment and hiring cycle” that “drain[s] our public 
tax dollars…undermine[s] teaching quality…and…hinder[s] our ability to close student 
achievement gaps” (2007b, p. 1).   
However, the NCTAF’s estimates deserve some explanation and caveats.  Although 7.3 
billion dollars is often cited as “the cost of turnover,” in reality it is just one estimate, reached 
through a series of conceptual and methodological choices.  First, the NCTAF (2007b, p. 11) 
claims that the U.S. employed 3,447,000 public school teachers in 2004-2005, but the NCES 
(Marvel et al., 2007, p. 7) reports only 3,214,900 teachers.  Second, the NCTAF fails to 
distinguish between attrition from the profession and mobility from district to district.  Third, 
the NCTAF includes turnover costs for retirees.  On the one hand, this makes sense, because 
teacher retirement has costs just like other turnover.  On the other hand, some level of 
retirement is unavoidable.  Even if each teacher who entered the profession remained in the 
same school for thirty-five years, from her first day of teaching until her retirement, teacher 
turnover would still be 3% per year.  Perhaps 3% turnover or some other ideal turnover rate 
should be assumed, and only costs for turnover above that rate should be reported.  Fourth, the 
NCTAF report suffers from missing data problems.  Unlike the Alliance, the NCTAF conducted 
original field research on the school and district costs of turnover, gathering human resource 
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data from five diverse school districts, and further, gathering school-level data from various 
schools within those districts.  But despite the NCTAF’s diligence, the school districts were not 
always able to provide requested data, and so, for example, school-level costs in Chicago were 
estimated using school-level costs from Milwaukee (2007a, pp. 5,72–73).  Fifth, the NCTAF 
ignores any potential cost-savings due to the lower average salaries of replacement teachers, 
calling those savings a “false economy” but not empirically exploring the question or factoring 
any savings, however small, into their total cost estimate (2007b, pp. 3, 83–84).  In short, the 
NCTAF estimate of 7.3 billion dollars is far from exact.  The estimate is noisy because it relies on 
a small sample of five districts and must overcome missing data problems, and the estimate is 
liberal because it includes retirees and inter-district movers, assumes there are more teachers 
than the NCES reports, and fails to account for cost-savings due to lower salaries for 
replacement teachers.     
Yet another attempt to estimate costs is made by Milanowski and Odden (2007) in a 
working paper published by the School Finance Redesign Project.  The paper examines turnover 
costs in a large, urban, Midwestern district, borrowing its conceptual model from management 
literature on employee turnover.  According to Milanowski and Odden, “Turnover Cost per 
Vacancy = Cost of Separation + Cost of Replacement Staffing + Net Replacement Pay + Cost of 
Training + Value of Lost Productivity” (p. 7).  Note that “Net Replacement Pay” means the 
difference between a leaver’s salary and a replacement’s salary, which is usually a cost savings.  
On the other hand, the “Value of Lost Productivity” can be expensive if a district replaces 
experienced teachers with less effective novices.  The authors monetize the value of lost 
productivity by, first, assuming that replacement teachers are .07 to .10 standard deviations less 
effective than leavers at helping students achieve and, second, estimating the cost of using 
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highly researched interventions, such as Success For All and class-size reduction, to regain lost 
effectiveness (pp. 14-15).  To regain .07 to .10 standard deviations of student achievement, 
Success for All would cost approximately $8,772 per teacher, and class-size reduction would cost 
approximately $35,349 per teacher (p. 15).  These cost estimates are plausible, but would have 
been more convincing if Milanowski and Odden had actually estimated the difference between 
the effectiveness of leavers and replacements in their sample.  As discussed earlier, the 
magnitude of turnover effects on student achievement is poorly understood.  The authors 
probably err when they operationalize a productivity difference between leavers and 
replacements that is lifted from the literature comparing experienced teachers and novices.  In 
the end, the authors estimate that turnover could cost anywhere from -5% to 27% of an average 
salary, depending on which benchmark is used to calculate the value of lost productivity.  
Because Success for All is relatively inexpensive, hypothetically, a district could save money by 
buying Success for All to increase productivity rather than by incentivizing experienced teachers 
to stay.  On the other hand, class-size reduction is expensive because it requires hiring additional 
teachers.  To regain productivity lost through turnover, districts turning to class-size reduction 
would need to pay heavily.  Altogether, Milanowski and Odden estimate that turnover could 
save a district as much as $4,014 per leaver, or it could cost a district as much as $22,613 per 
leaver.  In 2014 dollars, these figures are $4,873 and $27,450.   
A final cost consideration comes from Staiger and Rockoff (2010), who monetize lost 
productivity differently from Milanowski and Odden.  Whereas Milanowski and Odden estimate 
the cost of regaining productivity by paying for other school reforms, Staiger and Rockoff 
estimate the cost to students of never regaining that productivity.  Citing literature that 
connects student achievement scores to lifetime earnings, Staiger and Rockoff make the 
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“obviously…back-of-the-envelope calculation” that teacher turnover costs a given class 
$200,000 to $500,000 (pp. 99-101, 103).  When a teacher with two or more years of experience 
is replaced by a novice teacher, student achievement scores drop by .10 standard deviations on 
average, which costs each student $10,000 to $25,000.  Like many of the prior estimates, these 
estimates are imprecise and rely on at least one faulty assumption. Instead of identifying the 
true impact of teacher turnover on student achievement, the authors rely on a proxy, the 
difference in effectiveness between experienced and novice teachers.  Nevertheless, the 
authors’ thesis is worth noting.  From their perspective, the largest cost of teacher turnover is 
the cost associated with students’ lower future earnings: turnover reduces achievement, which 
reduces earnings.  Although Staiger and Rockoff refrain from providing a single number that 
captures the total cost of turnover, their “conservative” per-teacher estimate of $200,000 is 
approximately ten times the magnitude of the estimates by the other researchers.   
Perhaps the time is right to implement a single accounting method.  When multiple 
researchers approach the same problem in distinct ways, the policy world can benefit from 
unique insights and diverse perspectives.  But when too many numbers float around, some 
numbers ten times the size of others, ideologues are well-armed against empiricists.  
In review, people care about turnover, worrying that turnover is too high, that it has ill-
effects on student achievement, and that it costs districts money.  Historically, annual turnover 
has hovered around 15% for the profession as a whole and 23% for novices with 0 to 3 years of 
experience.   Some evidence suggests that occupations similar to teaching have turnover rates 
similar to teaching, but many educators worry that teacher attrition causes too many students 
to be taught by less experienced, less effective teachers.  Estimating the causal effects of 
turnover has proven difficult, with most papers making inappropriate comparisons, either 
18 
 
between inexperienced teachers and experienced teachers or between leavers and stayers, 
rather than between leavers and their replacements.  The paper by Ronfeldt et al. (2013) stands 
out, showing that turnover has negative effects that are both compositional and disruptive:  
compositional because replacement teachers are less effective, and disruptive because school-
level turnover has spillover effects beyond the replacement teacher’s classroom, harming even 
the students of stayers.  Despite several frightening reports, the one true cost of turnover is 
impossible to know.  The difficulty is partially practical.  Getting appropriate data from school 
districts is hard to do.  But mostly, the difficulty is definitional.  Which costs should be included?  
Should the cost-savings of hiring less effective teachers be factored in?  Should lost productivity 
be monetized, and if so, should it be monetized as the cost to districts (of regaining that 
productivity) or the cost to students (of never regaining that productivity as future earnings)?  
Clearly, turnover has costs, and clearly those costs are substantial, but the exact magnitude is 
impossible to say.   
TFA Teacher Turnover:  Why We Might Care 
If we are concerned by teacher turnover writ large, we should also be concerned with 
turnover among Teach For America teachers.  According to TFA, its mission is that “one day, all 
children in this nation will have the opportunity to attain an excellent education” and its 
mechanism is “recruiting, placing, training, and supporting diverse, effective teachers who will 
fill our most pressing needs within high-need schools” (Teach For America, 2010, p. 6, 2013a, p. 
1).  By this formulation, TFA is an organization meant to increase student achievement and 
reduce teacher shortages—though critics will contend it does neither. 
What is Teach For America? 
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Teach For America was conceived in 1988 when a Princeton University undergraduate 
named Wendy Kopp organized a conference on educational inequity (Kopp, 2003, pp. 5–7).  At 
that conference, Kopp listened as peers discussed their interest in teaching and frustration that 
most districts hired only graduates with degrees in education.  Inspired by the conference, Kopp 
wrote her senior thesis arguing for “a corps of top recent college graduates—people of all 
academic majors and career interests—who would commit to teach two years in urban and 
rural public schools and become lifelong leaders dedicated to the goal of educational 
opportunity for all” (p. 1).  Upon graduation, Kopp founded TFA, raised 2.5 million dollars, and 
recruited 500 corps members to teach in six locations (pp. 43-47).  According to Kopp, she 
aspired to create a “movement” rather than a “little nonprofit organization or a model teacher-
training program” (p. 1).   
Twenty-five years later, Teach For America has grown substantially while remaining 
highly selective (Teach For America, 2013a, pp. 1–3).  For the 2013-14 school year, TFA accepted 
approximately 14% of the 57,000 applicants to the program, with roughly 75% of accepted 
persons choosing to matriculate.  The average matriculate graduated from a selective college 
and had an undergraduate GPA of 3.55.  Currently, TFA supports 8,800 corps members and 
boasts 41,000 alumni.  In the 2011-12 school year, TFA supported 5,300 new corps members, or 
5.5% of the 96,300 first-year public school teachers in the US, and TFA teachers made up a much 
higher percentage of first-year teachers in many urban and rural labor markets (NCES, 2013a; 
Teach For America, 2010, p. 7). 
Unlike Peace Corps volunteers, and unlike the many AmeriCorps members who receive 
a living stipend, Teach For America corps members are paid directly by the districts and charter 
schools that employ them.  Corps members receive the same salary and have the same 
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responsibilities as other first-year teachers.  Although some corps members have graduated 
from education programs, the vast majority are alternatively certified.  This means they are 
provisionally licensed and must take graduate coursework in education during the evenings in 
order to become certified.  Corps members also receive training and support from TFA, including 
a five week summer “institute” at the start of the program.  During summer institute, corps 
members live in dormitories and teach summer school while receiving coaching and around-the-
clock professional development.  Throughout the two-year commitment, TFA continues to 
provide corps members with mandatory coaching and professional development in addition to 
any coaching or professional development provided by the local school district.  In this way, TFA 
attempts to support its corps members, a group of people with a history of high achievement 
but little prior teaching experience. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Teach For America has been controversial, attracting criticism in 
the media and academic press.  The criticism comes in many forms, but primarily two.  Some 
critics attack TFA for its outcomes, arguing that the program has detrimental effects on student 
achievement, that putting novice, alternatively certified teachers into America’s hardest to 
teach classrooms further disadvantages the students in those classrooms.  Other critics focus on 
TFA turnover, arguing that even if TFA teachers are individually effective, the program is still 
problematic.  These critics argue that TFA teachers rapidly exit the teaching profession, often 
leaving after two years and sometimes before, thereby adding instability and costs to already 
struggling school districts.  Of course, some critics make both arguments.  Echoing the Woody 
Allen line about life, “Full of misery, loneliness, suffering and unhappiness—and it’s all over 
much too quickly,” these critics attack TFA teachers for being ineffective—and for leaving the 
classroom too soon. 
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Ultimately, these arguments pivot on empirical evidence.  A priori, we might expect 
Teach For America teachers to be ineffective:  they are generally new to teaching and have 
experienced six weeks of summer training, not four years of education coursework.  Or, we 
might expect TFA teachers to be highly effective:  they come from elite colleges and have a 
history of high achievement.  Either way, we should revise any a priori hypothesis in the face of 
convincing empirical evidence, whether that evidence is provided by value-added models or 
randomized control trials, whether that evidence suggests TFA teachers are effective or 
ineffective.  Increasingly, the most rigorous evidence on TFA suggests that TFA teachers are just 
as effective, and sometimes more effective, than the other teachers in their schools.  Yet the 
public discussion persists.  People care about TFA and keep it in the policy spotlight. 
Are Teach For America teachers effective? 
Reviews of the literature on Teach For America often suggest that findings are “mixed,” 
that some studies find TFA teachers to be effective, while others do not.  For example, Heilig & 
Jez (2010) write, 
Research on the impact of TFA teachers produces a mixed picture, with results affected 
by the experience level of the TFA teachers and the group of teachers with whom they 
are compared. (p. 3, emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, Schneider (2011) writes, 
the results produced by corps members, while frequently positive, are mixed.  Some 
studies have found students of TFA teachers to outperform other students, particularly 
in math.  Others, however, have found that the students of TFA teachers score lower 
than those of traditionally certified teachers, particularly in measures of reading. (p. 24, 
emphasis added) 
 
Indeed, the findings on TFA effectiveness seem equivocal at first glance. 
Three studies stand out for finding negative effects, though each is susceptible to 
criticism.  In a study using matched-pairs, Laczko-Kerr and Berliner (2002) found that the 
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students of alternatively certified teachers, including Teach For America teachers, achieved 
about 20% less achievement growth than students of fully certified teachers.  This type of ex 
post facto comparison is difficult to do well, usually relying on propensity score matching or 
value-added modeling to achieve fair comparisons between teachers and to account for 
differences in the teachers’ students and teaching contexts.  Laczko-Kerr and Berliner use only 
rudimentary procedures, matching teachers within schools when possible but matching 
teachers across schools and even across districts when no within-school matches are available.  
The researchers make the dubious and empirically untested claim that “the assignment of 
teachers to schools, and to classrooms within schools, appears to have been unbiased” (p. 24) 
despite the large literature on teacher sorting (Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002; Betts, Rueben, 
& Danenberg, 2000).  And though the researchers admit that “random assignment…would have 
provided a stronger design,” they hardly acknowledge the depth of their methodological failings 
(pp. 24-25).  Because their matching procedures are so obviously problematic, Laczko-Kerr and 
Berliner’s findings should be treated with extreme caution. 
In a study of Houston elementary school students, Darling-Hammond, Holtzman, Gatlin 
and Heilig (2005) find that “uncertified TFA recruits are less effective than certified teachers, and 
perform about as well as other uncertified teachers” (p. 2).  The authors find that students of 
uncredentialed TFA teachers experience annual achievement gains that are “one-half month to 
3 months lower” than those experienced by students of credentialed teachers (p. 20).  However, 
it’s not clear why Darling-Hammond et al. decided to focus on only the uncredentialed (mostly 
first-year) TFA teachers.  A clearer policy analysis would have grouped all of Houston’s TFA 
teachers together, since presumably policymakers and human resource managers are interested 
in overall effectiveness of TFA teachers, not just a teacher’s effectiveness during her first year of 
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teaching.  And indeed, “relative to other teachers with standard certification, TFA teachers with 
standard certification did about as well” (p. 19).  It’s worth noting that a prior study on TFA 
effectiveness used the same Houston data but framed its research question differently, 
comparing the effectiveness of TFA teachers to that of (a) other new teachers and (b) all other 
teachers in Houston (Raymond, Fletcher, & Luque, 2001).  Although not peer-reviewed, that 
study found consistently, and sometimes significantly, positive effects for TFA teachers (p. xii).  
Given that the Darling-Hammond et al. paper was published four years later, one wonders 
whether ideology drove the reanalysis and new results.  After all, Darling-Hammond was a vocal 
critic of TFA from its inception, and ten years prior to her reanalysis of the Houston data, she 
had written the following: 
TFA is bad policy and bad education.  It is bad for the recruits because they are ill-
prepared…It is bad for the schools in which they teach, because the recruits often create 
staffing disruptions and drains on school resources….It is bad for the children because 
they are often poorly taught….Finally, TFA is bad for teaching.  By clinging to faulty 
assumptions about what teachers need to know and by producing too many teaching 
failures, it undermines the profession’s efforts to raise standards and create 
accountability. (1994, p. 33) 
 
These criticisms of TFA are common and pervasive, but ideally, they should be the result of 
research, not the basis for it. 
A third examination of Teach For America effectiveness can be found in the NBER 
working papers (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005).  Although not peer 
reviewed, NBER is prestigious and the Boyd et al. paper provides the most sobering criticism of 
TFA effectiveness, particularly in the first year, and particularly in English language arts, grades 
4-8.  The authors find statistically significant negative impacts when TFA teachers are compared 
to teachers entering the New York City public schools through other routes. 
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On the other hand, a growing body of literature based on value-added modeling 
suggests that Teach For America teachers are effective.  Not all of the literature is peer 
reviewed, and even when it is, value-added modeling is controversial in its own right (Jackson, 
2012b; McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004).  Still, the literature is suggestive.  
In Louisiana, Noell and Gansle (2009) found that TFA teachers had significantly better impacts 
than other new teachers.  This was true across four out of five content areas the authors 
analyzed (p. 3).  In Tennessee, the state published a “2013 Report Card on the Effectiveness of 
Teacher Training Programs,” which compared the performance of teachers coming from each of 
the major teacher-education programs in the state.  According to a value-added models based 
on student scores across subjects, teachers from both TFA Memphis and TFA Nashville out-
performed novice teachers, veteran teachers, and the statewide distribution of teachers for 
three school years in a row (Tennessee Higher Education Commission & Tennessee State Board 
of Education, 2013, p. 18).   The two TFA programs were the only programs in the state to 
accomplish that feat.  Finally, two studies of TFA in North Carolina reached similar conclusions.  
Using high school test scores, Xu, Hannaway, and Taylor (2011) found that TFA teachers had 
higher impacts than non-TFA teachers, novice and veteran.   Henry et al. (2014) found that 
although most alternatively certified teachers are less effective than teachers graduating from 
in-state teacher preparation programs, TFA teachers are sometimes more effective than other 
novice teachers, especially in STEM subjects and secondary grades. 
Three randomized control trials conducted by Mathematica also suggest that Teach For 
America teachers are as effective, and sometimes more effective, than other teachers of the 
same students.  In the first study, Glazerman, Mayer and Decker (2006) randomly assigned 
elementary students to teachers, so whether a given student was taught by a TFA teacher or a 
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non-TFA teacher was entirely a matter of chance.  From a sample of almost 1,800 students in 
100 classrooms in 17 schools, the authors found that “the size of the [TFA teacher] impact on 
math scores was about 15 percent of a standard deviation, equivalent to about one month of 
instruction” (2006, p. 76).  In reading, no impact was found, neither positive nor negative, 
meaning that the effectiveness of TFA teachers was indistinguishable from the effectiveness of 
other teachers.  Even though two TFA teachers quit, the impact findings were robust within an 
intent-to-treat framework.  Importantly, these findings compared TFA teachers to all other 
teachers in their schools—not just other novices.   
Seven years later, Mathematica published findings from a similar randomized control 
trial, this one comparing TFA teachers and non-TFA teachers of secondary mathematics.  In 
order to achieve truly random assignment of students to teachers, researchers needed to avoid 
any bias caused by explicit or incidental tracking of students (Jackson, 2012b).  Therefore, 
researchers identified time periods when two or more sections of the same math class were 
scheduled.  Within these class-period blocks, students were randomly assigned to teachers.  At 
the end of the year, the effectiveness of TFA’s secondary math teachers mirrored the 
effectiveness of TFA’s elementary school teachers:   
On average, students assigned to TFA teachers scored 0.07 standard deviations higher 
on end-of-year math assessments than students assigned to comparison teachers, a 
statistically significant difference…equivalent to an additional 2.6 months of school for 
the average student nationwide. (Clark et al., 2013, p. xix)   
 
In 2015, Mathematica released findings from its most recent randomized control trial.  
In that trial, which focused on elementary reading and math, TFA teachers and non-TFA teachers 
were found indistinguishable (Clark, Isenberg, Liu, Makowsky, & Zukiewicz, 2015a, p. 1).  Given 
TFA’s prior effect sizes (0.15 and 0.07 standard deviations), this trial was probably 
underpowered, with a minimum detectible effect size of 0.13 to 0.14 (Clark et al., 2015a, p. 51).  
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Nevertheless, even the null finding from this most recent trial underscores the point:  TFA 
teachers, even first and second year TFA teachers, are just as effective as other teachers in their 
schools.  The suggestion that TFA teachers are ineffective is increasingly undermined by 
empirical research.   
Is Teach For America turnover a problem? 
The second major criticism of Teach For America—that its teacher attrition is too high—
remains far less resolved.  Many questions remain:  What are TFA attrition rates?  If attrition 
rates are high, are they high enough to erase the impacts TFA teachers have on student 
achievement?  Is high attrition costly or cost-effective?  Why else might we be concerned, or 
unconcerned, by the attrition of TFA teachers?  These questions, and others, interest both 
education professionals and the general public.   
Teach For America is often in the news, with press coverage ranging from hyper-critical 
to outright gushing—but much of the press coverage on TFA strikes the “balance” familiar to 
newspapers readers.  An article seesaws between reproach and praise.  A critical quote is 
counterbalanced by a quote of support.  Although the best research suggests TFA teachers are 
effective, articles quote experts on both sides of the question or quote an expert who says the 
evidence is “mixed” (e.g. Winerip, 2010).  Even when articles suggest TFA is effective, they often 
portray TFA as a Faustian bargain, with school districts trading away teacher retention in order 
to gain effectiveness.  For example, the New Haven Independent quotes Imma Canelli, an 
assistant superintendent: 
Canelli said on balance the [TFA] teachers are worth hiring even if they stay only two 
years: “They're really good. You get two good years out of them. For us, two years is 
better than no years.” (Bailey, 2012) 
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Similarly, a writer for The New York Times weighs the costs of “a foreshortened teaching career” 
against the benefit of attracting “high-achieving college graduates into low-income schools” 
(Rich, 2013).  Even when articles take a darker view of TFA, they are often structured in point-
counterpoint format.  In The Washington Post, Birnbaum (2010) writes, “even if [TFA] teachers 
rapidly improve, they just as rapidly quit.”  Thus, articles forward the narrative that TFA’s 
organizational growth is “driven by severe teacher shortages” (Zernike, 2000), that TFA teachers 
may or may not be effective, and if TFA teachers are more effective, they also exit teaching at 
faster rates. 
This narrative also appears in books and academic literature on Teach For America.  For 
example, take the book Excellence For All, which is a contemporary history of education reform 
that argues that today’s reformers pursue excellence and equity simultaneously, whereas 
yesterday’s reformers saw excellence and equity as competing goods.  In the book, Schneider 
(2011) argues that “in order to get the ‘best and brightest’ into low-income urban public 
schools, [TFA] made a key tradeoff: time” (p. 92).  Schneider revisits Kopp’s senior thesis to 
suggest that the tradeoff between time and excellence is built into TFA’s DNA: 
As Kopp put it in her thesis, ‘rather than fighting a losing battle’ against higher-paying 
and higher-status opportunities, TFA would opt ‘not to compete.’  Instead, it would 
request ‘that individuals take a break from their fast-paced lives to serve the nation.  
That the best and brightest will be willing to do.’  TFA, according to its leadership, has 
seen it infeasible to ask for more than a two-year commitment to placement sites. (p. 
92) 
 
After their two-year commitment, corps members could choose to keep teaching or pursue 
other professional goals.  
If Teach For America teachers are more effective than other novice teachers, but also 
leave the profession more rapidly, we might wonder which group is more effective in the long 
term.  After all, teachers generally become more effective with time (Staiger & Rockoff, 2010, p. 
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102; Rivkin et al., 2005, p. 447).  Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) explore this question.  Using 
value-added models, they suggest that novice TFA elementary teachers have higher initial 
impacts on math achievement than novice regularly certified teachers in New York City (p. 616).  
The authors then use retention rates to determine the “steady-states” of new TFA and regularly 
certified teachers, where steady-state means the group’s stable distribution of estimated years 
of experience.  Using these steady-states and the average value-added score associated with 
each experience level in the distribution, the authors suggest that new TFA teachers and new 
certified teachers have similar impacts over time: 
despite large differences in retention rates, the differences in returns to experience and 
retention rates are not enough to generate large differences in steady-state impacts 
between TFA and other groups of teachers.  Even the small positive difference in value-
added for TFA corps members in teaching math would be sufficient to compensate for 
their higher turnover. (Kane et al., 2008, p. 627) 
 
If these findings are generalizable, if new Teach For America teachers have similar long-
term impacts to other new hires, then policymakers may want to stop thinking about 
effectiveness and start thinking about cost-effectiveness.  As previously discussed, teacher 
turnover is expensive, and all else being equal, districts will want to maximize teacher 
effectiveness while minimizing costs.   
As a rule, Teach For America teachers have neither master’s degrees, nor teaching 
experience, so they enter districts at the bottom of the pay scale, a cost savings for districts.  
However, lost productivity is the largest component cost of teacher turnover, and whether TFA 
mitigates or exacerbates this cost is unknown.  On the one hand, when experienced teachers 
leave, schools can minimize productivity losses by hiring TFA replacements, who are generally 
more effective than other novices.  On the other hand, precisely because TFA teachers are more 
effective than other novices, more productivity is lost when TFA teachers leave, at least 
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compared to other novices of equal experience.  Whether the increased productivity of hiring 
TFA teachers exceeds the decreased productivity of losing them is an empirical question. 
Other turnover expenses include administrative costs, recruitment costs, and teacher 
training costs borne by school district.  And when districts use Teach For America to recruit 
teachers, each of these costs is mirrored by TFA itself.  Like the districts, TFA spends money on 
recruitment, teacher training, and administrative expenses: 
We spend about $41,700 per corps member over three years, starting with the 
recruitment year. That breaks down to $10,700 to recruit and select each new teacher . 
. . $9,000 to train each new teacher; and $11,000 in professional development during 
each of their first two years in the classroom. We spend 10% of our annual budget on 
fundraising…and 10% on administrative expenses.  (Teach For America, 2014a)   
 
Altogether, TFA’s annual operating budget is 251 million dollars (G. M. Higgins, 2012).  This 
budget is financed through a combination of teacher finder-fees, government appropriations, 
and philanthropy.  Districts provide TFA with approximately $2,500 per corps member, and 
many state budgets include line items for TFA.  Federal grants, from AmeriCorps and the 
Department of Education, account for another 12-17% of TFA’s funding, but the largest portion 
of TFA’s budget comes from philanthropic support, which is raised at both the regional and 
national level (Teach For America, 2010, pp. 59–61). 
To these diverse funders, Teach For America is worth its high cost, and the 
organization’s 251 million dollar budget is justified.  Critics disagree, of course, suggesting the 
money could be better spent. 
Another pervasive criticism of Teach For America is that the program helps advantaged 
college graduates pad their resumes and thereby further their careers.  Rather than reduce 
inequality, TFA magnifies inequality twice-over, first by providing disadvantaged students with 
inferior teachers, and second by providing an additional career boost to already advantaged 
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college graduates.  In The New York Times, Winerip (2010) writes, “Teach for America has 
become an elite brand that will help build a resume, whether or not the person stays in 
teaching.”  In Phi Delta Kappan, Darling-Hammond (1994) writes, 
TFA has recruiters and advocates who have focused much of their attention on the 
advantaged college graduates for whom TFA serves as something useful to do on their 
way to their ‘real jobs’ in law, medicine, or business, rather than on the young people 
who will be the students of those advantaged college graduates in urban and rural class 
rooms. (p. 23) 
 
Twenty-years later, this criticism still resonates, especially among professors of teacher 
education. 
The Stanford professor David Labaree (2010) points out that “TFA is a program that we 
teacher educators love to hate” (p. 49).  Because schools of education represent the 
establishment and Teach For America is a disruptive force, teacher educators are likely to find 
fault with the program: first, because TFA draws students and revenues away from traditional 
teacher education programs, and second, because TFA’s model implicitly criticizes the 
traditional way of training teachers.   
Labaree (2010) and Maier (2012) use Labaree’s credentialism theory to explain the labor 
market advantages that Teach For America enjoys when compared to traditional teacher 
education programs.  According to Labaree, TFA offers  
elite college students a win-win option: By becoming corps members, they can do good 
and do well at the same time. They can do good by teaching disadvantaged students for 
2 years, as a kind of domestic Peace Corps stint, and then they can move on to their real 
life of work with high pay and high prestige. They can do well by joining a very exclusive 
club…a great career booster that will pay off handsomely in future salary and status. 
(pp. 48-49) 
 
From the perspective of Labaree and Maier, traditional teacher education offers mainly the 
opportunity to do good.  Traditional credentials have far less exchange value than the prestige 
of belonging to TFA.  Corps members can leverage their TFA membership to boost career 
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opportunities across professional sectors, a feat harder for traditionally trained teachers to 
accomplish.  Labaree suggests that TFA boosts careers and increases professional exchange 
value in three ways: 
Part of what makes TFA a career booster is a selection effect: Corps members graduate 
from highly selective colleges and then are admitted into a highly selective program. 
Part of it is a training effect: Corps members gain frontline experience as leaders, 
reformers, and game changers under the most difficult of circumstances. And part of it 
is a network effect: Corps alumni belong to a club whose members are going on to great 
things and thus serve as a powerful form of social capital for one another. The TFA Web 
site exploits all of these dimensions in making its pitch. (p. 50) 
 
Although Labaree emphasizes that his article is primarily analytical and descriptive, “not another 
attack on nor defense of Kopp’s program” (p. 48), other academics and educators clearly see 
TFA’s high exchange value as problematic.    
A similar trope against Teach For America is that alternative certification programs are 
“de-professionalizing teaching” (Milner, 2013).  For decades, social scientists have described 
teaching as a “semi-profession” (Etzioni, 1969; D. Lortie, 1969) and reformers have advocated 
that teaching become more professionalized, though sometimes reformers have used rhetoric 
divergent from the sociological perspective of what it means for an occupation to be a 
profession (Popkewitz, 1994; Zeichner, 1991).  Ingersoll and Merrill (2011, p. 186) identify seven 
indicators of professionalism as described in the sociological literature:  “1. Credential and 
licensing levels; 2. Induction and mentoring programs for entrants; 3. Professional development 
support, opportunities, and participation; 4. Specialization;  5. Authority over decision making; 6. 
Compensation levels; 7. Prestige and occupational social standing.”    
Within this framework, TFA corps members are most obviously outliers in two 
dimensions.  First, corps members circumvent traditional licensing.  Second, corps members 
carry with them, through the difficulty of getting into the program and the prestige of their 
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academic backgrounds, status not usually conferred on teachers.  Unsurprisingly, critics of the 
program tend to focus on the first.  By entering teaching with an alternative certification, no 
education degree, and only a summer’s worth of student-teaching experience, corps members 
seem to embody the idea, anathema to proponents of professionalization, that teaching 
requires no specialized knowledge of the sort held by engineers, doctors, lawyers, etc.  
Moreover, corps members undermine efforts to increase credentialing and teacher preparation 
that offer the best chance of improving teaching.  As for the second idea, rather than enhance 
the prestige of the profession, it seems to some that elite corps members diminish the prestige 
through contrast with their future careers.  
Ideologically, direct arguments against the professionalization of teaching can be hard 
to make.  Professionalization seems like an unfettered good.  There are certainly reasons to 
think that increased professionalism, especially in the form of increased compensation and 
status, would lead to improvements in the teacher workforce, and that increased professional 
development and autonomy might lead to better instruction.  On the other hand, 
professionalism might not be so good if credentialing keeps talented people out of the 
profession.  And increased compensation is expensive.  Teaching has long benefited from a 
workforce with a strong service ethic (Ingersoll & Merrill, 2011, p. 186; D. C. Lortie, 2002). 
Fixating on issues in the adult labor market without assessing implications for student 
outcomes seems misguided.  Teach For America, like many other education reforms, focuses on 
reducing K-12 inequalities.  If we think that TFA reduces K-12 inequalities, if we think that TFA is 
both effective and cost-effective, we might not care whether TFA boosts its corps members’ 
careers.  We might even want to leverage TFA’s reputation for career-boosting in order to 
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attract the best possible candidates into teaching.  Since the beginning, Kopp (1997) has argued 
that TFA’s high prestige and limited time commitment are critical for recruiting high-achievers: 
Teach For America . . . [recruits] a diverse and talented group of recent college 
graduates who probably would not otherwise have entered the profession…asking them 
to commit to teaching for two years. . . . Teach For America attracts them with a short-
term commitment, selective image, and streamlined training and placement processes. 
(p. 212) 
 
Teach For America’s recruiting efforts are similarly transparent.  On TFA’s website, the 
program is marketed as both an opportunity to do good as “a successful teacher in a low-income 
community” and an opportunity to do well by taking advantage of the “exceptional graduate 
schools and employers [who]…actively recruit corps members and alumni and offer them special 
benefits to recognize their experience in the corps” (“Graduate School and Employer 
Partnerships,” 2014).  TFA boasts arrangements with more than 175 graduate school programs 
that allow corps members to automatically defer matriculation for two years (“Graduate School 
and Employer Partnerships,” 2014), and even when graduate schools have no automatic 
procedure, corps members seldom have trouble.  For corps members who enter TFA without 
firm career plans, TFA offers career counseling and access to a job board where corps members 
can post their resumes and external organizations can post opportunities for jobs both in and 
out of the education sector (“Resources for Employers and Graduate Schools,” 2014).  On the 
job board, graduate schools offer application fee waivers, scholarship money, and sometimes 
guaranteed admissions spots reserved for a quota of TFA alumni.  Prestigious businesses like 
Goldman Sachs, Deloitte, and Boston Consulting Group give corps members streamlined access 
to corporate recruitment (“Graduate School and Employer Partnerships,” 2014; Goldman Sachs, 
2012).   
34 
 
The harshest critics of Teach For America see these partnerships as nefarious, with TFA 
advancing the careers of its corps members at the expense of disadvantaged children—but the 
most ardent supporters of TFA see only benefits:  the partnerships help TFA recruit the best and 
brightest, and the partnerships help launch corps members into the positions of leadership 
necessary to further “the movement” for education reform.  In theory, TFA’s short time 
commitment and prestigious partnerships work the way incentives are expected to work, both 
attracting candidates who would not have otherwise applied, but also luring away corps 
members who might have otherwise continued to teach after two years.  Whether the 
combined effect is societally positive or negative is much more complicated. 
In 2014, the co-CEOs of Teach For America, Matthew Kramer and Elisa Villanueva Beard, 
addressed the criticism that TFA’s two-year commitment leads to low retention.  In their “State 
of TFA” address, the pair argued that the two-year commitment is a recruitment strategy, not a 
retention strategy.  Kramer said, 
We don’t believe [people] should leave the classroom after two years.  We don’t believe 
that they should leave the field of education after two years.  We believe that the way 
to get the most extraordinary people in on the front end is to tell them they have to 
commit for at least two years.  And, frankly, other ways of education, traditional 
programs, have a zero-year commitment.  That’s a different approach.  We believe 
telling people they have to commit for two years on the front end is actually the way to 
get them to lean in and stick through what is going to be a very hard first year, which is 
why we see Teach For America people actually stay into their second year at higher 
rates than other programs and other ways into the profession. (Teach For America, 
2014b) 
 
Kramer also acknowledged consequences of the two-year commitment and emphasized TFA’s 
efforts to keep more corps members in the education sector: 
There’s a consequence of the two-year commitment, which is that it creates a mental 
break at the end of the second year that causes people to lift up their eyes and ask what 
else they want to do.  And the reason we’re thinking about [our] approach…at the end 
of two years, is we are trying to change the feeling of that break.  We are trying to make 
the end of two years not the end of two years so much as the beginning of a longer term 
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commitment in education.  Many people will be in the classroom the whole way.  
Others will be in two years and at other points they will shift to other things.  And for 
some people it’s right that they leave right away.  There are other things that are their 
personal calling.  But that’s what we’re trying to change, the strange break point that 
can occur in people’s heads if they over-focus on the two years. (Teach For America, 
2014b) 
 
Thus, without criticizing corps members who choose to leave teaching, or even those who 
choose to leave the education sector, Kramer suggests that TFA is committed to retaining 
teachers and educators. 
Therefore, Teach For America is making several organizational efforts to increase 
classroom retention.  One such effort, the “Teach Beyond Two” campaign, encourages second 
year corps members to continue teaching for a third year.  In the New York region, corps 
members receive a letter from a recent alumna (Carson, 2014).  Corps members are also 
directed to a “Teach Beyond Two” webpage featuring video content that encourages them to 
keep teaching (Teach For America New York City Alumni Team, 2014).  For the 2014-15 school 
year, Kramer announced that TFA would “try a bunch of different programs…a dozen different 
things” to make the third year of teaching more attractive (Teach For America, 2014b).  For 
example, he suggested TFA might provide “a dedicated…coach” to support third year corps 
members, and TFA might provide resources for “groups working for board certification.”  At the 
climax of Kramer’s speech, he offered supporters (and critics) this two sentence Rorschach test:  
“Teaching beyond two years cannot be a backup plan. It has to be the main plan.”  Critics will 
see admittance of guilt.  Supporters will see noble intent.  But both groups should see an 
organization devoting time and resources to thinking about teacher retention.  By supporting 
this research project, by giving away data and relinquishing control over published findings, TFA 
further signals its attention to the issue.  TFA gives the policy community and general public an 
opportunity to learn corps member retention rates.  Further, TFA attempts to understand 
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factors associated with higher and lower retention, factors the organization can use to guide 
strategy if it so chooses. 
Simultaneous to these efforts, Teach For America has defended its record, first by 
arguing that TFA teachers are effective and second by publicizing high rates of alumni 
persistence in the education sector, if not always in teaching.  To argue effectiveness, TFA points 
to many of the studies cited in this paper and encourages allies to do the same:  “Point to the 
studies of the Department of Education and Mathematica Policy Research” (Teach For America, 
2014b).  On its website, TFA provides fifteen pages on “What the Research Says” about TFA, 
including corps members’ “instructional impact” (Teach For America, 2013b).  TFA also calls 
attention to the market forces driving its growth, claiming that the organization is validated by 
the support of principals, policymakers, and philanthropists.  According to a biannual survey 
conducted for TFA, “Nearly two-thirds of principals rated our teachers as more effective than 
other beginning teachers, and 95% considered them at least as effective….97% expressed 
overall satisfaction with Teach For America teachers” (Teach For America, 2010, p. 41).  The high 
demand for TFA teachers allowed the organization to grow from “1,200 teachers in 15 regions 
to 7,300 teachers in 35 regions” in the decade leading up to 2010, growth that required support 
from philanthropies and various levels of government (Teach For America, 2010, p. 27).   
To demonstrate that Teach For America teachers remain in the education sector, TFA 
publishes statistics based on its annual alumni survey.  According to Co-CEO Elisa Villanueva 
Beard, “60% of our teachers stay for a third year” and more than 10,000 alumni remain in 
classrooms, which makes teaching “the most common profession of [TFA] alumns” (Teach For 
America, 2014b).  Compared to other new teachers, TFA teachers return for their second year at 
higher rates: “90% of our first-year teachers return for a second year, compared with 83% of 
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first-year teachers in high-poverty schools and 86% of all new teachers” (Teach For America, 
2014a).  Altogether, 63% of TFA’s 32,000 alumni are working in the education sector, including 
more than 800 who are serving in school or system leadership (Teach For America, 2013a). 
For Teach For America, these alumni in leadership positions are especially worth noting.  
Early on, Kopp (1997) emphasized TFA’s commitment to developing “lifelong leaders in the 
effort to ensure that one day, all children will have the opportunity to attain an excellent 
education" (p. 211).  Through TFA, Kopp thought corps members would both effect change and 
be affected.  As teachers, corps members would alter the lives of children, and as TFA alumni, 
many would become leaders in a movement for education reform.  Foote (2009) traces this 
“two-pronged theory of change” all the way back to Kopp’s first summer trying to raise money 
for TFA (p. 31).  Ten years later, Kopp (2003) felt that TFA was “building a force of civic-minded 
leaders for the future” (p. 155).  And nearly twenty-five years into the program, the co-CEOs 
were able to present this data: 
Over 750 [alumni] are school leaders.  Over 1,000 are assistant principals or deans.  Over 
600 are instructional specialists or teacher coaches.  One-hundred eighty-five are school 
system leaders, 70 are in elected office, and more than 100 are elected union leaders.  
(Teach For America, 2014b) 
 
But some critics see Teach For America’s commitment to leadership as a convenient 
cover-up for low teacher retention.  Although Foote (2009) notes that leadership was part of 
Kopp’s original fundraising pitch, Foote also describes TFA’s acquisition of a “brand czar” in 2001 
(p. 194).  The brand czar helped TFA articulate its two-fold mission to stakeholders, emphasizing 
the systemic change that alumni would initiate later in their careers.  For TFA, the benefits of 
this marketing approach were clear: “By emphasizing the longer-term goal of the mission, TFA 
was able to neutralize some of the well-founded concern around the issue of teacher churning 
in underperforming schools” (Foote, 2009, p. 194).  Schneider (2011) presents a more cynical 
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take on these events, writing that “the organization’s ability to develop future leaders…was not 
the original intent.  Kopp’s original plan mentioned nothing about leaders” (pp. 98-99).  From a 
historical perspective, this critique is interesting, but from a policy perspective, it’s not clear why 
the critique should matter.  The important policy question is not whether TFA intended to be a 
leadership pipeline for the education sector, but rather, whether it has become one.  What 
quantity and quality of leaders have come through TFA? 
Fully addressing this question is beyond the scope of this paper, especially because 
notions of “quality” education are highly contested.  In theory, though, producing more high-
quality leaders might be an acceptable tradeoff for having lower teacher retention.  Research by 
Dobbie and Fryer (2011) suggests that Teach For America brings high-quality people into the 
education sector, people who would not have otherwise entered teaching or become 
educational leaders.  Using a regression discontinuity, Dobbie and Fryer compare the 
employment patterns of people who were accepted into TFA to the employment patterns of 
people who were rejected.  The authors estimate that three to four years after applying to TFA, 
admittance to the program increases a person’s likelihood of being a teacher by more than a 
third and a person’s likelihood of being in the education sector by nearly a half (p. 15).  Because 
of Dobbie and Fryer’s low survey response rate (below 30%) and their extremely fuzzy 
discontinuity (about 35% of applicants below the TFA admissions cutoff serve in TFA and about 
35% above the cutoff do not)—the exact estimates should be taken with a grain of salt, but the 
direction, at least, is probably correct.  Other research suggests that TFA is playing an oversized 
role in the founding and leadership of education organizations.  Higgins, Hess, Weiner and 
Roison (2011) compiled a list of 49 “entrepreneurial education organizations” founded after 
TFA, then identified approximately 400 people who were founders or “top managers” of the 
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organizations.  Looking at these people’s resumes, Higgins et al. found that TFA appeared more 
than any other organization (p. 21), leading the authors to write, 
Rather than assume that it is good or bad when TFA members leave classrooms or 
school systems, we focused on the role that TFA alumni may play in launching 
entrepreneurial ventures. While TFA members may not be retained as teachers, the 
findings suggest they may still have an impact in education, perhaps an outsized impact. 
(p. 25) 
 
In its application for the Investing in Innovation scale-up grant, TFA emphasized the impact of 
these anticipated leaders.  The grant application, submitted in 2010, estimated that by the 2015-
16 school year TFA alumni would fill the following positions: 
Our alumni will lead over 5% of the 10,000 urban schools serving majority low-income 
students…[and] other alumni will drive innovations from inside and outside the 
education system—as superintendents, political leaders and policymakers, social 
entrepreneurs, journalists, advocates, and civic leaders in all sectors. (Teach For 
America, 2010, p. 68). 
 
In short, TFA suggests it will continue to act as a leadership pipeline. 
To review, we might care about teacher turnover writ large for several reasons.  
Turnover rates seem high, implying that teaching is an undesirable or undercompensated 
profession.  Turnover lowers student achievement at both the teacher and school level, and 
turnover is expensive, costing an unknown amount somewhere in the billions to tens of billions.   
For related reasons, we might care about the turnover of Teach For America teachers.  
We might worry that TFA turnover undermines student achievement, that TFA turnover is 
expensive, and that high turnover from the profession means that TFA is more a conduit for 
advantaged college graduates than a service to disadvantaged youth.  Alternately, we might 
dismiss these concerns.  I have argued the following:  First, the empirical studies suggest that 
TFA teachers are effective, but whether TFA teachers are cost-effective is less known.  Second, 
TFA is currently engaging public concerns about its low retention:  supporting research to 
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understand retention patterns, building pilot programs to increase retention, and publically 
arguing that high turnover is the price-paid for selective recruiting.  Third, TFA suggests that 
classroom effectiveness is just one of TFA’s twin goals, and that the organization should also be 
viewed as a pipeline for future leaders and educational entrepreneurs.     
Now that we have outlined the relevant policy concerns (the reasons we might care 
about teacher turnover), we can examine the descriptive literature (the empirical studies that 
explore turnover rates and turnover predictors).  Once again, we will start by looking at teacher 
turnover writ large before zooming in on Teach For America turnover in particular.  We will 
explore what’s known and unknown in order to extend the current literature using the best 
models and methods available. 
Teacher Turnover Writ Large:  Rates and Predictors 
Researchers have studied teacher turnover for decades.  In this section, we will review 
their findings, first, looking briefly at rates of teacher turnover, and second, looking more 
extensively at predictors of turnover.  Because so much literature exists, this review will lean 
heavily on two prior reviews (by Guarino, Santibañez, & Daley, 2006 and Johnson, Berg, & 
Donaldson, 2005) and one meta-analysis (by Borman & Dowling, 2008).  Other studies will be 
also cited, either because they offer particularly keen insights, or because they provide findings 
from the past five years.  In general, the literature on turnover is quite strong.  The reviews by 
Guarino et al. (2006), Johnson et al. (2005), and Borman and Dowling (2008) provide lucid 
synthesis and a foundation for thinking about turnover among Teach For America teachers—but 
the literature has limitations, and those limitations will also be discussed. 
What are teacher turnover rates? 
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In recent decades, rates of teacher mobility (from one school to another) and teacher 
attrition (out of the profession) have been remarkably stable.  According to the first seven 
iterations of the Teacher Follow-Up Survey, from 1988 to 2012 annual teacher mobility ranged 
from 7.2% to 8.1% and annual attrition ranged from 5.1% to 8.4% (Goldring et al., 2014, p. 6).  
During that time, novice teachers, who possessed 0-3 years of experience, left their schools and 
the profession at higher rates, with single-year mobility as high as 14.9% in 2003-04 and attrition 
as high as 9.1% in 2007-08 (Keigher, 2010, p. 7; Marvel et al., 2007, p. 8).   
Data from the NCES and elsewhere also demonstrate that teacher turnover is higher at 
certain kinds of schools.  According to Keigher (2010), turnover is persistently higher at charter 
schools and small schools, and persistently lower at schools that serve few students in poverty 
(pp.7-8). 
What factors predict turnover? 
When researchers theorize about why turnover occurs, they usually borrow their 
conceptual framework from economics.  Labor market theory (or human capital theory) 
assumes that people, being rational, will seek to maximize their compensation or rewards.  
Johnson et al. (2005) point out that rewards can be both intrinsic, like “the pleasure of being 
with children” and extrinsic, like “salary, benefits, and bonuses” (p. 1).  Guarino et al. (2006) 
make the same point, writing, “by overall compensation, we mean not only salaries…but also 
any other type of reward derived from teaching that can be encompassed under the heading of 
‘working conditions’ or ‘personal satisfaction’” (p. 174).  Teachers weigh the benefits of staying 
put against the benefits of other available options, both at other schools and in other 
professions.   
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Grissmer and Kirby (1992) are particularly nuanced and articulate on the subject.  
According to Grissmer and Kirby, professionals acquire various types of human capital.  Some of 
that capital, such as one’s teaching credential, is “occupation-specific,” meaning it cannot be 
transferred to other occupations.  Some capital is “location-specific.”  For example, state 
pensions can seldom be moved between states.  Other capital is “firm-specific.”  Relationships 
with other faculty members and proficiency in specific curricula fall into this category.  If 
teachers switch schools or exit the profession, their firm-specific capital evaporates.  For 
Grissmer and Kirby the implications are clear.  Theoretically, gaining “specific” capital lowers 
one’s probably of switching jobs:   
the greater the amount of occupation-specific, location-specific, and firm-specific 
human capital that accumulates, the lower will be the probability of attrition.  An 
alternate statement of this hypothesis is that the higher the accumulation of these types 
of human capital, the higher the alternative wages required to induce teachers to leave. 
(1992, pp. 9–10) 
 
There is, however, also the possibility that teaching provides teachers with transferable, non-
specific human capital.  Grissmer and Kirby call this the “stepping stone theory,” suggesting that 
capital gained from teaching can help teachers transition to certain other careers.  Teaching can 
provide a stepping stone for aspiring school counselors and school administrators.  Income 
gained from teaching can enable a return to graduate school, or acquired professional skills can 
be parlayed into employment in another occupation (p. 10).   
Grissmer and Kirby also discuss involuntary turnover, a topic absent from many 
conceptual frameworks and seldom accounted for in models.  Reasons for involuntary turnover 
include “layoffs,” a teacher’s inability to meet “threshold level[s] set by the school district,” 
“mandatory retirement,” and “illness and death” (pp. 14-15).  In practice, however, only a small 
amount of turnover is attributable to these causes.  Only 10.7% movers and 5.3% of leavers 
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report switching jobs because their contract was not renewed (Keigher, 2010, pp. 12–13).  In 
short, human capital theory suggests that teacher turnover is a largely voluntary phenomenon, 
driven by teacher aspirations to maximize their material and non-material benefits.  Teaching 
can provide a stepping stone to certain other careers, but over time, the accumulation of capital 
specific to teaching increases the cost of switching employment.   
As mentioned earlier, the empirical literature on teacher turnover is quite strong but 
limited by practical constraints.  Ideally, studies of teacher turnover would be experimental, 
nationally representative, and longitudinal.  To date, however, no effort has randomly assigned 
teachers to schools.  Although the School and Staffing Survey and the Teacher Follow-Up Survey 
are both nationally representative, they contain just two years of data, which makes longitudinal 
studies impossible.  Instead, longitudinal studies are conducted using administrative datasets 
from states and large school districts.  States and districts can be peculiar in ways the country as 
a whole is not, creating questions about the generalizability of findings.  Also, researchers using 
local datasets are blind to movements outside their locality.  When teachers exit a local dataset, 
they may be exiting the profession or may be continuing to teach in another state or district.  
One dataset that stands out is the Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS), which is both 
nationally representative and longitudinal.  However, only basic statistics from the BTLS have 
been computed at this time.  Even after researchers begin to build models with predictors, the 
BTLS will still have a generalizability issue:  chiefly, that it samples the peculiar cohort of 
teachers who began their careers in 2007 or 2008, just before the recession.  
Because we know that attrition patterns change over time and over teachers’ lifespans, 
longitudinal datasets should track teachers who entered the profession over many different 
years.  From state data, we know that teacher turnover fluctuates with the economy (Grissmer 
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& Kirby, 1992, p. 29).  From national data, we know the profession has experienced 
demographic shifts, becoming more female and more minority over time (Ingersoll, Merrill, & 
Stuckey, 2014).  Compared to the past, female teachers are more likely to return to teaching 
after child birth (Grissmer & Kirby, 1992, p. 29).  Finally, older and younger teachers leave at 
different rates, and seemingly, for different reasons (Borman & Dowling, 2008, p. 385; Guarino 
et al., 2006, p. 185; Harris & Adams, 2007, p. 334; Johnson et al., 2005, p. 4). 
Longitudinal data also tend to lack information about teacher attitudes and ambitions.  
Because data are collected for administrative purposes like payroll and school operations, the 
data include teacher-level variables (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, certification area, and salary) 
and school-level variables (e.g. grade-levels, enrollment size, percentage of students receiving 
reduced-price lunch, and other student demographics).  But other data, such as job satisfaction, 
are unlikely to be collected.  Research by Weiss (1999) underscores the issue of lacking data on 
teacher perceptions, finding that “how new teachers experience workplace conditions is often 
as important as the workplace conditions themselves. For example, dissatisfaction with class 
size, not actual class size, is associated with first-year teachers’ low morale” (p. 865).  When 
studies use administrative data to model attrition, they sacrifice key predictors related to 
teacher attitudes and perceptions.   
Some researchers have tried to understand perceptions by using surveys, asking 
teachers about both their attitudes and their career plans (e.g. Hall, Pearson, & Carroll, 1992, p. 
224).  Yet, these surveys have their own limitations.  First, the surveys are not longitudinal.  
Second, they are usually anonymous, making it impossible to know whether a given teacher 
actually left.  A teacher might say she plans to leave or desires to leave, but she might continue 
teaching nonetheless.  Surveys capture something related to job satisfaction, which is 
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important, but not identical to retention.  Even when surveys ask teachers why they left, 
attribution bias is likely. 
Despite these limitations, researchers have published prolifically on the topic of teacher 
turnover.  Borman and Dowling (2008, p. 373) identify more than 150 articles on the topic, and 
the literature reviews by Johnson et al. (2005) and Guarino et al. (2006) capitalize on prior 
literature by extracting and synthesizing key findings.  Although literature reviews and meta-
analyses can suffer from publication bias, a fact noted by Guarino et al. (2006, p. 177), the bias is 
likely mitigated in the case of teacher turnover.  Unlike experimental studies, which are often 
designed to test a single effect, studies of turnover typically examine multiple predictors at once 
and find multiple predictors to be significant.  In other words, a completely null finding is 
unlikely.   
The reviews by Johnson et al. (2005) and Guarino et al. (2006) lean on slightly different 
studies, but they identify similar predictors of turnover.  Some types of teachers have higher 
turnover than other types.  One of the most persistent findings is that teacher turnover is “u-
shaped,” with the higher attrition among both teachers with the least experience and teachers 
with the most experience (and lower attrition among mid-career teachers) (Guarino et al., 2006, 
p. 185; Johnson et al., 2005, p. 8).  This makes theoretical sense because novice teachers have 
the lowest transition costs, and veteran teachers retire.  For mid-career teachers, the costs of 
leaving are highest.  They sacrifice both specific knowledge and accrued retirement benefits.  By 
gender, the teaching profession is heavily female, currently around 76% (Ingersoll et al., 2014, p. 
14).  Women are much more likely than men to enter the profession, but women are also more 
likely to exit (Guarino et al., 2006, p. 186; Johnson et al., 2005, pp. 7–8).  By race, the story is 
somewhat more complicated.  White, non-Hispanic teachers comprise 81.9% of the profession, 
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with minority teachers making up the other 18.1% (NCES, 2014).  Minority teachers leave 
teaching at higher rates (Ingersoll & May, 2011, p. 24).  Yet, most regression-based studies 
predict lower attrition for minority teachers (Guarino et al., 2006, p. 186).  This inconsistency is 
likely explained by school placements.  Minority teachers are much more likely than white 
teachers to work in schools with elevated rates of turnover, especially schools with high-poverty 
and high-minority concentrations (Ingersoll & May, 2011, p. 40).  Thus, holding school-type 
constant, minority teachers have lower odds of turnover than white teachers.  Some evidence 
even suggests a possible interaction between race and school type, with white teachers leaving 
high-poverty and high-minority schools at elevated rates, but minority teachers leaving schools 
of various poverty and minority compositions at relatively consistent rates (Ingersoll & May, 
2011, p. 32).  However, this interaction is not directly tested. 
Other teacher-level predictors of turnover include teacher content area and latent 
ability.  Some studies find that special education teachers are more likely to leave the profession 
(Johnson et al., 2005, p. 9), but the finding has not been adequately replicated.  Other studies 
address whether math and science teachers leave at elevated rates.  Guarino et al. (2006, p. 
187) find evidence that math and science teachers leave more often than elementary school 
teachers, while Johnson et al. (2005, p. 9) find that evidence is mixed.  Finally, a recent paper by 
Ingersoll and May (2012) finds that math and science teachers leave the profession at similar 
rates to other teachers.  With regard to ability, Guarino et al. (2006, pp. 186–187) find that 
teachers have higher attrition if they either (a) graduated from a more selective college or (b) 
achieved high test scores on college entrance exams.  
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Teacher turnover also varies by school type.  Turnover is higher at schools with student 
populations that are high-minority, high-poverty, or low-achieving (Guarino et al., 2006, p. 191; 
Johnson et al., 2005, p. 77). 
The reviews by Johnson et al. (2005) and Guarino et al. (2006) also consider the role of 
policy in teacher turnover.  Johnson et al. (2005) review policies at three stages of the teacher 
pipeline—preparation, hiring, and career—and also consider how compensation and working 
conditions are related to teacher turnover.  I borrow their organizational scheme.   
Preparation.  In this area, Guarino et al. (2006, p. 201) write that “rigorous empirical 
studies…[are] sparse.”  Teachers coming from non-traditional programs seem to have higher 
turnover than teachers from traditional schools of education, but programmatic effects are 
difficult to distinguish from compositional effects; the people entering teaching from non-
traditional programs look very different from the people entering from traditional programs.  
Johnson et al. (2005, pp. 21–22) are puzzled by the “contradictory findings” on whether 
advanced degrees increase or decrease attrition.  Further, the authors wonder about the 
theoretical reasons why advanced degrees might affect attrition one way or the other.  Perhaps 
degree attainment signals commitment or increases specific capital.  Alternately, perhaps 
degree attainment provides a pathway to a new career.   
Hiring.  Neither review identifies studies that link the hiring process to retention.  
Johnson et al. (2005, pp. 29–30) do, however, identify studies that link information-rich hiring 
processes to increased satisfaction.  When the hiring process gives teachers more opportunity to 
get to know the school where they will work, satisfaction is higher (Liu & Johnson, 2006).  
Whether increased satisfaction translates into decreased turnover, however, is not empirically 
tested.   
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Induction.  Both reviews lean heavily on a study by Smith and Ingersoll (2004).  The 
study finds that teachers enrolled in induction programs have significantly lower turnover rates.  
Further, teachers enrolled in more robust induction programs (with more programmatic 
features) have lower turnover than teachers enrolled in less robust induction programs (with 
fewer programmatic components). 
Compensation.  According to Guarino et al. (2006, pp. 192–194, 200), the literature on 
compensation is clear and consistent:  higher salaries are associated with lower turnover.  
Further, leavers and movers seem responsive to higher salary opportunities.  These empirical 
results are robust and align satisfyingly with “the predictions of labor market theory” (Guarino 
et al., 2006, p. 194).  Johnson et al. (2005, p. 42) concur, emphasizing that higher salaries 
decrease turnover, especially among novice teachers, but the authors also step back from 
regression-based studies, reviewing the wider literature on teacher compensation.  Recalling the 
seminal work of Lortie (1975), and pointing to qualitative studies by Goodlad (1984), Johnson 
(1990), and Johnson and Birkeland (2003), the authors suggest that teachers care foremost 
about intrinsic or “psychic” rewards rather than compensation (Johnson et al., 2005, pp. 45, 74).  
In exit-interviews conducted by Johnson and Birkeland (2003), teachers attribute their moves 
and leaves to working conditions, not pay (Johnson et al., 2005, p. 45).  Of course, exit 
interviews are prone to attribution bias and social desirability bias.  In sum, even if entrants to 
teaching are less motivated by money than entrants to other professions, and even if teachers 
focus heavily on intrinsic rewards, compensation does seem to matter, with higher salaries 
decreasing turnover. 
Working Conditions.  The relationship between turnover and working conditions has 
become increasingly manifest.  Ingersoll (2001, pp. 518–519) finds that teachers with better 
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working conditions—including more administrative support, fewer student discipline issues, and 
more autonomy—have lower turnover.  Johnson et al. (2005, pp. 53–54) provide evidence from 
survey research conducted by Carroll, Fulton, Abercrombie, and Yoon (2004) and Luekens, Lyter, 
Fox, and Chandler (2004).  Movers and leavers cite working conditions like “salary, lack of school 
leadership, class size/pupil load, lack of supplies and…bad school facilities.”  Further, Johnson et 
al. (2005, p. 54) hypothesize that turnover is related to teaching assignment, with teachers 
seeking assignments that match their grade level and subject area preferences.  The review by 
Guarino et al. (2006, pp. 197–198) largely echoes these findings, and empirical work by Ladd 
(2011) provides additional support.  Ladd finds that “variation in working conditions…accounts 
for about 15% of the variation in actual departure rates, which is about the same as the 
contribution of the other school characteristics” (p. 241).  Quality of school leadership is 
especially predictive.   
A recent meta-analysis by Borman and Dowling (2008) reiterates many of these findings.  
Drawing from 34 studies, the analysis calculates effect sizes for 63 predictors of attrition, and 
groups the predictors into five broader categories: “teacher demographic characteristics; 
teacher qualifications; school organizational characteristics; school resources; and school 
student body characteristics” (p. 378).  All effect sizes are expressed as odds ratios. 
Teacher demographic characteristics (pp. 385-386).  According to Borman and Dowling, 
several groups of people have elevated odds of attrition, including whites (OR = 1.36), married 
persons (OR = 1.40), women (OR = 1.30), and women immediately following childbirth (OR = 
6.69).  These odds ratios are calculated across multiple studies, except for the last one, which 
comes from a single study by Stinebrickner (2002).   
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Teacher qualifications (pp. 387-389).  Teachers without certification have higher odds of 
attrition (OR = 2.63) as do teachers with graduate degrees (OR = 1.12).  Multiple studies 
examine whether attrition is elevated among teachers with high test scores, but findings are 
mostly null.  Elementary teachers have higher attrition than secondary teachers (OR = 1.02) and 
secondary teachers have higher attrition than special education teachers (OR = 1.02), but these 
differences have little practical significance.  Interestingly, science and math teachers seem to 
have lower attrition than other secondary teachers (OR = 0.89).  Finally, Borman and Dowling 
suggest that attrition increases with each year of experience (OR = 1.02) and that teachers with 
six or more years of experience have higher attrition than novice teachers (OR = 1.57).  These 
findings seem strange, however, and are more likely artifacts of the meta-analytic approach 
than accurate statements about predictors of turnover.  The meta-analysis by Borman and 
Dowling employs no mechanism to account for the u-shaped (or quadratic) pattern of attrition, 
but rather, includes only a linear effect.  Further, age and experience are highly related 
phenomenon, yet the meta-analytic approach clouds the interaction between the two.  Borman 
and Dowling do reiterate that older teachers are less likely than younger teachers to leave 
teaching, that is, until they near retirement age.  Then, teachers older than 50 become far more 
likely to leave (OR = 2.48) (p. 385-386). 
School organizational characteristics (p. 391).  Smaller schools experience higher 
attrition (OR = 1.08).  Schools with more administrative support experience lower attrition.   
School resources (p. 392).  Most predictors in Borman and Dowling’s school resources 
category come from just one or two studies, undermining the meta-analytic approach.  
However, eleven studies suggest that attrition is lower when compensation is higher.  And one 
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important null finding is that average class size has no discernable relationship to higher or 
lower attrition (OR = 1.00). 
School student body characteristics (pp. 393-395).  Student body characteristics are 
among the most robust and most researched predictors of teacher attrition.  In schools that 
serve low achieving, high poverty, and high minority populations, attrition is consistently higher 
and substantively meaningful.  Eight studies find odds of attrition are 1.01 times as high for each 
percentage of students receiving free lunch, and seven studies find odds of attrition are 1.03 
times as high for each percentage of minority students.  These effect sizes, however, are 
probably unreliable, given the frequency with which researchers must choose between including 
one or another of these collinear predictors.   
Like the reviews by Johnson et al. (2005) and Guarino et al. (2006), the meta-analysis by 
Borman and Dowling (2008) is subject to publication bias.  Moreover, the meta-analysis ignores 
even published studies when they lack information for calculating odds ratios.  Unlike meta-
analyses that gauge the effectiveness of a single intervention, this analysis extracts coefficients 
from heterogeneous models of attrition, models that include wildly different sets of covariates.  
A researcher comparing attrition by content area might be equally well served by including 
school-level poverty or school-level race/ethnicity—but because this meta-analysis computes 
effect size across prior research, its findings will be influenced by the original researcher’s 
decisions.  Despite these caveats, no better solution exists.  The meta-analytical approach 
provides the best evidence that particular factors are or are not associated with teacher 
turnover.   
In short, the rates of teacher turnover are well known, with annual school-level turnover 
usually between 12% and 17% and novice turnover somewhat higher (Keigher, 2010, p. 7; 
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Marvel et al., 2007, p. 8).  Further, several predictors of turnover are well known, as manifested 
by the convergent findings from Johnson et al. (2005), Guarino et al. (2006), and Borman and 
Dowling (2008).  Predicted turnover is higher among whites, women, novices, and near-retirees.  
Predicted turnover is also higher at schools serving high minority, high poverty, and low 
achieving students.  On the other hand, predicted turnover is lower when teachers receive 
robust induction programing, receive higher wages, and work under preferred working 
conditions. 
Teacher Turnover in NYC:  Rates and Predictors 
Many of the findings on teacher turnover writ large are mirrored by studies of teacher 
turnover in New York City.  The city operates the largest public school district in the country, 
enrolling 980,000 students, and employing 84,000 teachers (“Statistical Summaries,” 2014; UFT 
Research Department, 2014).  Because the district is so large, it attracts significant attention 
from researchers. 
Like many other urban districts, the NYCDOE has a history of high teacher turnover.  
However, the rate of turnover has decreased sharply in recent years.  According to The Wall 
Street Journal, approximately 12% of the NYCDOE’s teachers left the district in the 2001-02 
school year, but ten years later, in the 2011-12 school year, only 6% left (Fleisher, 2013).  A 
similar decrease in NYCDOE teacher mobility and attrition was reported by the Research Alliance 
for New York City Schools.  In 2002-03, 27% of middle school teachers, 23% of high school 
teachers, and 20% of middle school teachers left their schools, but by 2009-10, turnover rates 
dropped to 17%, 17%, and 12% respectively (Marinell & Coca, 2013, p. 14).   
Similarly, attrition and mobility rates among novice teachers were quite high at the start 
of the millennium, but then decreased substantially.  Marinell (2011) examined the population 
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of teachers who worked at the DOE from 2001-02 to 2008-09, isolating those teachers who 
were new to a particular school, though not necessarily new to teaching or even to the DOE.  
After one year, elementary schools retained 78% of these new teachers, high schools retained 
75%, and middle schools retained 73% (p. 10).  After five years, elementary schools retained 
41%, high schools retained 35%, and middle schools retained 34%.  These percentages are quite 
low, far below the percentages desired by most parents, principals, and policymakers. 
Fortunately, teacher attrition at the DOE has slowed in recent years.  According to the 
DOE, 18.9% of first year teachers left the district in the 2001-02 school year, but only 13.1% left 
in 2006-07 (New York City Department of Education, 2008).  According to the United Federation 
of Teachers (UFT), this downward trend has continued, with as few as 7.8% of first year teachers 
leaving the DOE in 2009-10 and 2010-11 (McAdoo, 2013).  And a recent report on new teachers 
hired in 2008-09 and 2009-10 finds that among new teachers who graduated from traditional 
education schools, 80% remained teachers at the NYCDOE for at least three years (New York 
City Department of Education, 2013, p. 8). 
Researchers have also used data from NYC to look for predictors of teacher turnover 
(Boyd, Grossman, et al., 2011; Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Ronfeldt, & Wyckoff, 2011; Marinell, 2011; 
Marinell & Coca, 2013; Pallas & Buckley, 2012).  However, research on teacher turnover in NYC 
focuses on turnover at the NYCDOE.  Research on teacher retention at charter schools is 
conspicuously lacking.  Charter schools now enroll more than 10% of the public school students 
in New York City (New York City Charter School Center, 2012, “Statistical Summaries,” 2014), 
and employ more than half of new Teach For America corps members.  However, all figures 
represented in the previous four paragraphs, and most figures in research on NYC public 
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schools, focus on the district (NYCDOE) schools, not the entire system of public schools serving 
NYC students. 
TFA Teacher Turnover:  Rates and Predictors 
Several papers investigate the turnover of Teach For America teachers, but more study 
is required.  In this section, I examine the prior literature.  First, I examine studies that describe 
corps member retention rates.  Most studies have limited external validity because they 
examine retention in a single school district.  Charter school teachers are ignored and district 
teachers are lost if they move to another locality or migrate to the charter sector.  Still, a 
consistent pattern emerges:  in a particular school district, corps members are more likely than 
other new teachers to continue teaching for a second year but less likely to continue teaching 
for a third.   
Second, I examine the literature on predictors of corps member retention and turnover.  
Namely, I examine four papers by Morgaen Donaldson and colleagues.  These papers, based on 
a survey of new corps members from 2000-2002, provide the best research available.  Older 
corps members and Hispanic corps members have lower risks of turnover, as do corps members 
who showed prior commitment to teaching by either majoring in education or applying to 
teaching jobs besides Teach For America (Donaldson, 2012; Donaldson & Johnson, 2010, 2011; 
Irizarry & Donaldson, 2012).  Corps members have higher turnover risks when they are given 
difficult assignments like teaching multiple grades, teaching multiple subjects, or teaching 
outside their field of expertise (Donaldson & Johnson, 2010, 2011).  The papers by Donaldson 
and colleagues are lucid, informative, and methodologically strong—but more work on corps 
member turnover is warranted.  The data used by Donaldson and colleagues are now more than 
a decade old.  Despite the high predictive power of school-level variables (such as poverty-level, 
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student achievement-level, and working conditions), no school-level covariates are included in 
any of Donaldson’s models.  And across Donaldson’s papers, models use distinct sets of 
covariates rather than one set of consistent covariates.   
In short, I will both review prior findings on corps member turnover and argue that 
more work is necessary.  The inferential work by Donaldson and colleagues demands replication.  
The descriptive work by other researchers lacks the level of detail demanded by the education 
policy community.   
What Are TFA turnover rates? 
For laypeople, Teach For America’s marketing materials provide the most accessible 
information on the careers of corps members.  According to TFA, “83% [of alumni] work in 
education or with low income communities…79% work in or have jobs that impact 
education…63% work in education…[and] 33% are pre-k-12 teachers” (“Alumni Snapshot,” 
2013).  However, these figures require some caveats.  First, some critics will question the 
veracity of the figures, which are computed by TFA.  Second, the marketing materials lump 
together all alumni, rather than looking at alumni employment as time goes on.  
Regarding teacher retention in particular, marketing materials claim that corps 
members have above-average second year retention, with corps members returning 90% of the 
time, other novice teachers returning 86% of the time, and novices in low income schools 
returning 83% of the time (Teach For America, 2014a).  These figures are also touted in TFA’s i3 
grant proposal, which states that “most” corps members stay in the classroom for longer than 
two years (Teach For America, 2010, p. 36). 
Several independent reports and peer-reviewed papers also report the retention rates 
of corps members.  Figure 2 displays data from six papers on corps members who began 
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teaching in the 1999-2000 school year or later.  The graphs included in Figure 2 are distinct from 
each other in several notable ways.  Five of the graphs measure corps member retention in the 
district system of a single large city, but the graph based on data from Donaldson and Johnson 
(2011) examines corps member retention nationwide, across all placement cities and rural 
locations.  Five of the graphs average retention rates across multiple annual cohorts of new 
teachers, but the graph based on the data from Houston ISD (2011) differs.  For the Houston 
graph, each year on the x-axis is based on the retention rate of a single cohort.  Second year 
retention is based on the number of 2009-2010 corps members who returned for the 2010-2011 
school year, whereas third year retention is based on the number of 2008-2009 corps members 
who returned for the 2010-2011 school year.  Five of the graphs look at retention by tracking 
the percentage of teachers who start a given year so that, by definition, 100% of teachers start 
the first year and some smaller percentage start each subsequent year.  However, the data 
reported by Mac Iver and Vaughn (2007) track the percentage of teachers who finish a given 
year.  Thus, for example, the data from Boyd et al. (2005) show that 89% of corps members 
placed at the NYCDOE between 1999-2000 and 2003-2004 returned to teach a second year, but 
the data from Mac Iver and Vaughn (2007) show that 93% of corps members placed in Baltimore 
CPS completed their first year.  Finally, across graphs, the reference group differs.  Sometimes, 
corps members are compared to all other new teachers, labeled on the graphs as “Non-TFA.”  
Other times, corps members are compared to traditionally trained teachers, labeled as 
“Traditional,” who have education degrees from university programs.  In the latter case, neither 
the “TFA” nor the “Traditional” line includes data on teachers from other alternative route 
programs such as the Teaching Fellows. 
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Notably, the six graphs display a consistent pattern.  Corps members are more likely 
than other new teachers to return for a second year, with 89 to 99% of corps members 
returning and only 80 to 89% of comparison teachers returning.  On the other hand, corps 
members are less likely than comparison teachers to return for a third year, with only 36 to 61% 
of corps members returning compared to 68 to 81% of comparison teachers.  Lower cumulative 
retention for corps members seems to persist into year four and beyond.    
That said, several substantive differences between the graphs are worth noting.  Four of 
the graphs are based on papers or reports that focus on teacher effectiveness but report 
teacher retention somewhere along the way.  The other two graphs, based on papers by Mac 
Iver and Vaughn (2007) and Donaldson and Johnson (2011) look directly and exclusively at 
teacher retention.   
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Figure 2.  Turnover Patterns of TFA Corps Members and Other Novice Teachers 
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Rates averaged across annual cohorts to shows percentage of teachers retained at year's … 
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Figure 2.  (continued)  Turnover Patterns of TFA Corps Members and Other Novice Teachers 
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From Houston ISD Department of Research and Accountability (2011, p. 3)       
Rates based on single cohorts to shows percentage of teachers retained at year's start. 
Annual TFA and Non-TFA Retention, 2005-2006 to 2009-2010, All Teachers, Houston ISD 
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From Strategic Data Project (2012, p. 7)       
Rates averaged across annual cohorts to shows percentage of teachers retained at year's … 
Annual TFA and Traditional Retention, 2004-2005 to 2006-2007, ELA Teachers, LAUSD 
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From Donaldson and Johnson (2011, p. 49)       
Rates averaged across annual cohorts to shows percentage of teachers retained at year's … 
Annual TFA Retention, 2000-2001 to 2002-2003, All Teachers, Nationwide 
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Interestingly, the cumulative retention rates estimated by Donaldson and Johnson 
(2010, 2011) are consistently higher than the estimates from the other authors, with Donaldson 
and Johnson finding that 61% of corps members begin a third school year and that the median 
corps member teaches 2.66 years (2010, p. 309).  Given that the other five studies are based on 
administrative data, and the study by Donaldson and Johnson (2011) is based on survey data, 
we might posit self-report bias or non-response bias.  Yet, it seems unlikely that corps members 
would lie about or fail to remember the number of years they taught.  Further, Donaldson and 
Johnson received responses from 62% of corps members, and respondents were 
indistinguishable on most observables (Donaldson, 2012, pp. 33–34).  More likely, the figures 
from Donaldson and Johnson are higher because Donaldson and Johnson look at the full 
population of corps members and are not constrained by a single district’s administrative 
dataset.  Whereas the other five studies ask, What is the cumulative retention of corps members 
in this school district?, the study by Donaldson and Johnson (2011) asks What is the cumulative 
retention of corps members in the teaching profession?  Both questions are important, but they 
should not be conflated.  The study by Donaldson and Johnson (2011) suggests that much of the 
so-called “attrition” of corps members from the profession is actually mobility, either to other 
geographical areas or from district schools to charter schools.  The study also suggests the 
possibility that corps members who start their careers in charter schools remain in the 
profession longer.    
According to Donaldson and Johnson (2011), 95% of corps members start a second year 
of teaching, 61% start a third year, 45% start a fourth year, and 36% start a fifth year.  Except for 
second year retention, these figures are far lower than national averages, but Donaldson and 
Johnson (2011, p. 49) note the difficulty of identifying an appropriate comparison group given 
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the challenging contexts where corps members work.  Ideally, papers would compare attrition 
rates among corps members to attrition rates among other novice teachers starting in the same 
schools in the same years. 
Two papers use conditional logit models to try to adjust for differences between the 
schools where corps members work and the schools where comparison teachers work (Boyd et 
al., 2005, pp. 22–23, 39; Kane et al., 2008, pp. 626–627).  Using a conditional logit model, Boyd 
et al. (2005) show less divergence between corps members and other novices when fixed-
effects are included for both school and year of entry.  At the start of the fifth year, actual 
cumulative retention rates are 15% for corps members and 63% for traditional novices, but 
predicted retention rates are 19% and 55% respectively, a meaningful narrowing though still a 
wide gap.  This narrowing is shown graphically in Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  Turnover Patterns of TFA Corps Members and Other Novice Teachers as Predicted by 
Conditional Logit Models 
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members who were hired by school districts between 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 and received 
2,029 responses.  She and colleagues then used discrete-time survival analysis to identify 
significant predictors of corps member turnover.  Survival analysis allows researchers to see 
whether various characteristics predict a person’s relative risks of “survival,” or in this case, 
retention.  Further, researchers can estimate the median survival time of persons with and 
without a given characteristic while holding all other characteristics at their mean value.  For 
example, a researcher can explore whether male or female corps members have a higher risk of 
leaving the teaching profession and what the difference is in their median survival times. 
In “The Price of Mismanagement” Donaldson and Johnson (2010, p. 302) theorize that a 
difficult teaching assignment can lead to feelings of low efficacy, which can lead to voluntary 
turnover—and their analysis supports their hypothesis.  At the elementary level, corps members 
assigned to teach multiple grades are more likely to leave their schools in year one, and at the 
secondary level, corps members teaching multiple subjects are more likely to leave the 
profession (pp. 311, 317).  Out-of-field teachers of math and social studies are also more likely 
to leave the profession, although interestingly, out-of-field science teachers are less likely (pp. 
317, 318).  To get a sense of the magnitude of these effects, the median survival time in the 
teaching profession is 2.64 years for corps members teaching a single subject at the secondary 
level but 2.31 years for corps members teaching multiple subjects (p. 317).  Among corps 
members, in-field math teachers last a median of 4.08 years in the profession compared to 2.51 
years for out-of-field math teachers, and in-field social studies teachers last a median of 2.66 
years compared to 2.14 years for out-of-field social studies teachers (p. 318).  On the other 
hand, in-field science teachers last a median of 1.90 years, but out-of-field science teachers last 
a median of 2.49 years (p. 318).  Also contrary to expectations, the authors note that corps 
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members who are bilingual and special education teachers are less likely than other teachers to 
exit the profession, although no models or coefficients are provided (p. 305).  In short, difficult 
teaching assignments predict lower retention.   
In “The Promise of Older Novices” Donaldson (2012) finds that older corps members 
(>25 years old when they start Teach For America) have higher retention rates than younger 
corps members (≤25 years old).  Older entrants remain teachers a median of 4.02 consecutive 
years, compared to 2.46 years for younger entrants (p. 22).  Further, older entrants claim to 
leave teaching for different reasons, attributing their exits to pregnancy, family, and health at 
elevated rates (p < .10) (p. 24).  Finally, when older entrants leave teaching, they take on 
different jobs than younger entrants.  Older entrants are more than twice as likely as younger 
entrants to become school administrators (8.74% vs. 3.78%) (p < .05), but only about a third as 
likely to become full-time graduate students (13.59% vs. 37.32%) (p < .001) (p. 23). 
In “Teach for América” Irizarry and Donaldson (2012) use critical race theory to explore 
whether and why retention patterns for Hispanic corps members might be different from 
retention patterns for white corps members.  Although the authors focus on Hispanics, their 
models also yield important insights about black and female corps members.  According to 
Irizarry and Donaldson (2012), Hispanic corps members stay in their placement schools and in 
the teaching profession longer than white corps members.  In any given year, conditional on no 
prior exit and after controlling for several covariates, Hispanic corps members have .73 times 
the odds of white corps members of leaving their placement school (p < .05) and .70 times the 
odds of leaving the teaching profession (p < .05) (pp. 176, 178). The same models show similar 
retention patterns for black corps members.  Compared to whites, black corps members have 
.60 times the odds of leaving their placement school (p < .01) and .73 times the odds of leaving 
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the teaching profession (p < .01).  Females also have higher retention.  Compared to males, 
females have .87 times the odds of leaving their placement school (p < .10) and .73 times the 
odds of leaving the profession (p < .01).  These odds ratios and p-values are nearly identical to 
those found in models from Donaldson  (2012, pp. 18, 21), “The Promise of Older Novices,” 
suggesting that race and gender are salient predictors of corps member turnover.  Irizarry and 
Donaldson (2012, p. 174) also explore interactions between race and STEM major, finding that 
white STEM and non-STEM majors leave the profession at indistinguishable rates, but that 
Hispanic STEM majors have 3.20 times the odds of leaving the profession compared Hispanic 
non-STEM majors (p < .01).   
In the final paper by Donaldson and colleagues, Donaldson and Johnson (2011, p. 48) 
suggest that corps member retention is related both “initial intentions” and “working 
conditions.”  Before starting Teach For America, 56.59% of corps members intend to teach for 
two years or less, while the other 43.41% intend to teach for more than two years (pp. 49, 50).  
Unsurprisingly, initial intentions predict retention.  Corps members who formally defer graduate 
school leave the profession sooner than average, whereas corps members who show prior 
commitment (through an education major, minor, or course-taking) remain teachers longer than 
average (pp. 49, 50).  Most corps members cite professional reasons for exiting teaching: 
• To pursue a position other than K-12 teacher (34.93%);  
• To take courses to improve career opportunities in education (11.79%); or  
• To take courses to improve career opportunities outside of education (10.26%). (p. 50) 
 
But 18% of corps members cite school-related working conditions, including 9.83% who cite 
“poor administrative leadership” (p. 50).  Of course, not all corps members who leave teaching 
leave education.  Twenty-one percent of leavers “[hold] positions in K-12 schools and 10.7% . . . 
[return] to the classroom as teachers” (p. 51).  In short, initial commitment to the teaching 
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profession is associated with longer tenure, whereas poor working conditions are associated 
with shorter tenure, at least according to corps member self-report. 
Donaldson and colleagues also report on the employment and employability of former 
corps members.  Noting common criticisms, Donaldson and Johnson (2011, p. 51) write that 
“contrary to popular expectations, only 3.7% [are] lawyers and 1.6% [are] medical 
professionals.”  Also, only about 5% are working in business or finance (Donaldson, 2012, p. 25).  
Of course, degrees in business, law, and especially medicine take time and Donaldson’s data are 
censored at 4 to 6 years after corps members first start teaching (Donaldson & Johnson, 2010, p. 
304).  At the time Donaldson’s survey is conducted, roughly 36% of leavers are graduate 
students (Donaldson, 2012, p. 25).  Whether more businessmen, lawyers, and doctors are 
advancing through the graduate school pipeline is either unknown or unreported.  What is 
manifest, is the high employability of former corps members.  Less than 1% of former corps 
members report being unemployed  (Donaldson, 2012, p. 25).  Moreover, leavers report earning 
higher salaries than they earned as teachers.  Approximately 50% of leavers report “My current 
job's salary is better than in teaching” (Irizarry & Donaldson, 2012, p. 170).  That percentage is 
extraordinarily high given the roughly 36% of leavers who are enrolled in graduate school and 
therefore unlikely to have any salary at all, let alone a salary higher than when they were 
teachers.  In short, work by Donaldson and colleagues demonstrates the high earning potential 
of corps members and the high rates at which corps members enroll in graduate school—but 
because the data are censored after 4 to 6 years, it reveals less about the future occupations of 
corps members who leave teaching.   
The work by Donaldson and colleagues is hugely informative, but it does have some 
limitations.  The authors include several important predictors of turnover writ large including 
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“gender…race…college major…[and] proximity of hometown to school placement” (Donaldson, 
2012, p. 14).  But other important predictors are left out of the models, presumably because the 
authors lack access to necessary data.  Despite the high predictive power of school-level 
variables like percentage of students who are minority, percentage of students living in poverty, 
and percentage of students who are low-achieving, the models fail to include any school-level 
covariates. 
Instead, fixed-effects are used to control for differences between schools, with corps 
members compared to other corps members working at the same school.  Using fixed-effects in 
this way makes practical sense but dodges the important substantive questions of whether 
school-level race, income, and achievement are associated with corps member turnover.  
Further, when Donaldson employs fixed-effects, coefficients shrink compared to when she uses 
random-effects.  For example: 
the effect of a challenging assignment is generally smaller, although still significant, 
when school fixed effects are included. . . . [T]he presence of a challenging assignment 
may not, in and of itself, affect turnover. Instead, a challenging assignment may be a 
proxy for poor working conditions.  (Donaldson & Johnson, 2010, p. 307)   
 
In other words, fixed-effects indicate a high level of between-school variance but hide any 
school-level characteristics that might explain the variance.   
Another possible concern is the way that models diverge slightly across papers.  In the 
paper focusing on Hispanic corps members, dummy variables are included to indicate 6 racial 
groups, but in the paper focusing on older corps members, only 3 racial groups are included.  
Further, the two models in the paper on older corps members use distinct sets of racial groups 
(Donaldson, 2012, pp. 18, 21; Irizarry & Donaldson, 2012, pp. 175–178).  Initial school retention 
is modeled with indicators for black and Hispanic teachers, but retention in the profession 
includes indicators on black and Asian, not Hispanic.  This may be explained by the authors’ use 
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of post-hoc methods like GLH to identify superior models—the authors begin with only time as 
predictors and then add covariates—but it would be reassuring to see a single, unified model 
across papers (Donaldson & Johnson, 2010, p. 307).   
In review, the prior literature on Teach For America turnover shows corps members 
have above-average retention going into the second year, but below average retention 
thereafter.  At the start of the third year, about 61% of corps members remain teachers, but a 
smaller percentage, perhaps as small as 36%, remain teachers in their initial district (Donaldson 
& Johnson, 2011, p. 49; Strategic Data Project, 2012, p. 7).  Donaldson and colleagues find that 
females, blacks, Hispanics, and older entrants to TFA all have lower odds of attrition (Donaldson, 
2012; Irizarry & Donaldson, 2012).  Further, initial intentions and difficulty of teaching 
assignment also predict turnover (Donaldson & Johnson, 2010, 2011).  However, some likely 
predictors, such as salary and school demographics, are absent from the work by Donaldson and 
colleagues.  More research is warranted. 
Conclusion and Future Study 
In conclusion, I offer a short review of my argument and describe opportunities for 
future research.   
We might care about turnover writ large because turnover rates seem high, implying 
that teaching is an undesirable or undercompensated profession.  At both the teacher and 
school level turnover lowers student achievement, and turnover is expensive, costing an 
unknown amount somewhere in the billions to tens of billions.   
We might also care about turnover among Teach For America teachers.  Research 
suggests that TFA corps members are more effective than other teachers, and especially more 
effective than other novice teachers—but corps members are also more likely to leave their 
68 
 
schools and the profession.  Thus, hiring corps members can mitigate harmful losses to student 
achievement at schools where turnover is already high, but also exacerbate losses to student 
achievement when corps members leave.  Critics of TFA worry that corps members use the 
program to catapult their careers, but TFA contends that the program brings talent into the 
teaching pipeline and provides a springboard for educational leadership and entrepreneurship.  
Further, TFA is making efforts to increase corps member retention in placement schools and the 
profession.  Currently, TFA spends about 250 million dollars per year, an amount some see as 
exorbitant and others see as justified.  But 250 million dollars is not the cost of TFA turnover.  
That number is far more difficult to ascertain.  In fact, some would suggest that TFA’s 250 million 
dollar budget is one effort to shrink the costs of high turnover and low achievement already 
endemic to high poverty schools.   
Prior research on teacher turnover has shown that annual school-level turnover is fairly 
consistent, between 12% and 17% annually, and turnover among novices is always somewhat 
higher.  Predicted turnover is higher among whites, women, novices, and near-retirees, and also 
higher at schools serving high minority, high poverty, and low achieving students.  On the other 
hand, predicted turnover is lower when teachers receive robust induction programming, receive 
higher wages, and work under preferred working conditions. 
Teach For America teachers show high rates of retention going into their second year, 
but relatively low rates of retention thereafter.  Several characteristics, including gender, race, 
and age at entry, lower a corps member’s risk of turnover.  Similarly, a corps member is less 
likely to turn over if she shows commitment to teaching prior to joining TFA and if her first 
teaching assignment is relatively straightforward. 
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Despite all that is known, more research is required.  Most studies of Teach For America 
turnover focus on district-level attrition, not attrition from the profession.  In the age of diverse 
providers and portfolio management (Bulkley, 2010), it makes sense to look at corps members 
who begin their careers at charter schools or migrate to charter schools.  Yet, prior research has 
largely ignored these corps members.   
The work by Donaldson and colleagues stands out, illuminating several predictors of 
corps member turnover.  However, empirical research demands replication, not the assurances 
of a single researcher or research group.  The work by Donaldson and colleagues relies on data 
that are almost a decade old and has methodological limitations that should be addressed.  
Future research should investigate whether school-level demographics predict corps member 
turnover.  Also, future research should explore whether corps members placed in charter 
schools or district schools have higher turnover.  Although corps members make a two-year 
commitment, Donaldson and colleagues make no effort to see whether the same characteristics 
that predict turnover in the first two years also predict turnover thereafter.  It could be that 
characteristics like grit and integrity predict retention in the first two years while other 
characteristics like long-term intentions predict retention in subsequent years.   
Very little work explores the occupations of corps members who leave teaching.  Teach 
For America provides vague numbers about the percentage of alumni engaged in the education 
sector.  Donaldson provides far more detailed numbers, but they are based on too short of a 
timeline.   
The education policy world wants to know more about the retention, mobility, and 
future careers of Teach For America corps members.  Providing answers can help inform 
stakeholders:  school districts, as they consider whether to partner with TFA and how many 
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corps members to hire; philanthropists, as they contemplate funding TFA; and TFA itself, as it 
continues to develop its strategy around retention and alumni engagement.  In the past, TFA has 
attempted to improve teacher quality through predictive modeling (Teach For America, 2010, p. 
29).  Future research can help TFA clarify whether increasing retention is a strategic priority, and 
if so, what aspects of selection, placement, or programing might be altered.     
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CHAPTER 3:  SAMPLE, DATA, AND METHODS OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of the sample, data, and methods that underpin this 
dissertation.  Three subsequent chapters each explore a single research question in depth and, 
when necessary, provide additional methodological details about model specification and the 
like.  However, this chapter contains the grittiest details about how myriad datasets were 
gathered, cleaned, and merged into the final analytical dataset. 
Sample 
Across the US, Teach For America manages 50 placement sites, which are also called 
“regions.”  Most regions serve a single city or greater metropolitan area, but some regions, like 
Connecticut, serve multiple cities, and other regions, like Eastern North Carolina, serve rural 
communities.  This paper focuses on TFA’s single largest region, New York City, where 
approximately 13% of all corps members have been placed.  
In particular, this paper examines the career trajectories of corps members who 
participated in Teach For America’s NYC region in the decade from 2004-2005 to 2013-2014.  
Importantly, the population includes all corps members who taught a single day of school in 
September but excludes corps members who exited the program before the school year started.  
Thus, if a corps member exited TFA during the summer institute or never secured employment 
after the institute ended, that corps member is excluded from the population.  She is excluded 
because although she is temporarily a TFA corps member, she is never a TFA teacher, and 
teacher turnover occurs only among teachers, not aspiring teachers.  Other turnover studies, 
including the TFA studies conducted by Donaldson use the same criterion, justifiably ignoring 
the many education majors, student-teachers, and job seekers who never secure a teaching job 
(personal communication, September 24, 2014). 
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From 2004-2005 to 2013-2014, just over 4,100 corps members taught at least one day 
of school in NYC.  Approximately 0.1% of these teachers needed to be dropped from the 
analytical population, either because of missing data or conflicting data, so the final analytical 
population includes 4,104 teachers.  Of these teachers, 72% were initially placed at district 
schools operated by the NYCDOE, 27% were initially placed in charter schools, and 1% were 
initially placed at early childhood educational centers.   
Over a ten year period, the NYC corps grew steadily, then contracted with the recession, 
then began to grow again.  The four largest cohorts, which started in the years 2005, 2006, 
2007, and 2008, had 500 or more new corps members, while the smallest cohort, which started 
in 2010, had 218 new corps members.  
Figure 4.  Number of New TFA Teachers in NYC, Corps Years 2004-2013 
 
Like other first-year teachers, the typical corps member is young, female, and white.  
According to the 2007-08 and 2011-12 Schools and Staffing Surveys, approximately 49 to 52% of 
all first-year teachers are younger than twenty-six, 74% are female, and 21 to 22% are people of 
color (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010, 2013).   
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Corps members are substantially younger, similarly female, and more likely to be people 
of color.  Figure 5 provides selected demographic and academic characteristics of corps 
members, highlighting missing data issues.  The figure shows that 94% of corps members are 
younger than twenty-six when they start their first school year and 6% are older than twenty-
five.  With regard to gender, 73% of corps members identify as female, 27% identify as male, 
and several corps members either do not identify as male or female or choose not to report a 
gender.  With regard to race, 63% of corps members identify as white, 35% identify as people of 
color, and 2% choose not to report.  Specifically, 9.1% of corps members identify as black, 7.7% 
identify as Hispanic, 8.7% identify as Asian, 0.3% identify as Native American, 6.2% identify as 
multi-racial, and 2.8% identify as people of color without providing more specific information.  
Of the corps members who started in 2006 or later, 28% received Pell grants, but no financial 
aid data are available for the first two cohorts in the sample.   
Corps members have impressive academic credentials.  Their median undergraduate 
GPA is 3.6, and 99% of corps members have GPAs of at least a 3.0.  Fifty percent of corps 
members graduate from colleges that Barron’s (2009) considers the “most competitive” to get 
into, 25% graduate from “highly competitive” schools, 15% graduate from “very competitive” 
schools, and another 8% graduate from “competitive” schools.  Only 1% of corps members 
graduate from “less competitive” or “non-competitive” schools.  Few corps members major in 
education during their undergraduate years, just 6%.    
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Figure 5.  Selected Demographic and Academic Characteristics of Corps Members 
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Data 
The final analytical dataset includes 23,385 rows, with each row representing one year 
of employment for a single corps member.  (I refer to rows interchangeably as “observations,” 
“records,” or “person-years.”)  Corps members who started Teach For America in 2004 have ten 
rows of data, from 2004 through 2013, but corps members who started in 2013 have just one 
row.  Each row includes three employment variables.  These three variables, employment, event, 
and profession, are the key variables of interest in chapters 4, 5, and 6 respectively.  The 
employment variable categorizes corps members into eight basic categories:  (1) teacher at 
placement school; (2) teacher in NYC but not at placement school; (3) teacher outside of NYC; 
(4) working in education but not a teacher; (5) full-time graduate student; (6) working outside of 
the education sector; (7) unemployed; and (8) unknown.  The event variable has three basic 
values: (0) still teaching at the start of the following year; (1) no longer teaching at the start of 
the following year; and missing (if unknown).  Finally, the profession variable provides additional 
detail about a person’s occupation, categorizing her into one of 29 occupational categories.  For 
example, the profession variable indicates whether a person is a doctor, lawyer, businessperson, 
etc.  Each row of data also includes person-level and school-level predictors like a person’s 
undergraduate GPA and the aggregate test scores of the school where she teaches, and each 
row includes several administrative variables like schoolid, schoolname, and jobtitle which are 
useful for generating the other variables but can then be disregarded.   
Figure 6 shows a few rows of data to serve as an example of how data are organized. 
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Figure 6.  How Dataset is Structured:  Example of Six Person-Year Rows 
personid schoolyear year employment event profession predictors… 
947 2010-2011 1 Teacher – Placement  0 Teacher  
947 2011-2012 2 Teacher – Placement  0 Teacher  
947 2012-2013 3 Teacher – NYC 1 Teacher  
947 2013-2014 4 Ed. Sector, Non-Teacher missing AP or dean  
2,456 2012-2013 1 Teacher – Placement  missing Teacher  
2,456 2013-2014 2 Unknown  Unknown  
 
All analyses conducted in this dissertation rely on the same dataset.  Some analyses 
require fewer variables than others, and some analyses require a slight reorganization of the 
data, but essentially, all analyses draw from the same analytical dataset.  The variables found in 
that dataset are described in Table 2, and further described in the paragraphs preceding each 
analysis.  Table 2 segments variables into the following types.  The dependent variables 
employment, event, and profession keep track of corps members’ occupations in any given year.  
The time-varying predictors take on unique values each year as corps members switch schools 
and teaching assignments.  The time-invariant variables remain the same from year to year, 
storing information about a corps member’s demographic characteristics and academic 
background.  Finally, the administrative variables help generate and manipulate the other 
variables in the dataset.  For example, the schoolid variable is helpful for determining whether 
corps members remain at the same school from one year to the next. 
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Table 2.  Description of Variables in Dataset 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables 
Employment nominal variable identifying occupation at start of year as one of the 
following: 
(1) teacher at placement school; 
(2) teacher in NYC but not at placement school; 
(3) teacher outside of NYC; 
(4) working in education but not a teacher; 
(5) full-time graduate student; 
(6) working outside of the education sector; 
(7) unemployed; 
(8) unknown 
Event binary variable identifying employment at start of following school 
year: (1) left teaching; (0) continued teaching; (missing) censored 
Profession nominal variable identifying alumna’s employment in a given year as 
one of the following: 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Teacher 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Possible 
teacher 
 Ed sector: PK-12: AP or dean 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Principal 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Instructional 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Operational 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Unknown 
 Ed sector: University 
 Ed sector: Other 
 Ed sector: Unknown 
 Other sector: Business: Banking 
 Other sector: Business: 
Consulting 
 Other sector: Business: HR 
 Other sector: Business: 
Marketing 
 Other sector: Business: Other 
 Other sector: Entertainment 
 Other sector: Health: Doctor 
 Other sector: Health: Other 
 Other sector: Law: Lawyer 
 Other sector: Media 
 Other sector: Miscellaneous 
 Other sector: Non-profit 
 Other sector: Policy 
 Other sector: Religion 
 Other sector: Social services 
 Other sector: STEM 
 Graduate school 
 Unemployed 
 Unknown 
 
Time-varying predictors 
Year ordinal year variable: (1) the year a corps member starts TFA; (2) the 
next year; (3) in the year after that; and so on… 
Selem indicator of whether elementary school: (1) elementary school; (0) 
nota 
Smid indicator of whether middle level: (1) middle school; (0) nota 
Shigh indicator of whether high : (1) high school; (0) nota 
Scharter indicator of whether charter school: (1) charter; (0) not 
Senroll number of students enrolled in school 
Sfarl percentage of school's students who receive free or reduced-priced 
lunch 
Stest average school achievement percentile on the NY state assessment 
Tsubmult indicator of whether teacher of multiple subjects: (1) yes; (0) no 
Tsubsped indicator of whether teacher of special education: (1) yes; (0) no 
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Time-invariant predictors 
Pmale gender: (1) male; (0) female 
Pageo25 indicator of whether 26 or older on first day of first school year: (1) 
yes; (0) no 
Ppell indicator of whether received a federal Pell Grants: (1) yes; (0) no 
Pracew indicator of whether white/Caucasian: (1) yes; (0) no 
Praceb indicator of whether black/African American: (1) yes; (0) no 
praceh indicator of whether Hispanic: (1) yes; (0) no 
Pracea indicator of whether Asian: (1) yes; (0) no 
Praceoth indicator of whether other person of color: (1) yes; (0) no 
Pbarrons six-level measure of undergraduate university’s admissions selectivity 
reverse-coded from Barron’s (2009): (6) most competitive; (5) 
highly competitive; (4) very competitive; (3) competitive; (2) less 
competitive; (1) non-competitiveb 
PGPA GPA 
Pearnpot lifetime earning potential by undergraduate major, measured in 
$millionc 
Pmajeduc indicator of whether education major: (1) yes; (0) no 
Administrative variables 
Personid identification number unique to each corps member 
Schoolid identification number unique to each school 
Schoolname a school’s name and address 
Jobtitle a corps member’s self-described job title 
Jobrole a corps member’s self-categorization of job role or occupation 
Employer the name of corps member’s employer 
Samesch indicator of whether a teacher still works at the same school where 
she worked the prior year: (1) yes; (2) no 
Maybetch indicator for educators with ambiguous titles who may actually be 
teachers: (1) possible teacher; (2) not 
Alumna indicator of whether corps member became alumna of TFA: (1) yes; 
(2) no  
Responded indicator of whether corps member responded to the alumni survey in 
a given year 
a
Usually, the three measures of school level (Selem, Smid, & Shigh) refer to school l levels included in the NYSED or 
USDOE data, but when school level is unknown, teachers are assigned a “school level” based on grades they teach.  
b
Percentile generated by first determining the percentage of a school’s students who scored advanced or proficient 
on the state exam in math or ELA, second determining a school’s percentile rank in that grade-subject across all 
schools in NY State, and third, averaging together the school’s percentile rankings across all grade-subject pairs. 
c
Lifetime earning potential estimates taken from Hershbein and Kearney (2014).  Double-majors assigned earning 
potential of higher-earning major.
 
 
Data sources 
To create the final dataset, I took several steps.  First, I gathered datasets from 
institutional partners.  Second, I cleaned each dataset individually.  Third, I applied strict 
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decision rules to retain the highest quality data when combining datasets.  Fourth, I cleaned the 
combined dataset, taking advantage of information gained from merges.  These steps required 
considerable time, effort, and care but rewarded me with a dataset superior to prior datasets.  
Indeed, this dissertation employs no methodological innovation.  Its chief advantage stems from 
superior data. 
The generosity of institutional partners made this work possible.  In particular, Teach For 
America, the New York State Education Department, the New York City Department of 
Education, and several charter management organizations contributed personnel data. 
The New York State Education Department (NYSED) supplied annual records of teachers 
working in New York State.  These records, meant to be comprehensive, were quite good—but 
they had two relevant holes.  Because the NYSED surveyed schools from October to January, a 
teacher could go missing if she started employment in September but quickly left her job.  
Teachers also went missing if their school failed to complete the survey in a given year.  
According to NYSED staff, schools completed the survey almost all the time, but charter schools 
responded slightly less often than district schools and were not required to report on 
administrative staff (M. McCarville, personal communication, June 20, 2014; J. Shaffer, personal 
communication, November 10, 2014).    
The school district of New York City, officially called the New York City Department of 
Education (NYCDOE), also supplied data.  Its data were generated from the payroll system, 
making errors unlikely.  Also, teachers appeared in the data even if employed for just a few days. 
Ideally, all the charter management organizations in New York City would have supplied 
similar data.  This proved infeasible.  There were too many CMOs in NYC to approach them all.  
Some CMOs lacked the data.  Other CMOs were reticent to share the data.  In the end, I secured 
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data from six CMOs, including four of the eight largest CMO employers of corps members and 
alumni.   
Teach For America also supplied employment records.  TFA supplied a comprehensive 
“placement” dataset that recorded where corps members worked during their first two years.  
TFA also supplied eight years of data from its alumni survey.  These data are incredibly useful 
but far less comprehensive.  TFA administers the annual survey to program alumni, but not 
program non-completers.  Moreover, the response rate to the annual survey varies from 44 to 
75%.  Fortunately, the surveys are repetitive, so information captured in later years can often be 
applied to earlier years, increasing the effective response rate to 65%.  In other words, the 
alumni surveys allowed me to recover 65% of annual employment records from corps members’ 
post-commitment years.   
In addition to employment records, Teach For America also provided records it collected 
during its admissions and matriculation process.  These records included data on corps 
members’ demographic characteristics, prior academic achievements, and teaching preferences.   
Because school characteristics also matter, the NYCDOE provided a multi-year crosswalk 
of city, state, and federal school ids.  I used this crosswalk to attach annual school-level 
predictors to the dataset, predictors I gathered from publically available data on the websites of 
the U.S. Department of Education, the NYSED, and the NYCDOE (U.S. Department of Education, 
2015; New York State Education Department, 2015; New York City Department of Education, 
2015).  Table 3 provides a brief overview of all datasets used to create the final analytical 
dataset.   
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Table 3.  Description of Datasets Used to Build Final Analytical Dataset 
Variable Description 
Personnel datasets 
NYSED dataset provided by the NY State Education Department, rich in 
covariates and theoretically including all corps members working 
as teachers in NY State, but in reality missing some corps 
members, especially corps members who leave teaching in the 
first few months of a school year 
NYCDOE dataset provided by NY City Department of Education including 
employment information on all corps members working at NYC 
district schools 
CMOs datasets provided by several charter management organizations 
operating in NYC detailing when corps members worked at 
particular schools 
TFA Placement dataset detailing the school and teaching assignments of corps 
members during their two-year commitment 
TFA Alumni datasets from TFA’s annual alumni survey, theoretically detailing 
employment of all TFA alumni in the years following their two year 
commitment, but prone, like all surveys, to missing data; values 
missing in one alumni survey can often be filled in using values 
from later alumni surveys which ask the same questions  
School-level datasets 
Crosswalk dataset provided by the NYCDOE including city, state, and federal 
school ids 
City publically available data on school-level achievement and student 
demographics at NY City schools 
State publically available data on school-level achievement and student 
demographics at NY State schools 
Federal publically available data on school-level achievement and student 
demographics at US schools 
 
Cleaning and combining data 
Of course, all these datasets required cleaning.  I restricted each dataset to the 
analytical population, pruned extraneous variables, and recoded existing variables to make 
combining datasets possible.  For most datasets, this process was rather vanilla, but the alumni 
dataset proved the exception.  For one thing, there were actually eight alumni datasets, one for 
each year from 2006 to 2013.  These datasets varied slightly from year to year because the 
questions in the alumni survey varied from year to year—but crucially, all the surveys asked 
alumni about their current employment, and most surveys asked alumni to supply or revise past 
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employment records.  I cleaned each alumni file separately but according to a single strict 
procedure.   
When extracting employment records from the alumni data, I always took the most 
conservative approach possible.  Alumni surveys were conducted online, so Teach For America 
recorded partial answers from alumni who failed to complete the survey.  I ignored these 
partial-responders, sacrificing about 1% of data but avoiding potentially unreliable records.  
Similarly, the online format allowed TFA to pre-populate individual surveys with past 
employment records.  On the 2013 survey, for example, alumni saw their last-known job pop up 
on the screen for editing.  I ignored all data pre-populated by TFA, worried about assumptions 
TFA had used to create those data.  For alumni who failed to complete the prior year’s survey, 
such data could be two, five, or even eight years old. 
Therefore, I only retained employment records if an alumna explicitly interacted with 
that record:  if she confirmed that a pre-populated record was correct, if she revised a pre-
populated record, or if she added a new record.  I was similarly conservative with start and end 
dates.  Alumni surveys improved with time, but especially in the early years, an employment 
record could include a start date, an end date, both, or neither.  When a new record indicated 
neither date, I generated a single row of data for the survey year.  When a past record included 
both dates, I generated rows for all relevant school years.  When a new record indicated a start 
date, I generated rows from the start date through the survey year.  Finally, when a past record 
included just one date, start or end, I generated a single row of data for the indicated school 
year.   
At that point, I began to categorize the jobs held by alumni as indicated in by their 
responses to the alumni survey.  For all employed corps members, I coded “working outside the 
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education sector” as the default category and then systematically re-coded alumni belonging to 
other categories.  First, I combined full-time volunteers, stay-at-home parents, and unemployed 
people into one “unemployed” category.  (Note the difference from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics construct.)  Second, I made a category for full-time graduate students and included all 
alumni who called themselves “JD candidate,” “Teaching Assistant,” or some other title held 
exclusively by graduate students.  Third, I coded all educators as such.  I included alumni who 
identified themselves as working in the education sector as well as alumni whose title, role, or 
employer made this clear.  The latter category included all people working at schools or at 
organizations obviously related to education (e.g. The College Board, The New Teacher Project, 
etc.).  Fourth, I identified all teachers.  Most teachers identified themselves as such, but some 
teachers provided a title or role without the word “teacher” in it.  Therefore, I searched through 
the records and coded alumni as teachers when they provided titles like “Foreign Language 
Instructor at P.S. 57.”  Fifth, I used geographical variables to identify teachers working in New 
York City.  Sixth, I identified alumni still teaching at their placement school.  Some years of the 
survey included a question specifically about this.  Other years, I relied on corps year and start 
date to figure this out.     
Importantly, all this coding adhered to the same conservative approach.  I assumed 
alumni worked outside of education and only assigned them to the education sector with 
compelling reason.  Similarly, I assumed all teachers worked outside of NYC and only coded 
them as NYC teachers or placement teachers if data compelled it.   
After cleaning the eight alumni files, I appended them together to make one giant file.  
Sometimes, if an alumna completed multiple alumni surveys, the combined file included 
multiple records for a given person-year.  Most of the time, these records matched from year to 
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year, but when they did not, I tried to retain the best record.  First, I dropped rows indicating 
unemployment or full-time graduate work if another alumni record in the same year indicated 
traditional employment.  I did this because a person who is unemployed in September or 
October can find a job soon after and then record that job on a later alumni survey.  As for 
graduate students, some alumni took full graduate course-loads while simultaneously working 
more than 20 hours per week.  I coded these alumni according to their paid employment, 
leaving them as graduate students only if they indicated no other job.  
Second, I reviewed employment matches, those times when records from multiple 
alumni surveys indicated the same category of employment for a given person-year.  In these 
cases, I retained the record from the earliest alumni survey.  I did this to minimize recall error, 
which can increase with time.  
Third, I compared conflicting records.  I determined that most conflicts stemmed from 
either missing data or title inflation.  When the problem was missing data, I kept the record with 
the most complete data.  This clarified that some teachers “outside NYC” were really teachers in 
NYC, and some teachers “in NYC” were really placement teachers.  Similarly, title inflation 
caused some alumni teachers to be miscategorized as educators rather than teachers.  This 
occurred for two reasons.  If an alumna provided an ambiguous title like “SPED Coordinator” or 
“Literacy Specialist” my conservative methodology demanded categorizing her as a non-teacher.  
Title inflation was also an artifact of the survey itself.  When alumni switched roles within an 
organization, they typically updated their title rather than generating a whole new record.  
Without a new record, the new title got linked to an inappropriate start date.  An alumna who 
taught for three years before becoming a dean this past year might appear to have been a dean 
for the past four years.  In situations like this, I retained the person-year record from the earliest 
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available alumni survey, thereby capturing both the early teacher years and the later transition 
to dean.  This resolved all remaining conflicts in the alumni file, leaving me with a cleaned 
dataset of only one row per person-year.       
Next, I combined datasets.  Again, I relied on strict decision rules to maximize data 
quality.  I started with the highest quality datasets and used lower quality datasets to fill in 
missing information.  First, I combined the NYSED (state) dataset with the NYCDOE (city) 
dataset.  I ignored the 0.2% of rows that conflicted, keeping the state data in those cases.  When 
rows matched, I used city data to update missing values, and when city data identified 
additional person-years, I retained those person-years.  Second, I merged on placement 
information.  In 96% of cases, the new master file, made by combining state and city data, 
already included rows captured by the placement file from Teach For America.  In these cases, I 
simply deleted the placement rows from Teach For America, knowing that the master records 
came from a better source, either the NYSED or the NYCDOE.  However, I retained the 4% of 
placement rows from Teach For America that provided new information.  These rows indicated 
first and second year teachers working in charter schools who somehow avoided the state 
survey.  Third, I merged on a file of teachers generated from the alumni survey, and fourth, I 
merged on a file of teachers generated from the CMO data.  In both cases, I retained data from 
the master file, not the new file, whenever a conflict arose.  In other words, I used the alumni 
and CMO data only to append new rows.  Finally, I merged on additional rows from the alumni 
survey, these rows containing non-teachers.  Again, I deferred to the master file in all conflicts 
because a teacher could end up with a “non-teacher” row in the alumni file for any number of 
reasons:  she provided an ambiguous or inflated title; she held a second job or attended 
graduate school part-time; she started the year as a teacher but then switched jobs; etc.   
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The result of all this merging was a single, giant employment dataset, a dataset with 
some rows missing but no rows conflicting.  To prepare the dataset for analysis, I scrubbed 
several variables one last time. 
I focused on school ids first.  Some records included a state id, while other records 
included only a city id or school name.  I used the crosswalk provided by the NYCDOE to attach 
the state school id, beds_cd to every NYC teacher.  I then used a teacher’s beds_cd to adjust her 
employment status, categorizing her as teaching outside of NYC, inside NYC, or at her placement 
school.  I made switching beds_cd the operational definition for switching schools.  No other 
definition made as much sense, but even this definition had its issues.  The past decade saw 
major structural changes at the NYCDOE, changes that included school-closings and school-
restructurings.  Frequently, large schools were closed, and multiple small schools were opened 
in the same space.  This made it possible for a teacher to “switch schools” over the summer 
without switching classrooms.  In short, some of the “teacher turnover” suggested by the data is 
actually school turnover.   
Perhaps more importantly, a small number of observations in the final dataset probably 
include the wrong beds_cd.  In most cases, I could pull a school id directly from the NYSED or 
NYCDOE file.  However, when observations came exclusively from the placement, alumni, or 
CMO files, generating a beds_cd was more difficult.  The placement file, though good, 
sometimes misidentified the schools where corps members worked.  The CMO and alumni files 
usually lacked numeric school ids.  In these cases, I was forced to rely on school names, which 
were sometimes ambiguous.  In short, at least a few beds_cds in the final dataset are probably 
wrong, so corps members will appear to leave their initial schools slightly faster than they 
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actually do.  However, these errors will not affect estimates of how fast corps members leave 
teaching in NYC or teaching in general. 
I next turned my attention to non-teachers, both educators and non-educators.  I used 
title, role, and employer values to determine whether educators worked for a K-12 district, a 
university, or some other educational institution.  Then, I subcategorized K-12 educators.  I 
made one category for educators whose ambiguous title suggested they might in fact be 
teachers.  I made separate categories for principals, assistant principals and deans, other 
instructional personnel, and personnel focused on operations.  Unfortunately, some titles were 
nebulous.  Did a “data coordinator” support school operations by managing state compliance, or 
did she drive school-wide instruction by helping teachers make sense of data?  Did a “literacy 
director” work for a district supervising principals, or did she work for a school, reporting to a 
principal?  What did an “implementation manager” do?  It was not always clear.  Given these 
ambiguities, I believe I plausibly categorized educators, but I also know that other researchers, 
given the same data, would have reached slightly divergent, also plausible conclusions.   
Categorizing non-educators was somewhat easier, but here too, I was forced to make 
judgement calls.  Over the years, Teach For America asked alumni to choose from dozens of 
employment fields and even allowed alumni to write in field names of their own choosing.  I 
collapsed these fields into larger buckets, focusing especially on law, medicine, and business, the 
categories most mentioned by TFA’s critics.  When alumni failed to indicate a field, I leveraged 
the values they provided for title, role, and employer.  Again, a second researcher would have 
generated slightly different categories and reached slightly different conclusions.  Art can be 
commercial.  Entertainment can be big business.  Non-profits can provide social services.  
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Despite these ambiguities, I believe I created a measure that helps answers a question obviously 
important to stakeholders:  what do corps members do if they stop teaching? 
At this point, the dataset was nearly complete.  I took three final actions.  First, I added 
blank employment rows whenever necessary.  Corps members from 2004 required ten years of 
data.  Corps members from 2013 required just one.  Whenever the dataset lacked an 
observation for a particular person-year, I added it, generating a blank row with employment 
coded to unknown.  Second, I used files provided by Teach For America to add time-invariant, 
person-level information to each observation in the dataset.  This information included a 
person’s demographic characteristics and her academic background.  Third, I added time-
varying, school-level information.  This information, gathered from the U.S. Department of 
Education, the NYSED, and the NYCDOE, included annual school test scores and other possible 
predictors of turnover.  The dataset was now “complete,” or at least more complete than any 
prior dataset on TFA turnover.  Still, some missingness persisted.   
Missing data 
This missingness, which was non-random, requires explanation.  The dataset includes 
4,104 corps members, but because of censoring, successive years have smaller and smaller 
sample sizes.  With each passing year, one cohort is censored from the dataset.  Thus, the 1st 
year sample includes all corps members, but the 10th year sample includes only the 310 corps 
members who started Teach For America ten years earlier, in 2004.  This shrinkage is expected 
and unproblematic. 
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Figure 7.  Number of Expected Person-Year Observations  
 
 
Other shrinkage is more problematic.  The dataset includes employment information for 
81% of all person-years.  Over time, however, the percentage of person-years lacking 
employment information increases steadily.  In the 1st year sample, all 4,104 corps members are 
accounted for; none are missing.  In the 2nd year sample, 10% of corps members lack 
employment information.  By the 5th and 10th years respectively, 25 and 44% of corps members 
lack employment information.   
Figure 8.  Percentage of Observations Where Employment is Unknown, by Year 
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Because the sample shrinks each year, the percentage of corps members lacking 
employment information can increase, even in years when the number of corps members 
lacking employment information decreases.   
Figure 9.  Number of Person-Years Where Employment is Known Versus Unknown 
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follow, I ignore missing observations and non-teaching observations, and focus only on teacher 
observations. 
The final teaching dataset includes far more teachers than any of its component 
datasets.  However, some teachers still go missing, especially if they work outside of New York 
State.  Because Teach For America provided placement data, all first year teachers appear in the 
dataset, as do all corps members who continued teaching for a second year.  With truly minimal 
exceptions, all teachers working for the NYCDOE also appear in the dataset, this thanks to the 
NYCDOE’s excellent payroll data.  Most teachers at NYC charter schools also appear in the data, 
showing up in the placement data their first two years and the NYSED data most years after 
that.  Unfortunately, some charter school teachers can go missing from the NYSED data if they 
quit at the start of the school year or if their school fails to report employment data to the state 
in a particular year.  Teachers working outside New York State are less likely to appear in the 
final dataset.  These teachers appear only if they respond to an alumni survey.  With a 65% 
response rate, the alumni survey probably captures most teachers outside New York State, but 
certainly misses quite a few.  Further, because the alumni survey suffers from instances of title 
inflation, people who only appear in the alumni data can be coded as educators when they are 
actually teachers.  Given prior patterns of missingness, this is most likely among teachers 
outside NYC, but can also apply to charter school teachers in NYC.  Finally, no teacher who quits 
TFA will appear in the dataset after year two.  It is possible that some corps members leave TFA 
only to return to teaching at some later point, but these teachers never receive alumni surveys.   
Table 4 demonstrates the contribution of each component dataset and the value of 
combining them.  Some employment records are unique, coming from just one dataset.  Other 
records are shared, coming from multiple datasets. 
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Table 4.  Number of Unique and Shared Person-Year Observations by Data Source 
Data source Unique Shared Total 
Total 1,911 11,059 12,970 
-State  344 10,078 10,422 
-District  61 8,255 8,316 
-Charter  22 862 884 
-TFA Placement 326 7,052 7,378 
-TFA Alumni 1,158 4,831 5,989 
 
Each cell of Table 4 tells a story about missingness.  The table shows 344 teachers who 
appear only in the state data, 94% of them working at charter schools and 6% of them working 
at district schools outside NYC.  Sixty-one teachers appear only in the district data, 
demonstrating the fallibility of the state data.  These teachers stopped teaching early in the 
year, started teaching late in the year, or worked at a school that failed to report data to the 
state.  Alternatively, these teachers disappeared from the state data because either TFA or the 
state had an incorrect social security number on file.  Twenty-two teachers appear only in the 
charter data, suggesting that a census survey of CMOs in NYC would have uncovered a few more 
teachers, but not too many.  Three hundred and twenty-six teachers appear in the placement 
data but not the state data.  These are mostly charter school teachers who either left early in 
the year or worked at a school that failed to report to the state, but 13% of them are teachers 
working at early childhood centers that the state did not survey.  Finally, 1,158 teachers appear 
only in the alumni dataset.  Among them, 5% teach at NYC private schools, 7% teach at NYC 
charter schools, and 85% teach outside NYC.   
In sum, Table 4 shows that each dataset adds information above and beyond the others.  
The state dataset is excellent but misses 13% of NYC teachers.  The district dataset is nearly 
infallible but only for district teachers.  The alumni dataset shows that hundreds of corps 
members transition to teaching jobs outside NYC, but how many hundreds is unclear due to 
missingness. 
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So far, I have focused on missingness on the dependent variable, namely whether a 
corps member is still employed as a teacher.  For obvious reasons, missingness on predictor 
variables is also important.  Some predictor variables appear in multiple datasets, so when 
values are missing in one dataset they can be filled in using other datasets.  Other predictors 
appear in just one dataset.  The state dataset, in particular, contains predictors found nowhere 
else.  For example, only the state dataset indicates whether a corps member teaches multiple 
subjects, a factor that Donaldson and Johnson (2010, pp. 311, 317) find predict shorter 
retention.  Problematically, corps members who exit teaching the fastest are least likely to 
appear in the state dataset.  Figure 10 demonstrates this.  Among corps members who stop 
teaching in year 1, only 53% have first-year state predictors.  Among corps members who stop 
teaching in later years, 83% have first-year state predictors. 
Figure 10.  Percentage of Corps Members with First-Year Predictor Variables from the NYSED 
Dataset 
 
Note:   Figure excludes corps members still teaching in 2013-2014 
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schools.  For comparisons, readers will need to look to the Schools and Staffing Survey and other 
resources that can provide rough counterfactuals like the teacher turnover rate across all high-
poverty urban schools.  However, prior research suggests that even within NYC, there might be 
systematic differences between the high-poverty schools where corps members are placed and 
other high-poverty schools, with novice teachers in “TFA” schools more likely to turn over (Boyd 
et al., 2005, p. 39).   
A second weakness of this dataset is its inability to distinguish between “voluntary” and 
“involuntary” turnover.  Evidence suggests that almost all Teach For America turnover is 
voluntary.  The difficulty of firing a teacher at the NYCDOE is well documented (Brill, 2009; 
Richman, 2008), and according to Donaldson (2012, p. 23), only 5.1% of teachers list a “school 
staffing action (e.g. layoff or involuntary transfer)” as a “very or extremely important” factor 
causing them to leave teaching.  Still, charter schools can fire teachers more easily, and district 
schools can move teachers from school to school.  In a personal communication provided before 
the start of this project, one NYC corps member described leaving TFA after teaching one year:  
he was one of several novice teachers being excessed from his placement school.  In his case, 
leaving the school was involuntary, but leaving the district was voluntary.  At the NYCDOE, 
involuntary mechanisms like “last in, first out” and school restructuring can force teachers to 
transfer to another school—but other mechanisms, like general transfer and charter school 
leave, encourage teachers to voluntarily transfer to a school or role they prefer (Department of 
Education of New York City & United Federation of Teachers, 2007, pp. 104, 139).  In short, 
corps member turnover is often described as a problem built into the DNA of TFA and the types 
of choices its corps members are likely to make, but mobility mechanisms are also embedded in 
the teacher’s contract, a document forged between the district and the teacher’s union.  This 
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suggests that either experienced teachers, district administrators, or both think that some level 
of teacher mobility is necessary or beneficial.  Unfortunately, the dataset at hand provides no 
information about mobility mechanisms.  It only describes where teachers are employed in a 
given year, not how they got there. 
A third weakness of the dataset is that it lacks variables of self-attribution.  Because the 
dataset is constructed from administrative data, it lacks the kind of personal questions that 
often appear in original surveys.  According to Donaldson, some corps members attribute their 
exit from teaching to personal issues, including 3% of leavers identifying “pregnancy/child 
rearing,” 10% identifying “other family reasons,” and 6% identifying “health” as a “very or 
extremely important” reason they left teaching (2012, p. 23).  Further, compared to non-TFA 
teachers, TFA corps members may be less satisfied with some aspects of the teaching 
profession.  Compared to other teachers of the same students, Clark et al. (2015b, p. 43) find 
that TFA corps members are significantly less satisfied with various aspects of the teaching 
profession including “opportunities for professional advancement,” “salary,” “professional 
prestige,” and “intellectual challenge.”  These figures are based on a non-random sample of 59 
TFA corps members and 76 comparison teachers, so broad generalizability is questionable, but 
the pattern is striking.  In short, although surveys can suffer from self-attribution bias, the data 
they produce can also be incredibly revealing.  The present dataset lacks information about why 
corps members say they leave their schools and the profession. 
Strengths of dataset 
Despite these weaknesses, the dataset has enormous strengths.  In several dimensions, 
the dataset is superior even to the dataset generated by Donaldson’s survey.  First, the current 
data are nearly up to date, containing information through the 2013-2014 school year.   
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Second, despite problematic patterns of missingness, the dataset’s relative 
completeness is probably its greatest strength.  Compared to prior datasets used to study the 
careers of Teach For America corps members, this dataset better identifies what corps members 
are doing in any given year.  The dataset includes employment information for 100% of all corps 
members and 81% of all person-years.  By comparison, the response rate to Donaldson and 
colleagues is 62% (Donaldson & Johnson, 2010, p. 304). 
Third, while Donaldson possesses up to seven years of data, I possess up to ten years.  
Possessing more years of data is obviously helpful, especially given common concerns that for 
“advantaged college graduates…TFA serves as something useful to do on their way to their ‘real 
jobs’ in law, medicine, and business” (Darling-Hammond, 1994, p. 4).  A degree in law requires 
three years of study.  A degree in medicine requires four.  Few of the corps members in 
Donaldson’s sample have enough time to complete their two-year commitment and also 
become a doctor.  Similarly, the likelihood of becoming a school leader in one’s first seven years 
is smaller than the likelihood in one’s first ten years.  And so it goes with all careers:  for 
longitudinal questions, a longer timeline is always better.   
Fourth, the present dataset includes a wealth of covariates.  Donaldson and colleagues 
are the only prior researchers to attempt predictive modeling of corps member turnover.  Yet, 
they lacked school-level information.  The present dataset includes important school-level 
variables like aggregate demographic characteristics, aggregate achievement on state tests, and 
whether a school is managed by the NYCDOE or a CMO.  The dataset also includes important 
teacher-level variables like undergraduate GPA and university selectivity.   
In brief 
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Prior research on Teach For America turnover has usually relied on data from a single 
source, either a state or large district.  In contrast, this research combines data from several 
sources, including New York State, New York City, Teach For America, and several charter 
management organizations (CMOs).  By combining datasets I attempt to minimize the missing 
data problems of prior research, problems that may have caused researchers to underestimate 
retention of TFA teachers or conflate TFA retention in one particular district with retention in 
the teaching profession as a whole.  The resulting dataset, rich in covariates and improved by 
triangulating multiple sources, represents the greatest strength of this project and the greatest 
advantage over prior research.   
Despite the relative completeness of this dataset, it still suffers from missing data.  
Analyses will need to take this into account.  Each chapter addresses missingness in a slightly 
different way.  Chapter 4 uses multiple models to present a range of plausible estimates.  
Chapter 5 uses full-information maximum likelihood.  Chapter 6 uses weighted-sample 
adjustments and raking.  Through these analytical strategies, I attempt to make good use of a 
great dataset.   
Methods 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 use survival analysis to ask and answer questions about the 
employment of Teach For America corps members and alumni.  Survival analysis encompasses a 
wide range of analytical strategies that describe and predict “survival,” which is the length of 
time a subject persists before experiencing some event.  In epidemiology, that event might be 
death, but in the current analysis the event is attrition from teaching.  The survival methods 
employed in chapters 4, 5, and 6 are detailed in the methods sections of those specific chapters, 
but here I provide a brief overview.   
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Chapter 4 asks how long corps members remain (1) educators, (2) teachers, (3) teachers 
in NYC, and (4) teachers at their original school.  To answer these questions, I use the Kaplan-
Meier survivor method (Kaplan & Meier, 1958).  The Kaplan-Meier method leverages joint 
probabilities to estimate survival in the presence of censoring.  Censoring occurs whenever it is 
unknown whether a person is still teaching at a particular time.  This occurs whenever a person 
falls out of the data through some administrative failure, and it occurs whenever a person is still 
teaching during the last interval when data are collected (since it is unknown when she will stop 
teaching).  Needless to say, datasets free of censoring are extremely rare.  The genius of the 
Kaplan-Meier function is that when a dataset is somehow free of censoring, the Kaplan-Meier 
function is identical to the survival function produced through simple tabulations of the number 
of people who survive to any given time point.  But, in the presence of censoring, the Kaplan-
Meier method provides an elegant solution.  Cumulative survival probability, which in this case 
is cumulative retention in teaching, is estimated through multiplication.  Cumulative survival to 
time point ti is found by multiplying across survival probabilities during all prior intervals.  The 
details of this method are further explained at the start of chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 asks what factors are associated with higher and lower retention.  To answer 
this question, I use logistic regression.  Logistic regression is ideal because the outcome of 
interest is binary:  namely, in any given year, did a corps member leave teaching or not.  Various 
predictor variables can be included in the model, including time-invariant predictor variables, 
like a corps member’s gender and race, and time-varying predictor variables, like annual test 
scores at a corps member’s school.  Because data are organized in person-years, time can also 
be included as a predictor to check whether, all else being equal, attrition is higher or lower in 
certain years.  Because of the missing data issues already discussed, I estimate the logistic 
99 
 
regressions using full-information maximum likelihood estimation, or FIML (Allison, 2010, pp. 
650–651).  As detailed in chapter 5, FIML uses correlations between variables to generate the 
most likely values of parameters of interest.  In this case, the parameters of interest are the 
coefficients for variables that predict higher rates of attrition. 
Chapter 6 asks how Teach For America alumni are employed as time goes on.  Ideally, 
this question could be answered using summary tabulations, but again, the presence of missing 
data requires slightly more complicated methods.  Because response rates to TFA’s alumni 
survey are less than 100%, I use basic survey methods to adjust estimates and provide 
confidence intervals.  Specifically, because some alumni are more likely to respond to the survey 
than others, I use weighted-adjustments to address non-response bias.  To answer the question 
of how alumni are employed, I present tables showing the percentage of corps members 
employed as teachers, lawyers, businesspeople, etc. in a given year. 
In short, across chapters I vary my analytical strategy to suit the specific question.  In 
each chapter, I choose the strategy that provides the most plausible answers given issues of 
missingness and censoring.  Through these strategies, I attempt to paint the clearest picture to 
date of how Teach For America corps members are employed over time. 
  
100 
 
CHAPTER 4:  RETENTION RATES 
Given the costs associated with teacher turnover and the contention by critics that 
Teach For America turnover is too high, it makes sense to ask a simple question:  What are 
turnover rates among TFA corps members?  Specifically, how long do teachers stay at a given 
school, and how long do they stay in the profession?   
As previously discussed, prior literature reports that corps members return for a second 
year around 90% of the time but return for a third year much less often.  The most alarming 
studies, which are based on district data from Los Angeles, New York City, and Houston, assert 
that just 36 to 44% of corps members remain district teachers at the start of their third year.  In 
stark contrast, a national survey of former corps members finds that 61% start a third year of 
teaching, though not necessarily in their initial district (Boyd et al., 2010, p. 40, 2005, p. 39; 
Donaldson & Johnson, 2011, p. 49; Houston Independent School District Department of 
Research and Accountability, 2011, p. 3; Mac Iver & Vaughn, 2007, pp. 40–41; Strategic Data 
Project, 2012, p. 7). 
In the current chapter, I use the data already discussed at length to provide new 
retention estimates.  The data tell a story that I hope stakeholders will find compelling.  
Moreover, I hope Teach For America’s critics and supporters alike will feel compelled to ground 
their dialectic in the estimates provided, rather than in vague claims about whether or not 
turnover is “too high.” 
Data 
For the current analysis, only a few variables are required.  Data are organized in the 
long form, with a single observation per person-year.  Each observation includes values for five 
initial variables: (1) a person identification number, personid; (2) an ordinal year variable, year; 
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(3) an indicator for whether a teacher is still working in the same school as the prior year, 
samesch; (4) an indicator for educators with ambiguous title who may actually be teachers, 
maybetch; and (5) a categorical employment variable, employment, coded for whether a corps 
member is a teacher at their placement school, a teacher in New York City, a teacher in New 
York State, a teacher somewhere outside New York State, a person working in the education 
sector who is not a teacher, a person employed outside the education sector, or a person of 
unknown employment. 
Methods 
To understand teacher turnover, researchers use the tools of survival analysis.  These 
are the same tools that biostatisticians and engineers use to determine how long people and 
machinery are likely to “survive” and what factors predict longer or shorter survival.  In the next 
chapter, I use discrete-time survival analysis to identify factors associated with a higher or lower 
risk of turnover.  That chapter controls for various predictors.  This chapter does not.  Here the 
goal is simply to describe the percentage of corps members still teaching after x years and 
estimate each year’s attrition rate.  If data were complete, and if all corps members stopped 
teaching within the study timeframe, no estimation would be required at all.  Analysis would be 
purely descriptive.   
However, because some observations are missing, corps member retention needs to be 
estimated rather than described.  To estimate retention, I use the Kaplan-Meier method (Kaplan 
& Meier, 1958).  At the start of each school year, corps members “survive” if they return to 
teaching, “fail” if they leave teaching, and are “censored” if their occupation is unknown.   
The way the Kaplan-Meier function works is fairly intuitive.  It models survival using joint 
probabilities.  At each time point, the model first removes censored people from the risk set.  It 
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then estimates a survival rate for each time interval by dividing the number of survivors at the 
end of the interval by the number of (uncensored) people in the risk set.  To estimate 
cumulative survival, the model multiplies together survival rates from all prior time intervals.  In 
our context, this product is “retention” or “cumulative retention” and its reciprocal is “attrition” 
or “cumulative attrition.”  The annual “attrition rate” is simply the probability of failure in a 
given year, equivalent to one minus the year’s retention rate. 
In equation form, the Kaplan-Meier survival function can be written as  
?̂?(𝑡) = ∏ (1 −
𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
)𝑗|𝑡𝑗≤𝑡   
where ?̂?(𝑡) is the probability of survival to time 𝑡𝑗, 𝑑𝑗 is the number of failures at time 𝑡𝑗, and 𝑛𝑗 
is the risk set at time 𝑡𝑗.  At each time, 𝑡𝑗, censored individuals are removed from the risk set 
before calculating the survival probability so that “fudging is kept conceptual, systematic, and 
automatic” (Kaplan & Meier, 1958, p. 461).  At any given time, 𝑡𝑗,  the attrition rate, which is 
usually called the “hazard rate,” is  
𝐻(𝑡𝑗) =
𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
 . 
For this paper, time is measured in years, and years stretch from the first day of school 
to the last day of summer.  For example, first year attrition includes teachers who exit during the 
first school year as well as teachers who exit during the following summer.  The term 
“cumulative retention” refers to the percentage of corps members estimated to start a given 
school year.  At the start of year 1, cumulative retention is 100%, but it drops with each passing 
year. 
To generate the estimates reported in this chapter, I reorganized the dataset from its 
long form (with one observation per person-year) to an abbreviated form (with one observation 
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per individual).  Each observation includes a duration variable measuring years until first event 
and an event variable, coded 0 if a person survives to a point of censoring or coded 1 if a person 
experiences an event of interest, an event like leaving her school, NYC, teaching, or the 
education sector.  For two analyses, these procedures were slightly modified.  First, for model 8 I 
organized the dataset so that individuals who taught, then went missing from the data, then 
taught again have two observations rather than one.  The missing years are ignored, the first 
teaching stint is coded 0 for event, and the second teaching stint is coded 0 or 1 depending on 
whether the individual leaves teaching at the end of the stint.  Second, for estimates of annual 
school-level turnover, I coded three types of event.  Stayers are coded 0 and remain in the 
following year’s risk set.  Leavers are coded 1 and exit the risk set.  Movers are coded 2, but 
though their “failure” rate is calculated, they remain in the risk set the following year, since they 
remain teachers. 
Results 
Figure 11 shows the general shape of corps member retention, a shape familiar from 
prior literature.  At the start of year 1, 100% of corps members are teachers.  In subsequent 
years, this percentage drops.  At the start of year 2, roughly 90% of corps members are teachers 
and at the start of year three, roughly 56% of corps members are still teachers.  In Figure 11, the 
darkest segment, closest to the bottom of the graph, represents corps members still teaching at 
their placement schools, the second-to-bottom segment represents corps members still 
teaching in NYC, and the third-to-bottom segment represents corps members teaching outside 
NYC.  Together, these segments show the total portion of corps members still employed as 
teachers at any given time.  The top segment of the graph represents corps members who have 
left teaching but remain employed in the education sector.  Finally, the white space at the top of 
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the graph represents corps members who have left the education sector entirely.  Figure 11, like 
all other figures and tables in this chapter, focuses on continuous retention.  Corps members 
who leave teaching are no longer considered, even if they return to teaching.  (In chapter 6, 
these returners are further discussed.) 
Figure 11.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members, Minimum Estimates, an Overview 
 
 
In Figure 11 the steep slopes between years 2 and 3 indicate that attrition is highest 
during year 2, which is to say, after the start of year 2 but before the start of year 3.  Most of 
this attrition occurs over the summer, but owing to limitations in the data, attrition and 
retention are discussed at the year level, not at smaller time intervals. 
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Table 5 provides annual figures.  For example, model 6 shows that approximately 90% of 
corps members are still teachers at the start of their second year, more than 56% of corps 
members continue teaching for a third year, and at least 41% of corps members continue 
teaching for a fourth.  These estimates, like all other estimates reported in Table 5, are 
minimum estimates, subject only to sampling error.  They are minimum estimates because they 
treat all censoring as attrition.  Per explanations provided in chapter 3, corps members are only 
categorized as working in the education sector if known to be working in the education sector.  
The same goes for all other categorizations.  For the estimates provided in Table 5, the only time 
censoring is treated as censoring rather than as attrition, is when a corps member is still 
teaching in 2013-2014, the last year of available data. 
Table 5.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members, Minimum Estimates, an Overview 
 Cumulative retention 
 Model 1: 
Still teaching 
at placement school 
Model 2: 
Still teaching 
in NYC 
Model 6: 
Still teaching 
somewhere 
Model 13: 
Still working 
in education 
Year 1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Year 2 82.0% 89.9% 89.9% 89.9% 
Year 3 32.5% 50.8% 56.3% 65.7% 
Year 4 16.9% 34.5% 41.0% 53.2% 
Year 5 9.4% 25.3% 31.5% 45.1% 
Year 6 6.1% 18.8% 24.4% 38.2% 
Year 7 4.3% 14.3% 19.0% 34.2% 
Year 8 2.8% 11.5% 15.2% 30.0% 
Year 9 2.2% 9.1% 11.4% 25.9% 
Year 10 1.1% 7.7% 8.2% 22.1% 
Note: Appendix A includes full output for all Kaplan-Meier functions presented in this chapter  
 
Table 5 shows that at least 82.0% of corps members are still teaching at their placement 
school at the start of year two, and at least 89.9% are still teaching in NYC.  At the start year 
three, at least 32.5% of corps members are still teaching at their placement school, at least 
50.8% of corps members are still teaching in NYC, at least 56.3% of corps members are still 
teaching somewhere, and at least 65.7% of corps members are still working in the education 
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sector (broadly defined).  Each year, these percentages fall.  By the start of year six, at least 6.1% 
of corps members remain teachers at their placement school, at least 18.8% of corps members 
remain teachers in NYC, at least 24.4% of corps members remain teachers, and at least 38.2% of 
corps members remain employed in the education sector.  Obviously, the percentage of corps 
members still working in education is always higher than the percentage still teaching, still 
teaching in NYC, or still teaching at placement school. 
Compared to most prior research, these estimates are high, perhaps suggesting that 
corps members in NYC are more likely than other corps members to remain teachers.  Yet, the 
estimates for retention in teaching are similar to the survey estimates reported by Donaldson 
and Johnson (2011, p. 49).  Indeed, the data strongly suggest that corps members remain 
teachers at rates far higher than any one district’s data can show, and though TFA’s retention is 
likely lower than critics desire, it is also likely higher than critics suspect.  Moreover, because the 
estimates in Table 5 treat nearly all censoring as attrition, they likely underestimate corps 
member retention in teaching.  For this reason, some of the other tables in this chapter relax the 
assumption that all censoring is attrition.   
Still teaching at placement school 
Table 6, which replicates model 1 in Table 5, estimates how long corps members remain 
at their placement school.  These estimates are certainly deflated, first because of missing 
employment data and second because of erroneous school ids.  Still, the estimates follow the 
expected pattern and provide an empirical floor.  In other words, retention is at least as high as 
estimated, but possibly somewhat higher.  At least 82.0% of teachers remain at their placement 
schools for a second year, at least 32.5% remain for a third, 16.9% for a fourth, and 9.4% for a 
fifth.     
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Table 6.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers at 
Placement School, Minimum Estimates 
 Cumulative retention (95% CI) 
 Model 1:  Still teaching at placement school 
Year 1 100.0%  
Year 2 82.0% (80.7-83.2%) 
Year 3 32.5% (30.9-34.1%) 
Year 4 16.9% (15.5-18.2%) 
Year 5 9.4% (8.4-10.5%) 
Year 6 6.1% (5.3-7.1%) 
Year 7 4.3% (3.5-5.2%) 
Year 8 2.8% (2.1-3.7%) 
Year 9 2.2% (1.5-3.1%) 
Year 10 1.1% (0.2-3.7%) 
 
As shown in Figure 12, attrition from placement school peaks in year two.  That year, 
60.4% of corps members still teaching at their placement school either switch schools or stop 
teaching.  In year three, 48.1% of corps members still teaching at their placement school either 
switch schools or stop teaching.   
Figure 12.  Annual Attrition of TFA Corps Members from Teaching at Placement School 
 
 
Still teaching in New York City 
Retention in NYC also follows the same pattern.  Figure 13 shows the annual attrition is 
highest in year two, when it reaches 43.4%.  It is lowest in year one, when it is 10.1%, and it is 
somewhere in between in years three through nine. 
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Figure 13.  Annual Attrition of TFA Corps Members from Teaching in NYC 
 
 
Because attrition is lowest in year one and highest in year two, 89.9% of corps members 
teach a second year but 50.8% teach a third.  These figures are shown in Table 7, which also 
shows that fourth year retention is 34.5% and fifth year retention is 25.3%.  Again, these 
numbers represent a floor, but this time, a more realistic one.  (Identifying whether teachers still 
work in NYC is much easier than identifying whether they still work at a particular school.)  
Interestingly, in the first three years, these figures are nearly identical those found in Boyd et al. 
(2005, p. 39), which also examines NYC corps members.  However, for years four and five, these 
figures are 8 to 10 percentage points higher than those found in Boyd et al.  This is largely 
because Boyd et al. look exclusively at district teachers, whereas the current data include 
charter school teachers.  As will be demonstrated in chapter 5, many corps members placed at 
district schools later transfer to positions at NYC charter schools.  
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Table 7.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers in 
NYC Schools, Minimum Estimates 
 Cumulative retention (95% CI) 
 Model 2:  Still teaching in NYC 
Year 1 100.0%  
Year 2 89.9% (88.8-90.8%) 
Year 3 50.8% (49.1-52.5%) 
Year 4 34.5% (32.8-36.1%) 
Year 5 25.3% (23.7-26.9%) 
Year 6 18.8% (17.4-20.3%) 
Year 7 14.3% (12.9-15.8%) 
Year 8 11.5% (10.1-13.0%) 
Year 9 9.1% (7.7-10.8%) 
Year 10 7.7% (5.9-9.8%) 
 
Still teaching in New York State 
Retention rates in New York State are higher than retention rates in New York City, 
though by magnitudes hardly worth mentioning.  Nevertheless, an examination of retention in 
the state reveals the superiority of using the comprehensive dataset, rather than just one of its 
components.   
Table 8 includes three models.  Model 3 shows the results of an analysis using only 
district data.  In this hypothetical, the NYCDOE generates a payroll file based on social security 
numbers provided by Teach For America.  The analytical sample consists of corps members who 
show up in the payroll data during their first year of teaching, which means it excludes all corps 
members placed at charter schools.  Corps members are assumed to fail when they leave the 
district.  Model 4 shows the results of an analysis using only state data.  In this hypothetical, all 
corps members identified by TFA are assumed to teach at the start of year one.  Subsequently, 
corps members are assumed to fail the first year they are absent from the state file.  Finally, 
model 5 leverages all available data, generating better, higher estimates.   
In other words, model 5 shows estimates based on my data, whereas models 3 and 4 
show estimates based on more limited data.  According to model 3, which uses only district 
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data, 40.6% of NYC corps members remain teachers in NY State at the start of year three.  
(Corps members who start their careers at charter schools are not considered, and corps 
members who move to charter schools or other cities in NY State are lost.)  In contrast, model 4, 
which uses state data and considers corps members who start at both district and charter 
schools, suggests that 48.3% of NYC corps members remain teachers in NY State at the start of 
year three.  Finally, model 5, which combines data from the district, the state, several CMOs, 
and TFA’s alumni survey suggests that 51.0% of NYC corps members remain teachers in NY State 
at the start of year three.   
In short, model 5, based on my combined dataset, recovers teachers lost to prior 
researchers.  Model 5 shows that prior researchers simply lacked the tools to track corps 
member retention in NY State, let alone in the teaching profession.  Importantly, model 5 
adheres to the same conservative methodology of all prior estimates.  Despite being higher than 
prior estimates, model 5 represents a floor.  Policymakers in Albany may be interested to know 
that sixth year retention of NYC corps members in NY State is at least 19.3%, but the main 
purpose of Table 8 is to establish the superiority of my dataset compared to prior datasets. 
Table 8.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers in NY State Schools, 
Dependent on Data Availability 
 Cumulative retention (95% CI) 
 
Model 3: 
Only district data 
Model 4: 
Only state data 
Model 5: 
All data 
Year 1 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  
Year 2 89.6% (88.4-90.7%) 84.2% (82.9-85.3%) 89.9% (88.9-90.8%) 
Year 3 40.6% (38.7-42.5%) 48.3% (46.6-50.0%) 51.0% (49.3-52.7%) 
Year 4 24.1% (22.4-25.8%) 33.0% (31.4-34.7%) 34.9% (33.2-36.5%) 
Year 5 17.3% (15.8-18.8%) 24.8% (23.3-26.4%) 25.7% (24.1-27.3%) 
Year 6 12.9% (11.5-14.2%) 18.8% (17.4-20.3%) 19.3% (17.8-20.8%) 
Year 7 10.1% (8.8-11.4%) 14.8% (13.4-16.3%) 14.8% (13.3-16.2%) 
Year 8 8.0% (6.8-9.4%) 11.0% (9.6-12.4%) 11.9% (10.5-13.5%) 
Year 9 7.0% (5.7-8.4%) 9.7% (8.3-11.2%) 9.4% (7.9-11.1%) 
Year 10 5.7% (4.2-7.6%) 7.1% (5.3-9.4%) 7.9% (6.1-10.1%) 
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Still Teaching Somewhere 
Table 9 shows seven models of corps member retention in the teaching profession.  
Each model makes slightly different assumptions in the face of ambiguous data.  Model 6, the 
floor, assumes failure whenever data are ambiguous, whereas model 12, the ceiling, assumes 
teaching whenever data are ambiguous.  The other models represent middle grounds, with each 
consecutive model relaxing one assumption.  Model 7 assumes that educators with ambiguous 
titles are teachers.  Model 8, explained earlier, ignores gap years when corps members first 
teach, second go missing from the data, and third return to teaching.  Model 9 assumes that 
corps members are teaching during these “unknown” gap years.  Model 10 tries to guess, as 
plausibly as possible, which unknown years are actually teaching years.1  Model 11 treats corps 
members as censored if their first post-teaching profession is unknown.  
Together, these models provide a range of estimates, some more plausible than others.  
Models 11 and 12 are least plausible because when teachers go missing from the data, they 
have almost certainly stopped teaching at the NYCDOE and in the vast majority of instances also 
stopped teaching in New York State.  Some corps members have continued to teach elsewhere 
without filling in their alumni survey, but most have probably moved on to other things.   
                                                          
1
 Approximately 26.5% of alumni teacher-years in NYC fail to appear in the alumni dataset.  This suggests 
that the composite dataset is missing around 26.5% of the alumni teacher-years that occur outside New 
York State (since no state or city data are available for triangulation).  Therefore, in model 10 I tried to add 
an additional 377 teacher-years back onto the file in the most plausible way possible.  First, I filled in the 
105 gap years, those times when a teacher goes missing for a year or two, then returns to the file as a 
teacher.  Second, I identified all cases when a corps member’s profession is unknown in the first year after 
her last-known teaching year.  I randomly changed 272 of these “unknowns” to “teacher.”  I then ran the 
model.  I completed this simulation 100 times and averaged results. 
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Table 9.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers, Plausible Estimates 
 Cumulative retention (95% CI) 
 Model 6: Model 7: Model 8: Model 9: Model 10: Model 11: Model 12: 
 (floor)  (ceiling) 
If title 
ambiguous 
Failure assumed Teaching assumed Teaching assumed Teaching assumed Teaching assumed Teaching assumed Teaching assumed 
If gap in 
teaching 
Failure assumed Failure assumed Nothing assumed
a
 Teaching assumed Teaching assumed Teaching assumed Teaching assumed 
If gap before 
failure 
Failure assumed Failure assumed Failure assumed Failure assumed Imputed Nothing assumed
1
 Teaching assumed 
Year 1 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  
Year 2 89.9% (88.9-90.9%) 89.9% (88.9-90.9%) 89.9% (88.9-90.9%) 89.9% (88.9-90.9%) 89.9% (88.9-90.9%) 89.9% (88.9-90.9%) 89.9% (88.9-90.9%) 
Year 3 56.3% (54.5-57.9%) 56.7% (54.9-58.3%) 56.7% (54.9-58.3%) 57.5% (55.7-59.1%) 61.4% (59.7-63.0%) 63.7% (62.0-65.4%) 66.3% (64.7-67.9%) 
Year 4 41.0% (39.3-42.8%) 41.5% (39.8-43.3%) 41.5% (39.8-43.3%) 43.2% (41.5-44.9%) 45.2% (43.5-47.0%) 51.5% (49.6-53.3%) 53.4% (51.7-55.2%) 
Year 5 31.5% (29.9-33.2%) 32.1% (30.5-33.8%) 32.3% (30.6-34.0%) 34.3% (32.6-36.0%) 35.8% (34.1-37.5%) 43.5% (41.5-45.4%) 45.5% (43.7-47.3%) 
Year 6 24.4% (22.8-26.0%) 25.0% (23.3-26.6%) 25.3% (23.7-27.0%) 27.1% (25.4-28.8%) 28.7% (27.0-30.4%) 37.4% (35.4-39.4%) 39.6% (37.8-41.4%) 
Year 7 19.0% (17.5-20.6%) 19.6% (18.1-21.3%) 20.2% (18.6-21.8%) 21.6% (20.0-23.3%) 23.1% (21.4-24.8%) 32.0% (29.9-34.0%) 34.5% (32.6-36.4%) 
Year 8 15.2% (13.6-16.8%) 15.8% (14.2-17.5%) 16.6% (15.0-18.2%) 17.5% (15.9-19.2%) 19.1% (17.4-20.9%) 28.6% (26.4-30.8%) 31.3% (29.4-33.3%) 
Year 9 11.4% (9.8-13.2%) 11.9% (10.3-13.7%) 12.9% (11.3-14.7%) 13.3% (11.6-15.1%) 14.9% (13.1-16.8%) 24.0% (21.4-26.6%) 28.0% (25.9-30.2%) 
Year 10 8.2% (6.1-10.8%) 8.8% (6.7-11.4%) 10.1% (7.9-12.5%) 9.8% (7.6-12.3%) 11.4% (9.1-14.1%) 21.4% (17.9-25.1%) 25.6% (23.0-28.4%) 
a
Corps members treated as censored during relevant years. 
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Models 7 to 10 are more plausible because they make more realistic assumptions about 
who is teaching and who has left teaching.  Together, they show that second year retention is 
89.9%, third year retention is 56.7 to 61.4%, fourth year retention is 41.5 to 45.2%, and fifth 
year retention is 32.1 to 35.8%.  Model 10, which provides the highest estimates of the plausible 
models, is nearly identical to the model reported in Donaldson and Johnson (2011, p. 49).  The 
exception is year two, when Donaldson and Johnson estimate retention is 95%, about 5% higher 
than the estimate from model 10.   
Figure 14 stylizes the same information a bit more intuitively, showing the percentage of 
corps members who teach for one year, two years, three years, and so on.  The modal corps 
member teaches two years in a row, but the median corps member teaches three years.  
Moreover, because some corps members stick around for much longer than three years, the 
mean corps member actually teaches four years in a row.2 
Figure 14.  Number of Consecutive Years Corps Members Spend Teaching, Starting with Their 
Initial Year in TFA (Based on Model 10) 
 
                                                          
2
 Again, corps members are considered teachers if they start a school year, even if they do not finish it. 
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As for annual attrition from teaching, it follows the expected shape.  Figure 15 shows 
estimates from model 6, the most conservative model.  Annual attrition from teaching is highest 
in year two, when it is 37.5%.  Attrition is lowest in year one, when it is 10.1% and attrition 
ranges from 20.1 to 28.0% all other years. 
Figure 15.  Annual Attrition of TFA Corps Members from Teaching (Based on Model 6) 
 
 
The conservative model is also helpful for estimating annual school-level turnover.  
Table 10 shows the employment pattern for 100 representative corps members.  All 100 corps 
members begin year one as teachers.  By the start of year two, approximately 8 of them move 
to another school, approximately 10 of them leave teaching, and approximately 82 of them 
remain teachers at the same school.  Similarly, of the 89.9 corps members who start a second 
year of teaching, 20.5 switch schools by the start of year three, 33.7 leave teaching, and 35.7 
remain teachers at the same school.  By summing across years, I estimate that each year 
approximately 61.9% of TFA teachers are “stayers” at the same school, 14.4% are “movers” to a 
new school, and 23.8% are “leavers” from teaching.  Because these estimates are based on the 
most conservative model, and because some corps members are still teaching after nine years, 
these estimates are probably off by 1 or 2 percentage points. 
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Table 10.  Annual School-Level Turnover of 100 Representative TFA Corps Members 
 
Starters 
(as teachers) 
Stayers 
(at school)
 
Movers 
(to another school) 
Leavers 
(from teaching) 
Year 1 100.0 82.0 8.0 10.1 
Year 2 89.9 35.7 20.5 33.7 
Year 3 56.3 32.2 8.7 15.4 
Year 4 40.9 24.7 6.6 9.5 
Year 5 31.3 20.6 3.6 7.2 
Year 6 24.1 15.4 3.4 5.4 
Year 7 18.7 12.4 2.5 3.8 
Year 8 14.9 9.7 1.4 3.8 
Year 9 11.1 7.1 0.9 3.1 
Years 1-9 387.3 239.7 55.7 92.0 
Annual % 100.0 61.9 14.4 23.8 
 
Finally, it probably makes sense to reiterate that all estimates provided in this and 
future chapters are generated by combining data on corps members from 2004-2005 through 
2013-2014.  Retention patterns vary somewhat from cohort to cohort.  In general, it seems that 
corps members from more recent cohorts are staying teachers at higher rates.  This is shown in 
Figure 16.  Each cluster of vertical bars represents an ordinal year, like year one or year two.  
Each bar within a given cluster represents a cohort year, like 2004-2005 or 2005-2006.  The 
trend lines above each cluster demonstrate that retention in teaching is generally higher for 
more recent cohorts. 
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Figure 16.  Cumulative Annual Retention of TFA Corps Members by Cohort 
 
 
Still working in education 
Obviously, some corps members who exit teaching remain in the education sector.  
Table 11 provides minimum estimates.  At least 65.7% of corps members work in education 
their third year, at least 53.2% work in education their fourth, and at least 45.1% work in 
education their fifth.  These estimates, like all other estimates reported in this chapter, exclude 
corps members who exit the education sector and then return. 
Table 11.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Educators, 
Minimum Estimates 
 Cumulative retention (95% CI) 
 Model 13:  Still working in education 
Year 1 100.0%  
Year 2 89.9% (88.9-90.9%) 
Year 3 65.7% (64.1-67.3%) 
Year 4 53.2% (51.5-54.9%) 
Year 5 45.1% (43.3-46.8%) 
Year 6 38.2% (36.4-40.0%) 
Year 7 34.2% (32.3-36.0%) 
Year 8 30.0% (28.1-31.9%) 
Year 9 25.9% (23.8-28.0%) 
Year 10 22.1% (19.4-24.9%) 
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As might be expected, the vast majority of corps members who stop teaching in year 
two also leave the education sector at that time, whereas corps members who exit teaching in 
later years are more likely to transition to other education jobs.  Table 16 shows annual attrition 
rates of corps members from the education sector.  Annual attrition from the education sector 
is highest in year two, when it is 27.0% and lowest in year one when it is 10.1%.   In other years, 
attrition of corps members from the education sector varies from 10.5 to 19.0%. 
Figure 17.  Annual Attrition of TFA Corps Members from Education Sector 
 
 
The professions of non-teachers are discussed in more detail in chapter 6, which 
examines the positions held by educators and non-educators alike.   
Conclusion 
In summary, Teach For America turnover follows the much-discussed pattern.  Attrition 
peaks in the second year and retention is lower than many think ideal.  Yet, the thirteen models 
presented in this chapter draw an important distinction between teacher retention in particular 
schools and teacher retention in the profession. 
Some stakeholders, particularly principals and human resource managers, may be more 
interested in the former, noting the literature on school-level costs and harms associated with 
10.1% 
27.0% 
19.0% 
15.3% 15.3% 
10.5% 12.1% 
13.7% 14.9% 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 118 
 
school-level turnover.  These stakeholders should note how many corps members return to a 
teaching position at the same school year-over-year (around 61.9%) and how many corps 
members remain at their placement school at the start of year three (around 32.5%). 
Other stakeholders may be more interested in how long corps members remain 
teachers.  For critics who worry that Teach For America de-professionalizes teaching and for 
supporters who view Teach For America as a talent pipeline, the figures reported in this chapter 
should be informative.  Most corps members remain teachers for at least three years, and the 
mean corps member teaches for approximately four years.  In short, corps member retention is 
longer than commonly thought or reported.  Findings from most prior research are flawed 
because corps members are highly mobile and therefore fall out of datasets that focus on a 
single state or school district.  In contrast, these results are based on data pooled from multiple 
sources.  These results, coupled with the results reported by Donaldson and Johnson (2011, p. 
49), provide stakeholders with narrow empirical estimates of how long corps members remain 
teachers.  Approximately 89.9% of corps members remain teachers for a second year, 56.7 to 
61.4% for a third, 41.5 to 45.2% for a fourth, and 32.1 to 35.8% for a fifth.   
In short, this chapter answers empirical questions so that stakeholders can better 
answer pragmatic and normative questions.   
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CHAPTER 5:  PREDICTORS OF ATTRITION 
 
For decades, researchers have worked to answer a question obviously important to 
policymakers:  What factors are associated with teacher turnover?  More recently, Donaldson 
and colleagues examined factors associated with the turnover of Teach For America teachers in 
particular.  Unsurprisingly, they found that corps members placed in more difficult teaching 
positions—teaching multiple grades in elementary school, multiple subjects in secondary school, 
or a subject out of their field of expertise—were more likely to leave the profession (Donaldson 
& Johnson, 2010).  Teachers of special education, however, were less likely to leave.  Donaldson 
and colleagues also identified several demographic characteristics related to corps member 
turnover.  Female corps members remained teachers longer than male corps members, black 
and Hispanic corps members remained longer than white corps members, and corps members 
older than 25 remained longer than younger corps members (Donaldson, 2012; Irizarry & 
Donaldson, 2012).  Finally, retention was associated with “initial intentions” (2011).  Corps 
members who deferred graduate school before starting TFA left teaching sooner than average, 
whereas corps members with a minor, major, or coursework in education remained teachers 
longer than average. 
In this chapter I extend the work of Donaldson and colleagues.  I examine factors that 
predict corps members’ exit from the teaching profession.  First, I describe my analytical 
strategy in detail.  Second, I use the Kaplan-Meier method to examine differences across a single 
factor (Kaplan & Meier, 1958).  For example, how does attrition differ among district and charter 
school teachers?  Third, I use logistic regression to simultaneously examine multiple predictors 
of attrition.   
Data 
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The data for this analysis are described in detail in chapter 3.  Data are organized in the 
long form, with a single observation per person-year.  Initially, each observation has an ordinal 
year variable coded “1” for first year, “2” for second year, and so on.  Each observation includes 
an event variable that is coded “0” by default but “1” if a person is no longer a teacher at the 
start of the following school year.  In accordance with the norms of survival analysis, censored 
observations are removed from the data because no additional information is provided when 
event is unknown.  Censored observations include all observations from the 2013-2014 school 
year and all observations when it is ambiguous whether a corps member continues to teach the 
following year or works in another school-based role.  Because the analysis focuses on first exit 
from teaching, observations are dropped after a person’s first exit or first instance of censoring.  
Finally, each observation includes multiple predictor variables, some that are time-varying and 
some that are time-invariant. 
For technical and substantive reasons, two slight changes were made to the analytical 
population.  The five corps members who chose not to report a gender were dropped from the 
analysis because it was unclear whether to treat them as transgender or gender unknown.  Also, 
observations were deleted whenever a teacher started the year at a private school.  These 
teachers account for less than 1% of all person-years and exactly 0% of year one and year two 
person-years.  Treating these teachers as censored is necessary because the data include no 
information on school-level covariates for private schools. 
Methods 
The survival functions presented in this chapter are estimated using a method devised 
by Kaplan & Meier (1958) and discussed at length in the prior chapter.  Absent censoring, 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates are identical to descriptive survival statistics, telling what 
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portion of people “survive” to a certain point in time.  In the presence of censoring, the Kaplan-
Meier method estimates survival through a series of joint probabilities.  Of the people known to 
start the first time period, what percentage are known to survive it?  Likewise, what percentage 
of people who start the second time period survive to its end?  The joint probability of these 
two events, found by multiplying together each event’s discrete probability, represents 
cumulative survival to the end of time period two.  Cumulative survival to all future time points 
is calculated in the same way, by finding the product of survival probabilities across all prior time 
periods.  
In this chapter, Kaplan-Meiers are used to describe survival patterns for a given factor, 
like race, without controlling for any other factors.  This is useful for two reasons.  First, 
descriptions of this sort are useful for their own sake.  It is interesting and useful to know 
whether male or female corps members remain in teaching longer, whether retention is longer 
among corps members from more selective colleges or less selective colleges, etc.  Second, this 
type of univariate analysis lays the groundwork for a multivariate approach.  If males and 
females remain teachers at different rates, then gender should likely be included in a 
multivariate model that adjusts or controls for various other predictors of retention. 
The multivariate models presented in this chapter are estimated through discrete-time 
survival analysis conducted in a logistic regression framework.  Time is “discrete” rather than 
continuous because it is measured in years rather than a more continuous unit like day.  
Substantively, this means that models predict attrition at the start of the next school year (or 
before), but do not distinguish between attrition that occurs over the summer and attrition that 
occurs during the school year. 
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As explained in chapter 3, the data are organized in the long form with one observation 
per person-year.  Each observation includes the dependent variable event, which is coded “0” if 
a corps member remains a teacher at the start of the following school year or a “1” if a corps 
member exits teaching.  Because the event is binary rather than continuous, logistic regression is 
used rather than traditional OLS.  Each observation also includes multiple predictor variables, 
which are described in Table 12 and Table 13.  Predictor variables can vary with time, and time 
itself is also included as a predictor.  Other functions of time, like time-squared, can also be 
included if the effect of time is non-linear in the logit.   
Allison (2010, pp. 650–651) shows how to use Mplus to conduct logistic regression with 
full-information maximum likelihood for missing data.  Full-information maximum likelihood 
estimation, or “FIML,” is useful because most observations in the dataset are missing values on 
at least one predictor variable.  Employing listwise deletion would both bias estimates and 
shrink the sample from 9,994 observations to 4,707.  In contrast, FIML provides a better strategy 
since it uses all observations and produces the most likely estimates given observed values.  
Using FIML, however, does require assuming that data are missing at random, or “MAR” (Rubin, 
1976).  Under the MAR assumption,  missingness on a given variable may be correlated with 
observed values of other variables included in the model, but not with the variable that has 
missing data  Thus, the MAR assumption is untestable but plausible for these data.  (Missingness 
is chiefly a function of whether corps members turn up in a given administrative dataset, and 
whether corps members turn up is highly related to Year and Charter, which are both included 
as predictors.)  To implement logistic regression with FIML for missing data, the basic code in 
Mplus Version 7 is as follows: 
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VARIABLE: 
 NAMES ARE event predictor_vars ;  
 MISSING ARE ALL (-9999) ; 
 CATEGORICAL = event ; 
ANALYSIS: 
ESTIMATOR = ml ;  
INTEGRATION = montecarlo ; 
MODEL: 
 event ON predictor_vars ;  
 predictor_vars ;  
 
The code tells Mplus that missing values are all coded as “-9999,” that event is a binary 
“CATEGORICAL” variable, and that for the “ANALYSIS”, parameters should be estimated using 
full-information maximum likelihood.  The “MODEL” statement regresses event on a list of 
predictor variables under the assumption that the predictor variables fit a multivariate normal 
distribution.  Although some predictor variables are binary, the given specification is robust to 
that particular violation and is common in the literature (Allison, 2010, pp. 651–652).  Following 
recommendations by Hosmer, Lemeshow and Sturdivant (2013, pp. 90–93,107–124), models are 
refined using “purposeful selection.”   
The final model is further validated through comparison to a fixed-effects logit for panel 
data, also known as a “conditional logit.”  To complete this analysis, I drop school-level variables 
and nest person-years within schools.  I then center continuous predictor variables, recoding 
them as deviations from the school-level (group) mean.  Finally, I drop schools from the analysis 
if they lack variation on the dependent variable, either because all observations experience an 
event or none do.  In this way, I avoid omitted variable bias at the school-level by controlling for 
all school characteristics, both observed and unobserved.  Corps members are compared to 
other corps members at the same school (and themselves at the same school during other 
years).  This is accomplished in Mplus through the following code:  
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VARIABLE: 
 NAMES ARE event predictor_vars ;  
 MISSING ARE ALL (-9999) ; 
 CATEGORICAL = event ; 
 CLUSTER = schoolid ; 
WITHIN = predictor_vars ; 
DEFINE: 
 CENTER predictor_vars (GROUPMEAN) ;3 
ANALYSIS: 
ESTIMATOR = ml ;  
INTEGRATION = montecarlo ; 
TYPE = twolevel ; 
MODEL: 
 %WITHIN% 
event ON predictor_vars ;  
  predictor_vars ;  
 %BETWEEN% 
 
The “CLUSTER” command identifies the school-level groups and the “WITHIN” command 
identifies variables measured at the individual level and modeled only on the within level.  The 
“TYPE” command specifies that the model is two-levels.  Finally, the “%WITHIN%” and  
“%BETWEEN%” commands specify a regression of event on individual-level covariates but only a 
random intercept at the school-level. 
As an equation, the one-level, unconditional model can be written as 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛽𝑥𝑖)
 
where i represents observations 1,…,n; yi is either 0 or 1;  represents a vector of coefficients; 
and xi represents a vector of predictor variables.  Similarly, the two-level, conditional model can 
be written be written as  
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑗) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑗)
 
                                                          
3
 Continuous predictor variables are group-mean centered.  Dummy predictors are not.   
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where i now represents a school; j represents individual observations within a school; αi 
represents a school effect;  continues to represent a vector of coefficients; and xij represents a 
vector of predictor variables measured as individual deviations from the school mean (with 
school-level variables dropped from the model).  The two-level model includes slightly fewer 
observations, since observations are dropped if (a) there is only one observation for a particular 
school or (b) all observations for a school are either yij = 0 or yij = 1.   
Variables and Values 
Predictor variables are listed and described in detail in Table 12.  Some predictors are 
binary or categorical and are represented by dummies, while other predictors are continuous.  
Some predictors, like the race and gender of a particular corps member are time-invariant; they 
do not change across a corps member’s observations.  Other predictors, like whether a corps 
member works at a charter school, are time-varying; a person can work at a district school one 
year and at a charter school the next.     
Without exception, the predictor variables in Table 12 (or similar measures of the same 
latent constructs) have been theorized and empirically shown to relate to teacher attrition 
broadly or corps member attrition in particular.  Conceptually, they might be grouped into six 
categories: (1) time, (2) school type, (3) school demographics, (4) teaching assignment, (5) 
teacher demographics, and (6) credentials.  For this analysis, time is measured in years but is 
coded somewhat eccentrically to give direct estimates of possible first and second year effects, 
effects that are obviously important given the elevated attrition of first-teachers in general and 
the explicit two-year commitment made by Teach For America corps members in particular.  
School type can be charter or district, and can be elementary, middle, or high.  School 
demographic variables include the school’s total enrollment, the portion of students who qualify 
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for free or reduced-price lunch, and the portion who pass annual state assessments.  Teaching 
assignment variables include whether a corps member teaches multiple subjects and whether a 
corps member teaches special education.  Teacher demographics include gender, race, age, and 
a corps member’s economic background as measured by whether or not she received Federal 
Pell Grants in college.  Finally, a corps member’s ability and opportunity costs are measured by 
the selectivity of her undergraduate university, her undergraduate GPA, the potential lifetime 
earnings suggested by her undergraduate major, and whether or not she majored in education. 
Summary statistics for each predictor variable are found in Table 13.  
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Table 12.  Description of Variables Used in Survival Analysis 
Variable Description 
Dependent variable  
Event employment at start of following school year: (1) left teaching; (0) 
continued teaching 
Time-varying 
predictors 
 
Year1 indicator: (1) year 1; (0) not 
Year2 indicator: (1) year 2; (0) not 
Time time variable: (0) years 1 through 3; (1) year 4; (2) year 5; (3) year 6; 
(4) year 7; (5) year 8; (6) year 9 
Selem indicator of whether elementary school: (1) elementary school; (0) 
nota 
Smid indicator of whether middle level: (1) middle school; (0) nota 
Shigh indicator of whether high : (1) high school; (0) nota 
Scharter indicator of whether charter school: (1) charter; (0) not 
Senroll number of students enrolled in school 
Sfarl percentage of school's students who receive free or reduced-priced 
lunch 
Stest average school achievement percentile on the NY state assessment 
Tsubmult indicator of whether teacher of multiple subjects: (1) yes; (0) no 
Tsubsped indicator of whether teacher of special education: (1) yes; (0) no 
Time-invariant predictors 
Pmale gender: (1) male; (0) female 
Pageo25 indicator of whether 26 or older on first day of first school year: (1) 
yes; (0) no 
Ppell indicator of whether received a federal Pell Grants: (1) yes; (0) no 
Pracew indicator of whether white/Caucasian: (1) yes; (0) no 
Praceb indicator of whether black/African American: (1) yes; (0) no 
Praceh indicator of whether Hispanic: (1) yes; (0) no 
Pracea indicator of whether Asian: (1) yes; (0) no 
Praceoth indicator of whether other person of color: (1) yes; (0) no 
Pbarrons six-level measure of undergraduate university’s admissions selectivity 
reverse-coded from Barron’s (2009): (6) most competitive; (5) 
highly competitive; (4) very competitive; (3) competitive; (2) less 
competitive; (1) non-competitiveb 
PGPA GPA 
Pearnpot lifetime earning potential by undergraduate major, measured in 
$millionc 
Pmajeduc indicator of whether education major: (1) yes; (0) no 
a
Usually, the three measures of school level (Selem, Smid, & Shigh) refer to school l levels included in the NYSED or 
USDOE data, but when school level is unknown, teachers are assigned a “school level” based on grades they teach.     
b
Percentile generated by first determining the percentage of a school’s students who scored advanced or proficient 
on the state exam in math or ELA, second determining a school’s percentile rank in that grade-subject across all 
schools in NY State, and third, averaging together the school’s percentile rankings across all grade-subject pairs. 
c
Lifetime earning potential estimates taken from Hershbein and Kearney (2014).  Double-majors assigned earning 
potential of higher-earning major.
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Table 13.  Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable                Mean             S.D. % Obs. non-missing 
Time-varying predictors (N=9,994 person-years) 
Year1 0.366 - 100.0% 
Year2 0.261 - 100.0% 
Time 0.481 1.057 100.0% 
Selem 0.579  94.3% 
Smid 0.294 - 94.3% 
Shigh 0.127 - 94.3% 
Scharter 0.281 - 100.0% 
Senroll 578.355 401.985 93.5% 
Sfarl 84.015 12.724 91.6% 
Stest 0.338 0.244 79.0% 
Tsubmult 0.136 - 83.5% 
Tsubsped 0.192 - 83.5% 
Time-invariant predictors (N=3,656 people) 
Pmale 0.275 - 100.0% 
Pageo25 0.052 - 95.2% 
Ppell 0.262 - 74.1% 
Pracew 0.662 - 98.8% 
Praceb 0.084 - 98.8% 
Praceh 0.074 - 98.8% 
Pracea 0.084 - 98.8% 
Praceoth 0.095 - 98.8% 
Pbarrons 5.178 1.021 99.4% 
PGPA 3.571 0.258 99.8% 
Pearnpot 1.135 0.203 95.3% 
Pmajeduc 0.060 - 100.0% 
 
Kaplan-Meier Estimates 
Using the Kaplan-Meier method, I investigate the relationship between corps member 
retention and individual predictor variables.  For each variable, I display a graph that isolates a 
single variable and shows whether retention varies across distinct values of that variable.  By 
definition, retention is 100% at the start of year 1, then decreases at the end of each interval if 
attrition is observed.  Traditionally, Kaplan-Meier curves are graphed as step-functions to 
emphasize their discrete treatment of time.  Each “curve” is graphed to look like a staircase 
descending to the right.  Each step of the staircase represents one time interval.  The “rise” 
(which, because the staircase descends is really a “fall”) represents attrition.  The “run” 
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represents time.  To improve the readability of graphs, I ignore the stepwise convention, instead 
using a single downward-sloping line to connect cummulative retention at one time point to 
cummulative retention at the next time point.  Needless to say, these lines should not be 
interpretted because attrition is measured only at the start of each year, not in between. 
In addition, it bears emphasizing that interpretation is straightforward when variables 
are time-invariant but slightly unintuitive when variables are time-varying.  For a time-invariant 
variable like gender, the Kaplan-Meier estimator tells the percentage of female corps members 
who remain teachers at any given time period.  However, when a variable is time-varying a 
single teacher can switch categories from year to year.  She can work in a school with top 
quartile test scores one year and a school with second quartile test scores the next.  This can 
happen because she switches schools or because test scores fall at the school where she 
teaches.  Despite this technical point, the thrust of Kaplan-Meiers for time-varying and time-
invariant variables is the same.  Both show how retention varies based on group membership.      
Cumulative retention in teaching by school type 
We might expect corps member retention to vary according to school type.  Past 
research has found higher attrition among middle school teachers (Marinell & Coca, 2013, p. 
14).  However, corps members working at different school levels appear to leave the profession 
at similar rates.  This is shown in Figure 18 and Table 14.  The logrank test of equal curves is 
marginally significant, (p=0.98) but substantively retention varies only slightly.  At the start of 
year 6, 37.3% of primary school corps members remain teachers, 35.0% of middle school 
teachers remain teachers, and 34.5% of high school teachers remain teachers.   
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Figure 18.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by School Level 
 
 
Table 14.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by School Level 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Primary 100.0% 91.1% 65.4% 52.3% 43.6% 37.3% 
Middle 100.0% 87.3% 60.2% 47.7% 40.9% 35.0% 
High 100.0% 92.1% 62.2% 50.2% 39.6% 34.5% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
In the past decade, increasing numbers of high-poverty students have attended charter 
schools, and increasing numbers of Teach For America corps members have taught in charter 
schools.  Figure 19 shows retention for teachers working in district schools versus charter 
schools.  To the eye, charter school retention seems higher than district retention, but the 
logrank test of difference is not statistically significant (p=.297).  The difference seems greatest 
in year 3, when retention at charter schools appears to be nearly 10 percentage points higher.  
By year 6 however, the lines have mostly converged.  Retention at charter schools is only 2.7% 
higher. 
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Figure 19.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by School Type 
 
 
Table 15.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by School Type 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
District 100.0% 89.9% 61.5% 49.1% 42.1% 36.9% 
Charter 100.0% 90.3% 71.4% 57.6% 47.5% 39.6% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
The more notable difference between district and charter school teachers is that district 
teachers often migrate to charter schools, but charter school teachers seldom migrate to 
districts.  Figure 20 and Table 16 show annual switch rates.  Approximately 0.5% of teachers 
switch from district to charter or vice versa before the start of year 2.  In subsequent years, a 
slightly higher percentage of charter school teachers switch, peaking at 3.4% in year 3.  In 
contrast, 15.4% of year 2 district teachers switch to charter schools for year 3, and 10.9% of year 
3 district teachers switch to charter schools for year 4.   
The obvious question is why?  Why do corps members transition from district schools to 
charter schools at such high rates?  Are corps members pulled toward charter schools by 
ideology, by working conditions, by compensation, by advancement opportunities?  Or are 
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charter schools simply places where corps members find it easier to get hired?  These are 
important questions worth addressing in future research. 
In addition, this pattern of mobility demonstrates one reason why past estimates of 
corps member retention were too low; when teachers migrate from district to charter schools 
they drop out of municipal datasets.   
Figure 20. Annual Switching Rates from District to Charter and Vice Versa 
 
 
Table 16. Annual Switching Rates from District to Charter and Vice Versa 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
District to charter 0.6% 15.4% 10.9% 7.3% 3.6% 4.3% 
Charter to district 0.4% 1.5% 3.4% 2.8% 1.5% 1.9% 
 
Cumulative retention in teaching by school demographics 
Prior research finds that teacher turnover is related to the student population at a given 
school.  Turnover is especially high at schools that serve large populations of minority students, 
low-income students, and low-achieving students (Borman & Dowling, 2008, pp. 393–395). 
Among Teach For America teachers in particular, turnover seems unrelated to school 
size, with corps members in the highest quartile, interquartile, and lowest quartile of schools 
remaining teachers at approximately the same rates (p=.335). The survival curves in Figure 21 sit 
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nearly atop each other, and Table 17 shows that sixth year retention is in the mid-thirties across 
these three groups. 
Figure 21.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Student Enrollment 
 
 
Table 17.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Student Enrollment 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Lowest 25% 100.0% 91.6% 64.9% 51.2% 41.8% 36.2% 
Middle 50% 100.0% 90.0% 63.2% 51.0% 43.7% 37.0% 
Highest 25% 100.0% 89.3% 62.4% 49.1% 39.4% 34.3% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
Surprisingly, corps member retention is also similar across school poverty levels.  This is 
shown in Figure 22 and Table 18.  Year 6 retention is slightly higher among corps members 
working at the lowest-level poverty schools, but the logrank test is only marginally significant 
(p=0.086) and substantive differences are slight.  One reason retention rates may be so similar 
across school-poverty levels is the consistently high-level of poverty at schools where corps 
members teach.   Even the “lowest quartile” schools are high poverty.  Across all observations, 
the mean percentage of students receiving free or reduced-priced lunch is 84%.    
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Figure 22.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by School Free and Reduced Lunch Population 
 
 
Table 18.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by School Free and Reduced Lunch Population 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Lowest 25% 100.0% 91.6% 68.7% 53.2% 43.4% 39.0% 
Middle 50% 100.0% 90.5% 62.9% 50.8% 42.8% 35.1% 
Highest 25% 100.0% 89.2% 61.1% 49.0% 40.6% 36.3% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
In contrast to school-poverty, school test scores are strongly related to corps member 
retention (p<.001).  Figure 23 and Table 19 show that corps member retention is lowest at 
schools with the lowest test scores and highest at schools with the highest test scores.  Much of 
the difference seems to occur early.  Corps members at schools with the lowest test scores 
return to teach a second year 87.8% of the time whereas corps members at schools with the 
highest test scores return 93.6% of the time.  The gap continues to widen at the start of year 3, 
the first year after the two-year commitment.  At that point, 58.5% of corps members at schools 
with the lowest test scores remain teachers versus 70.4% of corps members at schools with the 
highest test scores. 
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Figure 23.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by School Test Scores 
 
 
Table 19.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by School Test Scores 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Lowest 25% 100.0% 87.8% 58.5% 44.1% 36.7% 29.2% 
Middle 50% 100.0% 89.6% 62.9% 50.3% 43.7% 37.5% 
Highest 25% 100.0% 93.6% 70.4% 56.5% 46.7% 40.2% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
Cumulative retention in teaching by teaching assignment 
 
Donaldson and Johnson (2010) found an association between corps member retention 
and initial teaching assignment.  In particular, they found lower retention among secondary 
teachers who were assigned multiple subjects and higher retention among special education 
teachers.  I find marginally significant differences between teachers of multiple subjects and 
teachers who teach a single subject, but I neither look at secondary teachers in particular nor 
look at how the first year effect for multi-subjects may be different from other year effects.  
Figure 24 and Table 20 actually show slightly higher rates of retention amongh multi-subject 
teachers, but the difference is only marginally significant (p=0.090).  At the start of year 6, 40.6% 
of multi-subject corps members and 38.5% of other corps members remain teachers.  The 
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estimates for multi-subject teachers are notable, however, because both multi-subject teachers 
and single subject teachers seem to remain teachers longer than average, an obvious 
impossibility.  This means that the corps members who are missing values on this measure are 
substantially more likely to exit teaching—but whether those teachers tend to be multi-subject 
teachers or not is unavailable in the data.  
Figure 24.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Whether Multi-subject Teacher 
 
 
Table 20.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Whether Multi-subject Teacher 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Not multi-subject teacher 100.0% 93.0% 65.0% 52.1% 44.1% 38.5% 
Multi-subject teacher 100.0% 95.7% 72.8% 58.4% 47.5% 40.6% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
The measure for whether a corps member teaches special education also suffers from 
missingness with both special education teachers and non-special education teachers appearing 
to remain in teaching longer than average.  For this reason, Figure 25 and Table 21 should be 
interpreted with caution.  It is possible that the true pattern of retention across special 
education status looks different.  That caveat notwithstanding, special education teachers 
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appear to stay in teaching at higher rates (p<.001).  Year 3 retention is 74.7% for special 
education teachers and 63.8% for others.  Year 6 retention is 49.2% for special education 
teachers and 36.6% for others.  
Figure 25.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Whether Special Ed Teacher 
 
 
Table 21.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Whether Special Ed Teacher 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Not special educator 100.0% 93.0% 63.8% 50.4% 42.2% 36.6% 
Special educator 100.0% 94.5% 74.7% 64.6% 55.4% 49.2% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
Cumulative retention in teaching by teacher demographics 
Prior research has shown that several demographic characteristics of teachers are 
associated with higher retention in general and higher retention among Teach For America 
corps members in particular.  As shown in Figure 26 and Table 22, female corps members 
remain in teaching longer (p<.001).  The difference is especially sharp at the start of year 3.  At 
that point, 65.8% of female corps members remain teachers versus 56.7% of male corps 
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members.  At the start of year 6, 39.7% of female corps members remain teachers compared to 
28.6% of male corps members. 
Figure 26.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Gender 
 
 
Table 22.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Gender 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Female 100.0% 90.7% 65.8% 53.2% 45.4% 39.7% 
Male 100.0% 88.2% 56.7% 44.1% 35.9% 28.6% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
The retention pattern of older corps members differs from the retention pattern of 
younger corps members (p=.090).  Corps members who are older than 25-years-old when they 
start Teach For America are substantially less likely to return for a second year of teaching.  As 
shown in Table 23, year 2 retention is 81.0% for corps members who start TFA when they are 
older than 25 compared to 90.4% for corps members who start when they are 25 or younger.  
However, as time goes on, retention among older corps members surpasses retention among 
younger corps members.  At the start of year 3, 73.1% of older corps members remain teachers 
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versus 62.7% of younger corps members.  At the start of year 6, 54.4% of older corps members 
remain teachers compared to 35.8% of younger corps members. 
Figure 27.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Age 
 
 
Table 23.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Age 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
25-years-old and under 100.0% 90.4% 62.7% 49.9% 42.0% 35.8% 
Over 25-years-old 100.0% 81.0% 73.1% 65.9% 58.6% 54.4% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
Retention also differs depending on whether corps members come from higher or lower 
income backgrounds.  As shown in Figure 28 and Table 24, corps members from lower income 
backgrounds, the ones who receive Federal Pell Grants in college, remain teachers longer 
(p<.001).  At the start of year 3, 73.7% of grant recipients are still teaching compared to 64.4% of 
corps members who did not receive a grant.  At the start of year 6, the figures are 45.9% and 
35.2%.   
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Figure 28.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Pell Grant Status 
 
 
Table 24.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Pell Grant Status 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Not grant recipient 100.0% 90.5% 64.3% 51.8% 42.4% 35.2% 
Grant recipient 100.0% 89.9% 73.7% 59.8% 51.8% 45.9% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
   
Corps member retention also differs by race (p<.001).  Hispanic corps members have the 
highest retention at all time points and Asian corps members have the lowest.  For the most 
part, blacks have the second highest retention, whites have the third highest retention, and 
other people of color have the fourth highest retention.  At the start of year 3, 76.8% of Hispanic 
corps members remain teachers compared to 69.1% of blacks, 63.2% of whites, 62.4% of other 
people of color, and 50.4% of Asians.  At the start of year 6, retention is 48% for Hispanics, 44% 
for blacks, 36.9% for whites, 33.7% for other people of color, and 21.9% for Asians.  These 
patterns are shown in Figure 29 and Table 25.   
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Figure 29.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Race 
 
 
Table 25.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Race 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
White 100.0% 90.1% 63.2% 51.5% 43.3% 36.9% 
Black 100.0% 90.4% 69.1% 57.7% 51.4% 44.0% 
Hispanic 100.0% 94.4% 76.8% 63.4% 53.4% 48.0% 
Asian 100.0% 90.1% 50.4% 33.1% 25.4% 21.9% 
Other person of color 100.0% 89.5% 62.4% 46.1% 40.1% 33.7% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
Cumulative retention in teaching by credentials 
Researchers and policymakers have long worried that turnover is related to teacher 
quality, that the people who leave teaching might be the people with the highest latent ability.   
Figure 30 and Table 26 show how retention varies across college selectivity.  In Figure 30 
the line that stands out is the one for colleges with “non-competitive” admissions, but since that 
line is based on only 7 people—see appendix B—it should be interpreted with extreme caution.  
The other lines, however, follow a consistent pattern.  Starting in year 3, the more selective a 
corps member’s college was to get into, the less likely she is to remain a teacher.  At the start of 
year 3, corps members who attended the “most competitive” colleges remain teachers 58.7% of 
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the time, whereas corps members who attended “less competitive” colleges remain teachers 
68.2% of the time, a difference of 9.5 percentage points.  At the start of year 6, 31.3% of corps 
members from the “most competitive” colleges remain teachers compared to 49.5% of corps 
members from “less competitive” colleges, a difference of 18.2 percentage points.  Between 
these extremes, retention decreases as selectivity increases.  In year 6, 46.3% of corps members 
from “competitive” colleges remain, 42.1% of corps members from “very competitive” colleges 
remain, and 41.5% of corps members from “highly competitive” colleges remain. 
Figure 30.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by College Selectivity 
 
 
Table 26.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by College Selectivity 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Non-competitive 100.0% 71.4% 71.4%    
Less competitive 100.0% 90.9% 68.2% 57.7% 57.7% 49.5% 
Competitive 100.0% 88.1% 74.3% 61.7% 55.9% 46.3% 
Very competitive 100.0% 89.5% 67.6% 56.2% 49.5% 42.1% 
Highly competitive 100.0% 91.2% 66.8% 55.1% 48.0% 41.5% 
Most competitive 100.0% 89.9% 58.7% 45.2% 36.4% 31.3% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
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The retention pattern by undergraduate GPA is similar to the pattern by college 
selectivity, though perhaps less pronounced.  Corps members with the highest GPAs remain in 
teaching at lower rates.  This is shown in Figure 31 (p=.003), and is also shown in Table 27.  At 
the start of year 3, 59.2% of corps members in the highest quartile of GPAs remain teachers 
compared to 65.4% of teachers in the lowest quartile.  At the start of year 6, 32.1% of highest 
quartile corps members remain teachers compared to 39.4% of lowest quartile teachers.   
Figure 31.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by GPA 
 
 
Table 27.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by GPA 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Lowest 25% 100.0% 90.9% 65.6% 53.2% 43.9% 39.4% 
Middle 50% 100.0% 90.4% 64.1% 51.7% 43.9% 37.6% 
Highest 25% 100.0% 88.5% 59.2% 46.1% 39.5% 32.1% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
Basic economics suggests that corps members with higher opportunity costs will remain 
teachers at lower rates.  One measure of opportunity cost is how much money corps members 
can expect to make, on average, based on their college major.  Figure 32 shows that corps 
members with the lowest potential earnings stay in teaching at the highest rates (p<.001).  
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Corps members in the lowest quartile of potential earnings remain teachers 67.6% of the time at 
the start of year 3 whereas corps members in the highest quartile of earnings remain just 55.4% 
of the time, which is 12.2 percentage points lower.  At the start of year 6, 45.9% of lowest 
quartile teachers (by potential earnings) remain in teaching, whereas 32.3% of highest quartile 
teachers do.   
Figure 32.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Earning Potential 
 
 
Table 28.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Earning Potential 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Lowest 25% 100.0% 89.4% 67.6% 59.4% 52.4% 45.9% 
Middle 50% 100.0% 90.4% 62.2% 46.1% 37.5% 31.7% 
Highest 25% 100.0% 89.3% 55.4% 44.2% 37.5% 32.2% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
Just 6% of of corps members major in education, but those corps members remain in 
teaching at higher rates than other corps members (p<.001).  This difference is shown in Figure 
33 and detailed in Table 29, though the cause for the difference is unclear.  Majoring in 
education may (a) indicate higher commitment to teaching as a profession, (b) help prepare 
corps members for the rigors of classroom life, or (c) be associated with diminshed 
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opportuniites ouside of teaching.  At the start of year 2, education majors remain teachers 
93.2% of the time compared to non-education majrs who remain 89.9% of the time.  The gap 
widens at the start of year 3, when 78.9% of education majors and 62.5% of non-educatin 
majors remain teachers, and the gap persists moving forward.  At the start of year 6, 51.8% of 
education majors remain teachers compared to 35.9% of non-eduction majors, a difference of 
15.9 percentage points.  
Figure 33.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the 
Start of Year X by Whether Education Major 
 
 
Table 29.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start 
of Year X by Whether Education Major 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Not education major 100.0% 89.8% 62.5% 49.6% 41.8% 35.9% 
Education major 100.0% 93.2% 78.9% 70.4% 62.7% 51.8% 
Note: Full output for this table, including standard errors and beginning population totals, can be found in appendix B. 
 
In short, corps member retention varies depending on factors related to both corps 
members and the schools where they teach.  Corps members at charter schools remain teachers 
longer and a large portion of district teachers migrate to charter schools.  Retention seems 
unrelated to school size and less related to school poverty than we might expect, probably 
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because nearly all corps members work in high-poverty schools.  Corps member retention is 
more strongly related to student achievement, with higher retention at schools where 
achievement is higher.  It is possible that retention is higher among teachers who teach multiple 
subjects, but the multiple subjects variable may be flawed due to missing data.    Although the 
special education measure is also flawed, the evidence suggests that special education teachers 
remain in teaching at higher rates.   
By demographics, female teachers and teachers from lower income backgrounds are 
significantly and substantially more likely to remain teachers.  Older corps members start year 2 
at lower rates than younger corps members but thereafter remain teachers at higher rates.  By 
race, a clear pattern emerges.  Retention is highest among Hispanics, then blacks, then whites, 
then other people of color, then Asians.  The evidence suggests that corps members with 
stronger academic backgrounds (as measured by college selectivity and GPA) remain teachers at 
lower rates, as do corps members with higher potential earnings.  Education majors remain 
teachers more often than non-education majors.   
Multivariate Models 
The Kaplan-Meier estimates provide strong hints about variables that might be 
associated with corps member retention even after controlling for other variables.  Table 30 
offers an even more parsimonious approach:  bivariate logistic regression.  Table 30 shows the 
relationship between each predictor variable and attrition without controlling for other 
variables.  When the coefficient is negative, the predictor is negatively correlated with attrition.  
When the coefficient is positive, the predictor is positively correlated with attrition.  Please note 
the reversal of language.  In the prior section, it was convenient to discuss higher or lower 
retention, but in this section, higher or lower attrition will be discussed.  In Table 30, the odds 
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ratio (OR) provides the same information as the coefficient, but in a more digestible form.  
Whereas the coefficient indicates the change in the logit for a one unit increase in x, the odds 
ratio gives the change in odds of attrition for a one unit increase in x.   The LR (likelihood ratio) χ2 
tests the null hypothesis that the amount of variance in event explained by the variable could be 
due to chance.  A high χ2 and low p-value suggests a statistically significant relationship between 
the predictor variable and event.   
Most predictors in Table 30 are significant.  The exceptions are school level (Slevel) and 
school enrollment (Senroll).  The multi-subject variable (Tsubmult) is only marginally significant.  
The variable Time and the year dummies Year1 and Year2 are all significant.  The school-level 
variables for school enrollment (Senroll), school poverty (Sfarl), and school test scores (Stest) are 
also all significant, as are all variables related to corps member demographics and prior 
academic achievement. 
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Table 30.  Bivariate Models:  Event History Analysis of TFA Corps Members’ First Exit from the 
Teaching Profession (N = 9,994) 
Variable Coefficient OR OR 95% CI LR χ2 p 
Year1 -0.936 0.392 0.347, 0.444 249.19 <0.001 
Year2 1.001 2.720 2.443, 3.029 321.68 <0.001 
Time -0.100 0.904 0.857, 0.954 14.51 <0.001 
Slevel     3.11 0.212 
Smid 0.103 1.109 0.984, 1.249   
Shigh 0.074 1.077 0.915, 1.267   
Scharter -0.143 0.867 0.771, 0.974 5.83 0.016 
Senroll 0.000 1.000 1.000, 1.000 0.67 0.414 
Sfarl 0.007 1.007 1.003, 1.012 10.14 0.001 
Stest -0.562 0.570 0.446, 0.729 20.72 <0.001 
Tsubmult -0.162 0.850 0.714, 1.013 3.40 0.065 
Tsubsped -0.422 0.656 0.558, 0.771 28.18 <0.001 
Pmale 0.306 1.358 1.212, 1.521 27.14 <0.001 
Pageo25 -0.272 0.762 0.580, 1.000 4.07 0.044 
Ppell -0.293 0.746 0.644, 0.863 15.99 <0.001 
Prace     40.62 <0.001 
Praceb -0.193 0.824 0.670, 1.014   
Praceh -0.428 0.652 0.519, 0.818   
Pracea 0.404 1.497 1.246, 1.799   
Praceoth 0.075 1.078 0.905, 1.283   
Pbarrons 0.159 1.172 1.110, 1.238 34.35 <0.001 
PGPA 0.385 1.469 1.201, 1.798 14.13 <0.001 
Pearnpot 0.880 2.412 1.879, 3.096 46.36 <0.001 
Pmajeduc -0.567 0.567 0.439, 0.732 21.58 <0.001 
 
Hosemer et al. (2013) suggest including predictors in the initial multivariate model if 
they are significant at the 0.25 level, a suggestion I follow.  Before fitting the initial model, 
however, I take a short detour to explore whether multi-level modeling is required to account 
for the clustering of corps members within schools.  The evidence suggests not.  The intraclass 
correlation is 0.00875, which suggests no need for a multi-level model. 
Therefore, I fit my first model, a logistic regression including all bivariate predictors with 
a p-value of less than 0.25.  Model 1, found in Table 31, suggests that after controlling for other 
predictors, the variables for multiple subject (Tsubmult), school poverty (Sfarl) and teacher age 
at entry (Pageo25) are no longer significant.  Therefore, I drop them from model 2.   
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Table 31.  Unconditional Models:  Event History Analysis of TFA Corps Members’ First Exit from the Teaching Profession (N = 9,994)  
Variable Model  1 Model   2 Model   3 Model   4 Model   5 Model  6 Model   7 Model  8 Model  9 
Year1 -0.923 *** -0.906 *** -0.916 *** -0.891 *** -0.892 *** -0.873 *** -1.007 *** -0.979 *** -1.042 *** 
Year2 0.437 *** 0.455 *** 0.446 *** 0.471 *** 0.470 *** 0.468 *** 0.468 *** 0.467 *** 0.463 *** 
Time -0.089 ** -0.085 * -0.086 * -0.264 ** -0.264 ** -0.263 ** -0.266 ** -0.266 ** -0.265 ** 
Time*Time    0.045 * 0.045 * 0.045 * 0.047 * 0.046 * 0.046 * 
Smid 0.035         
Shigh -0.127         
Scharter 0.200 * 0.203 * 0.207 * 0.213 * 0.213 * 0.204 * 0.209 * 0.196 * 0.199 * 
Sfarl 0.002         
Stest -0.761 *** -0.787 *** -0.810 *** -0.811 *** -0.808 *** -0.793 *** -0.818 *** -0.795 *** -0.820 *** 
Tsubsped -0.340 *** -0.360 *** -0.342 *** -0.342 *** -0.340 *** -0.348 *** -0.351 *** -0.332 *** -0.342 *** 
Tsubmult -0.145  -0.178 ~ -0.177 ~ -0.177 ~ -0.170 ~ -0.175 ~ -0.167 ~ -0.167 ~ 
Pmale 0.293 *** 0.272 *** 0.281 *** 0.281 *** 0.279 *** 0.279 *** 0.279 *** 0.276 *** 0.277 *** 
Pageo25 -0.033       -0.649 *** -0.605 ** 
Pageo25*Year1        1.657 *** 1.444 *** 
Ppell -0.190 * -0.188 * -0.189 * -0.189 * -0.189 * -0.195 * -0.314 *** -0.196 * -0.279 ** 
Ppell*Year1       0.473 **  0.367 * 
Praceb 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.026 0.020 0.017 0.028 0.012 
Praceh -0.284 * -0.289 * -0.286 * -0.290 * -0.288 * -0.289 * -0.290 * -0.277 * -0.291 * 
Pracea 0.416 *** 0.414 *** 0.413 *** 0.407 *** 0.404 *** 0.411 *** 0.402 *** 0.405 *** 0.409 *** 
Praceoth 0.107 0.101 0.098 0.096 0.094 0.094 0.092 0.095 0.090 
Pbarrons 0.159 *** 0.156 *** 0.156 *** 0.156 *** 0.157 *** 0.234 *** 0.158 *** 0.159 *** 0.219 *** 
Pbarrons*Year1      -0.296 ***   -0.227 *** 
PGPA 0.432 *** 0.425 *** 0.429 *** 0.431 *** 0.433 *** 0.428 *** 0.431 *** 0.441 *** 0.440 *** 
Pearnpot 0.680 *** 0.637 *** 0.650 *** 0.647 ***      
Ln(Pearnpot)     0.837 *** 0.849 *** 0.839 *** 0.841 *** 0.850 *** 
Pmajeduc -0.318 * -0.316 * -0.317 * -0.320 * -0.304 * -0.298 * -0.304 * -0.314 * -0.313 * 
Wald χ
2
 6.878    3.547  5.173  24.297  21.690  7.560  34.622  53.613  
df 5    1  1  1  1  1  2  4  
p 0.230    0.060  0.023  <0.001  <0.001  0.006  0.006  <0.001  
Comparison Model  2   Model  2 Model  3 Ln(Pear npot) Model  5 Model  5 Model  5 Model  5 
~p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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In model 2, all predictors are significant except for the dummies for corps members who 
are black and corps members who are other people of color.  These dummies must remain in 
the model because dummies for Hispanic and Asian are both significant, so race remains a 
variable of interest.  A Wald test comparing model 2 to model 1 provides no evidence that 
model 1, with its three additional predictors, fits the data better (χ2=6.878, df=5, p=0.2298)4.  
Therefore, I use a Wald test to check whether including any single variable removed from model 
1 improves model 2.  The Wald statistic for multiple subjects provides modest evidence that the 
variable should be put back into the model (χ2=3.547, df=1, p=0.0597).  Model 3, therefore, 
includes Tsubmult in addition to the other variables in model 2. 
Examining model 3, we see that time is strongly associated with attrition.  Year1 
attrition is significantly lower than other years and Year2 attrition is significantly higher.  
Substantively, this means that compared to other times, corps members are less likely to leave 
teaching during their first school year and summer, and they are more likely to leave teaching 
during their second school year and summer.  (The vast majority of TFA attrition occurs over the 
summer.)  Colloquially, one might think of Year2 attrition as the attrition that starts before year 
3.  The variable is called Year2, however, because year 2 is the year that predicts the attrition.  
The variable Time is also negatively associated with attrition, suggesting that after year 2, corps 
members have reduced probabilities of attrition with each passing year.   
After adjusting for other variables, teachers at charter schools are more likely to leave 
the profession, the opposite of what is suggested by the bivariate relationship between Scharter 
                                                          
4
 Some readers will question the use of the Wald statistic to compare fit rather the likelihood ratio test.  In 
this case, however, using a likelihood ratio test would have been inappropriate.  Typically, likelihood ratio 
tests fit a χ
2
 distribution with a number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables in the 
bigger model minus the number of variables in the smaller model.  However, in order to fit models with 
missing data, Mplus estimates many additional parameters.  These extra parameters, however, are of no 
substantive interest.   
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and Event.  Teachers at schools with higher test scores are less likely to leave the profession.  By 
teaching assignment, special education teachers and multi-subject teachers are both less likely 
to leave teaching.  By demographics, males are more likely to leave then women, and corps 
members without Pell Grants are more likely to leave than corps members with Pell Grants.  
Compared to whites, Hispanics are less likely to leave, Asians are more likely to leave, and blacks 
and other people of color are statistically indistinguishable from whites.  The measures of ability 
and opportunity costs remain in the expected directions.  Corps members from more selective 
schools, corps members with higher GPAs, and corps members with higher earning potential all 
leave teaching at higher rates than their counterparts.  On the other hand, education majors 
leave teaching at lower rates. 
Models 4 and 5 introduce non-linear effects to try to improve model fit.  Model 4 
introduces a squared effect for time, Time*Time, and the Wald test suggests improved fit 
(χ2=5.173, df=1, p=0.0229).  Coefficients in model 4 are nearly identical to coefficients in model 
3—except for time variables, which change, as they should.  The coefficients for Year1 and Year2 
remain similar, but the coefficient for Time goes from -0.086 to -0.264, suggesting a greater 
negative effect for time.  This is balanced, however, by the new squared term, Time*Time, which 
suggests that attrition increases with time-squared.   
Similarly, model 5 introduces a non-linear effect.  Model 5 is identical to model 4 except 
that instead of including a variable measuring earning potential, Pearnpot, it includes a variable 
measuring the natural log of earning potential, Ln(Pearnpot).  This use of log earnings or log 
income is common in economic literature because income is usually associated with diminishing 
returns.  (The changes in lifestyle associated with going from $0 in income to $10,000 in annual 
income are much greater than the changes associated with going from $100,000 to $110,000.)  
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Using a Wald test, I compare both model 4 and model 5 to a model without an earnings 
variable.  The tests suggest that log earnings provide a slightly better fit (χ2=24.297, df=1, 
p<0.001 compared to χ2=21.59, df=1, p<0.001).  Therefore, for both theoretical and empirical 
reasons, I use log earnings in all future models. 
Models 6 through 8 test interactions.  Specifically, they test interactions between Year1 
and other predictors.  In laymen’s terms, the models test whether the association between a 
predictor and attrition changes depending on whether corps members are still in their 
commitment years.  These types of interactions are highly plausible.  For example, if college 
selectivity or GPA are good measures of ability, then corps members from more selective 
colleges, with higher GPAs might better handle the difficulties of teaching and persist through 
the first two years.  After the two year commitment, however, they may parlay their high ability 
and impressive credentials to gain jobs that are higher status or higher paying.  Model 6 shows 
an interaction between Pbarrons (college selectivity) and Year1.  Corps members who attend 
more selective colleges are more likely to leave the profession in general, but in year 1, this 
difference mostly disappears.  The coefficient for Pbarrons*Year1 is -0.296, roughly the opposite 
of the coefficient for Pbarrons, which is 0.234.  Both Pbarrons and Pbarrons*Year1 are 
significant in model 6, and the model with the interaction fits better than the model without it 
(χ2=21.69, df=1, p=0.006).   
Like model 6, model 7 adds an interaction to model 5.  This time the interaction is 
between Year1 and Ppell, a measure of whether corps members received a Pell Grant in college.  
Adjusted for other predictors, corps members who received a Pell Grant exit teaching less often, 
but in Year1 corps members who received a Pell Grant leave teaching more often.  Both 
interaction and main effect are statistically significant (χ2=7.56, df=1, p=0.006).   
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Model 8 adds both Pageo25 and Pageo25*Year1 to the model.  The variable Pageo25 
was not itself significant in model 1, but the Kaplan-Meier shown in Table 23 provides strong 
evidence of an interaction, and prior research on TFA attrition provides both empirical evidence 
of a main effect and theoretical reasoning why older corps members might persist in teaching 
longer.  In model 8, both the main effect (Pageo25) and interaction (Pageo25*Year1) are 
significant, and the Wald test of model 8 suggests a better fit than model 5 (χ2=34.622, df=2, 
p=0.006).   
Model 9 is the final unconditional model.  It includes all predictors from model 5 as well 
as the three significant interactions added in models 6 through 8, and according to the Wald 
test, model 9 fits the data significantly better than model 5 (χ2=53.613, df=4, p=0).   
Across the 9 models presented in Table 31, coefficients for most predictors vary only 
slightly.  For example, the coefficient for charter school (Scharter) ranges from 0.196 to 0.213, 
less than a 9% change, and the coefficient for school test scores (Stest) ranges from -0.761 to -
0.820, less than an 8% change.  The coefficients that do change noticeably do so because I 
introduce related non-linear terms.  The coefficient for Time changes when Time*Time is 
introduced into the model and the coefficient for Ln(Pearnpot) is obviously different from the 
coefficient for Pearnpot.  The coefficients for Pageo25, Ppell, and Pbarrons change noticeably 
only when interacted with Year1. 
To ease interpretation of the final model, Table 32 includes both coefficients and 
exponentiated coefficients, also known as adjusted odds ratios.  The adjusted odds ratios give 
the change in attrition odds for a one unit increase in the predictor variable while controlling for 
other variables in the model.  An odds ratio greater than 1 means an increased likelihood while 
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an odds ratio less than 1 means a decreased likelihood.  Specifically, an odds ratio of .99 means 
a 1% decrease in the odds, while an odds ratio of 1.01 means a 1% increase in the odds.   
Table 32.  Unconditional Model 9 (in Detail):  Event History Analysis of TFA Corps Members’ First 
Exit from the Teaching Profession (N = 9,994) 
Variable Coefficient SE p OR 
OR  
95% LB 
OR  
95% UB 
Year1 -1.042 0.098 <0.001 0.353 0.291 0.427 
Year2 0.463 0.079 <0.001 1.589 1.361 1.855 
Time  -0.265 0.087 0.002 0.767 0.647 0.910 
Time*Time 0.046 0.020 0.021 1.047 1.007 1.089 
Scharter 0.199 0.090 0.026 1.220 1.023 1.456 
Stest -0.820 0.179 <0.001 0.440 0.310 0.626 
Tsubmult -0.167 0.095 0.079 0.847 0.702 1.019 
Tsubsped -0.342 0.087 <0.001 0.710 0.599 0.842 
Pmale 0.277 0.062 <0.001 1.319 1.168 1.490 
Pagero25 -0.605 0.206 0.003 0.546 0.365 0.818 
Pageo25*Year1 1.444 0.293 <0.001 4.236 2.386 7.525 
Ppell -0.279 0.094 0.003 0.756 0.629 0.910 
Ppell*Year1 0.367 0.173 0.034 1.443 1.028 2.026 
Praceb 0.012 0.116 0.915 1.012 0.806 1.270 
Praceh -0.291 0.124 0.019 0.748 0.586 0.953 
Pracea 0.409 0.103 <0.001 1.505 1.230 1.842 
Praceoth 0.090 0.094 0.337 1.094 0.910 1.316 
Pbarrons 0.219 0.035 <0.001 1.245 1.162 1.333 
Pbarrons*Year1 -0.227 0.065 0.001 0.797 0.702 0.905 
PGPA 0.440 0.115 <0.001 1.553 1.239 1.945 
Ln(Pearnpot) 0.850 0.171 <0.001 2.339 1.673 3.271 
Pmajeduc -0.313 0.137 0.022 0.731 0.559 0.956 
 
The final model shows a strong relationship between attrition and time.  In Year1, odds 
of attrition are 65.7% lower than in the reference year, which is year 3.  In contrast, in Year2, 
odds of attrition are 58.9% higher than in year 3.  Starting in year 3, the odds of corps member 
attrition diminish with each passing year, but at a rate that slows over time.  Figure 34 graphs 
this trend based on the coefficients for Year1, Year2, Time, and Time*Time.  The pattern in 
Figure 34 closely matches the pattern provided by hazard rates in chapter 4.  Specifically, the 
odds are lowest in the first year, highest in the second, and somewhere in between in other 
years. 
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Figure 34.  Odds Ratio of Attrition for a Corps Member in Year X Compared to a Corps Member in 
Year 3 
 
 
Predictors related to school and teaching assignment also seem to matter.  After 
adjusting for other covariates, odds of attrition are 22% higher for charter school teachers, a 
reversal of what is suggested by the bivariate relationship between Scharter and Event.  Corps 
members are less likely to leave teaching when test scores are high.  Compared to a corps 
member working at a school with 1st percentile test scores, odds of attrition are 66% lower for a 
corps member working at a school with 99th percentile test scores.  The odds of attrition are 
29% lower for special education teachers than for other teachers. 
Demographic characteristics are also strong predictors.  Male teachers have 32% higher 
odds of attrition than female teachers.  Compared to white teachers, Hispanic teachers have 
odds of attrition that are 25% lower, while Asians have odds that are 50% higher.  The odds for 
blacks and other people of color are indistinguishable from the odds for whites.  In general, Pell 
Grant recipients have 24% lower odds of attrition than other corps members, but in the first 
year Pell Grant recipients have 9% higher odds.  Similarly, corps members who are 26 and older 
at the start of TFA have odds of attrition that are 45% lower, except in year 1, when these corps 
members have odds of attrition that are 131% higher.  
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Several other teacher characteristics are predictive.  Each additional point of GPA is 
associated with 55% higher odds of attrition.  Likewise, a one unit increase in college selectivity 
is associated with 25% higher odds of attrition.  The exception is year 1, when a one unit 
increase in college selectivity is associated with 1% lower odds of attrition.  Corps members with 
higher earning potentials have higher odds of attrition.  Specifically, a 1% increase in earning 
potential is associated with 0.85% higher odds of attrition.  Finally, education majors have 27% 
lower odds of attrition than other corps members. 
For the most part, these effects are robust to alternate specification.  Table 33 
compares odds ratios from the final unconditional model to odds ratios from a conditional 
model.  As explained in the methods section, the conditional model controls for all school 
characteristics, both observed and unobserved.  In the conditional model, Time and Time*Time 
are no longer significant predictors, but Year1 and Year2 remain significant, as do all other 
predictors that are significant in the unconditional model.  As for effect sizes, most odds ratios 
from the unconditional model fall within the 95% confidence interval for the conditional model.  
The exceptions are time variables.  Whereas the unconditional model suggests that first year 
teachers have 65% lower odds of attrition, the conditional model suggests 58% lower odds.  
Similarly, the unconditional model suggests that second year teachers have 59% higher odds of 
attrition, but the conditional model suggests that odds are 100% higher. 
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Table 33.  Final Unconditional Model (Model 9) vs. Conditional (Fixed-Effects) Model:  Event 
History Analysis of TFA Corps Members’ First Exit from the Teaching Profession 
 
Unconditional 
(N = 9,994) 
 
Conditional 
(N = 9,358) 
Variable OR  OR 
OR  
95% LB 
OR  
95% UB 
Coeff. SE p 
Year1 0.353  0.421 0.350 0.506 -0.865 0.094 0.000 
Year2 1.589  2.004 1.716 2.339 0.695 0.079 0.000 
Time  0.767  1.012 0.857 1.196 0.012 0.085 0.888 
Time*Time 1.047  1.002 0.963 1.042 0.002 0.020 0.929 
Scharter 1.220        
Stest 0.440        
Tsubmult 0.847  0.865 0.714 1.048 -0.145 0.098 0.138 
Tsubsped 0.710  0.745 0.625 0.889 -0.294 0.090 0.001 
Pmale 1.319  1.365 1.204 1.547 0.311 0.064 0.000 
Pagero25 0.546  0.511 0.340 0.768 -0.672 0.208 0.001 
Pageo25*Year1 4.236  4.431 2.467 7.965 1.489 0.299 0.000 
Ppell 0.756  0.804 0.666 0.971 -0.218 0.096 0.023 
Ppell*Year1 1.443  1.592 1.148 2.209 0.465 0.167 0.005 
Praceb 1.012  0.967 0.768 1.219 -0.033 0.118 0.778 
Praceh 0.748  0.743 0.582 0.950 -0.296 0.125 0.018 
Pracea 1.505  1.464 1.191 1.798 0.381 0.105 0.000 
Praceoth 1.094  1.081 0.894 1.308 0.078 0.097 0.420 
Pbarrons 1.245  1.247 1.158 1.344 0.221 0.038 0.000 
Pbarrons*Year1 0.797  0.780 0.686 0.888 -0.248 0.066 0.000 
PGPA 1.553  1.759 1.369 2.261 0.565 0.128 0.000 
Ln(Pearnpot) 2.339  2.758 1.883 4.044 1.015 0.195 0.000 
Pmajeduc 0.731  0.667 0.508 0.876 -0.405 0.139 0.004 
 
Discussion 
This chapter offers new insights about factors associated with the attrition of Teach For 
America corps members from teaching.  I use the Kaplan-Meier method to estimate how long 
corps members remain teachers across distinct values of a given variable.  Then, I use 
multivariate logistic regression to estimate the unique effects of specific predictors while 
controlling for other predictors.  If diminishing attrition is a goal of TFA or its stakeholders, 
understanding the association between predictors and attrition is a good first step.   
The relationship between corps member attrition and time is obviously quite strong.  It 
is certainly plausible that the two-year commitment helps corps members “lean in” to get 
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through the difficulties of first-year teaching, a hypothesis advanced by Co-CEO Matt Kramer 
(Teach For America, 2014b).  But it is also the case that the highest odds of attrition align with 
the end of the two-year commitment.  If the commitment is itself the mechanism for higher 
retention in year 1 and lower retention in year 2, TFA may want to consider asking corps 
members to make a longer commitment either when they apply to TFA or at some interval into 
the program.  This research offers no insights into how such a change would affect TFA’s brand 
or attractiveness to applicants.  Perhaps, if asked to make a three-year commitment, high-
performing applicants would apply in much smaller numbers.  Still, the option is worth exploring 
through surveys, focus groups, or perhaps a pilot program in one or more regions.   
Two school-level factors are strong predictors of corps member attrition:  whether the 
school is a charter school and how high the school’s test scores are.  The first factor is 
interesting because corps members at charter schools leave teaching less often, but adjusting 
for other variables, they leave teaching more often.  This directional “flip” is possible because 
across person-years, the mean test scores are much higher at the charter schools where corps 
members work (M=.608, SD=.208) than at the district schools where corps members work 
(M=.238, SD=.168), t(7,892)=-81.13, p<.0001.  Corps members, like other teachers, are more 
likely to leave the profession when they work at a school with low test scores, a depressing but 
predictable finding.   
In contrast, the finding about special education teachers is more uplifting.  Teach For 
America seems to be recruiting people into a position they never would have found themselves 
in otherwise—teaching high-poverty students with special needs—and once in that position, 
corps members seem to stay in teaching at slightly elevated rates.   
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Several demographic characteristics of teachers are also associated with attrition but 
given labor laws and Teach For America’s strong commitment to diversity, the path forward is 
unclear.  Teach For America might be able to increase retention by accepting fewer males and 
fewer Asians into the program, but that kind of policy change is obviously problematic.  The 
findings on Pell Grant recipients and older corps members hold more promise.  Through 
adjusted marketing, TFA may be able to recruit more of these kinds of candidates, and through 
programmatic supports better guide older corps members through the first year.  After year 1, 
these corps members typically remain teachers at higher rates.  
As for the credentials of corps members, the finding on education majors is highly 
predictable on both theoretical and empirical grounds.  Having an education major 
demonstrates a high level of commitment and may also indicate fewer career options outside of 
teaching.  Moreover, prior research by Donaldson and Johnson (2011) reached the same 
conclusion.  The finding on potential earnings is also fairly intuitive, though not previously 
demonstrated.  Corps members with higher potential earnings have higher opportunity costs 
related to staying in teaching.   
These two findings offer suggestions about how Teach For America may be able to boost 
retention—but again, those suggestions may conflict with TFA’s essential character.  If TFA 
recruits too many education majors, it risks undermining its goal of bringing untraditional 
candidates into teaching, and if TFA focuses on recruiting high-performing candidates from 
poorly paid majors, it risks losing talent, destroying its brand, and undermining its goal of 
providing future leaders across professional sectors with the experience of teaching high-
poverty students. 
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The most disconcerting findings presented in this chapter probably relate to college 
selectivity and college GPA.  Strong academic skills offer no guarantee of strong teaching skills.  
Still, we might prefer to see corps members with the best academic credentials remaining 
teachers at the same or higher rates than other corps members.  Yet, corps members from the 
most selective colleges and corps members with the highest GPAs remain teachers for a shorter 
period of time. 
In short, the findings presented in this chapter are clear, but the practical implications 
may not be. 
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CHAPTER 6:  ALUMNI EMPLOYMENT 
Articles about Teach For America suggest broad curiosity about how alumni are 
employed, not just how long alumni remain teachers, but what they do if they stop teaching.  
For TFA’s critics and supporters alike, this is an important question.  Critics worry that TFA is a 
privileged pit stop on the way to somewhere else, a pit stop made at the expense of 
underprivileged children.  In contrast, supporters suggest that TFA attracts persistent talent to 
the education sector, and further, even alumni who leave the education sector can bolster 
education reform.  These alumni carry their teaching experience with them to high status 
professions and roles, positions that allow them to effectively advocate for institutional reforms 
to improve the lives of children born into poverty.  
Yet, despite broad curiosity, it is hard to find credible, detailed estimates of alumni 
employment.  The most detailed estimates are published by Teach For America itself and 
suggest that most alumni remain educators (Teach For America, 2015).  According to TFA, 65% 
of alumni work in education and 8% are enrolled in graduate school.  Another 5% of alumni 
work in business, 4% work in law, 3% work in health, and 14% are otherwise employed.  These 
proportions are quite similar to estimates from Donaldson and Johnson (2012, p. 25; 2011, p. 
51) who find that 4% of alumni are lawyers, 2% are medical professionals, and 5% work in 
business.  However, the estimates from Donaldson and Johnson require a rather large caveat:  
the estimates are based on too short a timeline for most alumni to fulfill their two year teaching 
commitment and then complete four years of graduate school.  Moreover, both the estimates 
by TFA and the estimates by Donaldson and Johnson lump all alumni together.  Given TFA’s 
consistent annual growth, ever growing portions of alumni are only recently so, and therefore, 
they are closer to their teaching years and more likely to be involved in the education sector.  
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Moreover, recent alumni respond to TFA’s survey at higher rates than less recent alumni, 
further biasing the sample.   
This chapter attempts to clarify the employment of Teach For America alumni.  Instead 
of lumping all alumni together, a technique that hides trends and introduces bias, I investigate 
how alumni are employed after x number of years.  I estimate the percentage of alumni who are 
employed inside the education sector and outside the education sector each year, and I further 
disaggregate those broad categories into more specific professions.  
Data 
For the current analysis, data are organized in the long form with a single observation 
per person-year.  Observations begin in year three, the first “alumni” year, and persist until 
2013-2014, the final year with available data.  Thus, corps members who start teaching in 2004-
2005 are alumni for eight years, while corps members who start teaching in 2011-2012 are 
alumni for just one year.  
The dataset consists of several demographic variables, plus five other key variables: (1) a 
person identification number, personid; (2) an ordinal year variable, year; (3) an indicator for 
whether a corps member became an alumna, alumna; (4) an indicator for whether an alumna 
responded to the alumni survey in a given year, responded; and (5) a variable categorizing an 
alumna’s annual profession, profession.  The profession variable is obviously the most 
important.  It takes on 29 unique values that show, among other things, whether an alumna is a 
teacher, a doctor, a principal, a graduate student, etc.  All variables and their potential values 
are detailed in Table 34.  
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Table 34.  Description of Variables Used to Identify Annual Employment of TFA Alumni 
Variable Description 
Personid identification number unique to each corps member 
Year 
ordinal year variable: (1) the year a corps member starts TFA; (2) the next 
year; (3) in the year after that; and so on… 
Alumna indicator of whether corps member became alumna of TFA: (1) yes; (2) no  
Responded 
indicator of whether corps member responded to the alumni survey in a 
given year 
Profession 
nominal variable identifying alumna’s employment in a given year as one 
of the following: 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Teacher 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Possible teacher 
 Ed sector: PK-12: AP or dean 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Principal 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Instructional 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Operational 
 Ed sector: PK-12: Unknown 
 Ed sector: University 
 Ed sector: Other 
 Ed sector: Unknown 
 Other sector: Business: Banking 
 Other sector: Business: Consulting 
 Other sector: Business: HR 
 Other sector: Business: Marketing 
 Other sector: Business: Other 
 Other sector: Entertainment 
 Other sector: Health: Doctor 
 Other sector: Health: Other 
 Other sector: Law: Lawyer 
 Other sector: Media 
 Other sector: Miscellaneous 
 Other sector: Non-profit 
 Other sector: Policy 
 Other sector: Religion 
 Other sector: Social services 
 Other sector: STEM 
 Graduate school 
 Unemployed 
 Unknown 
 
 
The sample for this analysis is slightly more restricted than the sample in prior analyses.  
It focuses on “alumni.”  Operationally, Teach For America defines alumni as corps members who 
successfully complete their two year commitment and remain engaged with TFA during that 
time period.  Due to data constraints, however—namely that it was not always clear who 
completed two years of teaching—I define “alumni” as corps members who start year two.  
Multiple measures suggest that around 98% of corps members who start a second year of 
teaching also complete it.  (This is a finding in its own right, showing that most teachers who 
drop out of TFA do so in the first year, and that corps members who start a second year almost 
always finish it.)  Thus, my alumna construct is nearly identical to TFA’s, but it is free of potential 
biases introduced by misidentifying the corps members who exit during year two.   
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Some readers will object to this sample, wishing I had investigated the future 
employment of all corps members, both alumni and non-alumni alike.  That would have been 
ideal.  Unfortunately, since Teach For America only surveys alumni, data on non-alumni were 
generally unavailable.  However, given the finding that approximately 88% of all corps members 
finish year two, statistics on alumni and statistics on corps members can only diverge so much. 
Methods 
To estimate the number of alumni working in various professions, I use conventional 
survey techniques (Kreuter & Valliant, 2007; StataCorp, 2013).  Namely, I use casewise deletion, 
weighted-adjustments, and raking to estimate frequencies.  These techniques are necessary 
because each year some alumni fail to complete the alumni survey.  For all analyses presented 
in this chapter, I treat each ordinal year as its own survey.  I then combine results across years to 
show employment trends over time.  
To estimate employment frequencies, I specify five models, each one more 
sophisticated than the prior.  Model 1 is a simple tabulation, so not really a model at all.  It 
includes no adjustments.  Model 2 repeats the tabulation from model 1 but drops “unknowns” 
from the sample.  Models 3 and 4 use weighted-adjustments to address unit non-response 
(Kreuter & Valliant, 2007, pp. 2–5; Little, 1988, p. 293; Oh & Scheuren, 1983; Rea & Parker, 
2014, p. 196).  Finally, model 5 uses raking to generate slightly more complicated weights that 
adjust for unit non-response across multiple dimensions (Deming & Stephen, 1940; Battaglia, 
Hoaglin, & Frankel, 2009; Kolenikov, 2014).  This chapter includes results from model 5 only, but 
interested readers can find the results of other models in appendix C.   
Model 1 is the simplest.  It shows the percentage of alumni who report working in a 
specific profession in a given year.  The percentage of alumni whose profession is unknown rises 
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from 11% in year three to 38% in year ten.  In model 1, these alumni are reported simply as 
“unknown.”  Because this model is purely descriptive, no standard errors are calculated or 
reported.  Rather, each figure represents a hard floor, an absolute minimum percentage of 
alumni in the census who are employed in a given profession in a given year. 
Model 2, the complete-case analysis, is also fairly simple.  It shows the estimates of a 
naïve researcher.  The “unknowns” are dropped from each year.  Then, sample proportions are 
interpreted as population proportions.  If 5% of year three respondents say they are banjo 
players, then 5% of year three alumni are assumed to be banjo players.  This is done by assigning 
each respondent a probability weight, 𝑝 =
𝑁
𝑟
, where N is the number of alumni in a given year 
and r is the number of respondents.  Because response rates are quite high relative to the 
census, the standard error is adjusted using a finite population correction.  
Unfortunately, model 2, though parsimonious, is extremely biased.  It is biased because 
the response rate across all alumni is 81.6%, but the response rate across teachers in NYC is 
around 100%.  Although NYC teachers respond to TFA’s survey at approximately the same rate 
that other alumni respond, NYC teachers generally turn up in administrative files from the NY 
City, NY State, and NY charter management organizations.  Thus, the dataset includes nearly 
100% of NYC teachers, but only about 81.6% of other professionals.  Therefore, a peculiar form 
of response bias causes model 2 to seriously overestimate the number of alumni who are 
teachers. 
Model 3 adjusts for this response bias.  It does so by combining the approaches of 
model 1 and model 2.  Teachers in NYC are assumed fully captured by the data, and therefore, 
they are treated descriptively.  For example, in year three 1,658 / 2,934 alumni are teachers in 
NYC.  That translates to 56.5% with no standard error.  All other alumni in year three are 
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considered part of the survey population.  These alumni are given the probability weight, 𝑝 =
𝑛
𝑟
, 
where n and r represent the total number of alumni and total number of respondents, 
respectively, after NYC teachers are removed from the sample.  Standard errors are adjusted to 
reflect post-stratification and heavy sampling within a finite population.  Finally, the coefficients 
and standard errors for non-NYC teachers are multiplied by 
𝑛
𝑁
, where N represents the total 
number of alumni in a given year.  Thus, figures that previously estimated the percentage of 
survey respondents employed in a given profession are converted to figures estimating the 
percentage of alumni employed in that profession. 
Through the aforementioned process, model 3 adjusts for the most obvious form of 
response bias in the data.  However, it may miss other forms of response bias.  In particular, bias 
would result if, conditional on year, alumni educators or teachers responded to TFA’s annual 
survey at rates higher than non-educators.  Fortunately, this sort of bias seems absent from the 
data.  Usually, testing for such bias is impossible in a given sample.  How do you know whether 
members of a certain profession respond at lower rates unless you know the professions of non-
respondents?  However, this particular dataset includes employment information on all NYC 
teachers, regardless of whether they respond to the alumni survey.  NYC teachers respond to 
the alumni survey 73.9% of the time whereas other alumni respond 72.1% of the time.  The 
difference is statistically significant but not substantively so.  Bias is likely minimal.   
 Other tests for response bias come back mostly negative.  The portions of respondents 
and non-respondents who are male, over 25, Pell grant recipients, education majors, and STEM 
majors are statistically indistinguishable—likewise the percentage who are Hispanic, Asian, 
Native American, and multiracial.  However, whites over-respond at rates that are statistically 
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significant (OR = 1.028) and blacks under-respond at rates that are statistically significant (OR = 
.847).     
Model 4 takes the general approach of model 3, but further adjusts for response rates 
by race.  The model produces the same number of NYC teachers as models 1 and 3.  However, 
the number of alumni estimated to work in other professions changes slightly because of a 
different weighting procedure.  Alumni are given the probability weight 𝑝 =
𝑛𝑘
𝑟𝑘
, where, after 
removing NYC teachers from the sample, nk is the number of alumni of race k and rk is the 
number of respondents of race k.  Again, a finite population correction is applied, and again, 
proportions and standard errors are scaled down to apply to all alumni, rather than all 
respondents.   
Finally, model 5 applies a “raking” procedure to adjust for non-response (Deming & 
Stephen, 1940; Battaglia et al., 2009; Kolenikov, 2014).  The chief advantage of raking is that it 
adjusts for non-response across multiple dimensions.  Whereas the probability weights in model 
4 adjust for race only, the probability weights created through raking adjust for race, gender, 
and age.  Within a given dimension, say gender, the probability weights across some subgroup, 
say male, sum to the total n for that subgroup.  For model 5, raking was implemented using the 
survwgt package in Stata.5 
The results from models 3, 4, and 5 are extremely similar.  Across the three models, no 
two estimates diverge by more than 2.39 percentage points, and in the first eight years, before 
the sample size shrinks and estimates become slightly noisier, no two estimates diverge by more 
than 0.29 percentage points.  Because the models are so similar, only the results of model 5 are 
reported in the chapter’s text.  Results from the other four models can be found in appendix C.   
                                                          
5
 To facilitate convergence, I dropped from this analysis the 0.1% of corps members who do not identify as 
male or female.   
 168 
 
 
Finally, it makes sense to point out conceptual differences between estimates in this 
chapter and similar estimates in chapter 4.  In chapter 4, the survival analysis, alumni who leave 
teaching are removed from the sample in later years.  In this chapter, however, alumni who 
return to teaching return to the sample.  Also, chapter 4 uses joint probabilities to estimate 
cumulative survival, so the survival rate in a given year affects future estimates.  However, in 
this chapter, all years are estimated independently.  In the results section, all figures and tables 
begin with year three, the first year that corps members become alumni. 
Results 
Figure 35 provides an overview of alumni professions by sector.  The basic pattern is 
clear.  Over time, the percentage of alumni working in education decreases, the percentage of 
alumni working in other sectors increases, and the percentage of alumni enrolled in graduate 
school first increases, then decreases.  Nearly all alumni are either employed or students.  In a 
given year, only 2 or 3% are “unemployed,” a category that includes alumni who are out of work 
as well as stay-at-home parents and full-time volunteers.   
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Figure 35.  Annual Employment of TFA Alumni, an Overview 
 
Table 35 provides numerical estimates, showing that in year three, 79% of alumni work 
in education, 9% work in other sectors, 11% are enrolled in graduate school, and 2% are 
unemployed.  These percentages shift over time.  In year ten, 61% of alumni work in the 
education sector, 32% work outside education, 4% attend graduate school, and 3% are 
unemployed. 
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Table 35.  Annual Employment of TFA Alumni, an Overview 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Education sector 78.51 69.23 65.22 62.37 63.00 62.29 62.89 60.86 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.49) (0.58) (0.69) (0.93) (1.26) (2.50) 
Other sector 9.01 11.52 11.65 17.00 21.78 25.74 27.57 32.26 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.36) (0.49) (0.62) (0.87) (1.19) (2.46) 
Graduate school 10.59 17.73 21.59 18.20 13.62 9.72 6.89 4.00 
 (0.30) (0.38) (0.45) (0.49) (0.52) (0.60) (0.66) (0.96) 
Unemployed 1.89 1.52 1.54 2.44 1.59 2.25 2.65 2.88 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.29) (0.42) (0.82) 
 
Alumni working in the education sector 
The percentage of alumni working in the education sector, broadly defined, is worth 
emphasizing.  The percentage certainly decreases over time but not as rapidly as one might 
expect.  The percentage of alumni who work in the education sector drops from 79% in year 
three to 65% in year five but remains nearly flat thereafter, oscillating from about 61 to 63%.  In 
short, most alumni of Teach For America remain employed in the education sector, and alumni 
who remain in the education sector for five years seem mostly to remain in the education sector 
for ten years—two major findings.  Moreover, these figures are roughly similar to the figures 
found in TFA’s press release and discussed at the start of this chapter (Teach For America, 2015). 
Some readers will object to how broadly I define working in the education sector, a 
category that includes not only people who work directly as educators but also people who 
work in educational publishing and advocacy, for example.  For these readers, the more 
important question may be how many alumni work in PK-12 schools and districts.   
Most alumni who work in the education sector do so by working for a PK-12 school, 
district, or CMO.  The pattern of employment for PK-12 educators mimics the pattern of 
employment across all alumni educators.  In year three, 68% of alumni work in PK-12.  By year 
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six, the percentage has dropped noticeably, to 47%.  However, in following years decreases are 
slight.  In year ten, 43% of alumni still work in PK-12. 
As for alumni working in other segments of the education sector, the percentage 
working at universities creeps up over time.  In year three, 1% of alumni work at universities.  In 
year ten, 5% do.  Alumni also work outside school settings.  These alumni work in educational 
publishing, advocacy, technology, policy, etc.  They work for non-profits, for-profits, and 
governments but in roles primarily focused on education.  In year three, 9% of all alumni work in 
these types of educational roles.  In years four to ten, the percentage increases to about 12 to 
14% of alumni.  Table 36 shows annual figures. 
Table 36.  Annual Employment of TFA Alumni in the Education Sector 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Education sector 78.51 69.23 65.22 62.37 63.00 62.29 62.89 60.86 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.49) (0.58) (0.69) (0.93) (1.26) (2.50) 
--PK-12 district 68.35 55.49 50.46 46.69 46.53 45.89 45.55 43.43 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.45) (0.54) (0.66) (0.91) (1.25) (2.39) 
--University 0.89 1.77 1.78 1.93 2.13 2.73 4.53 4.84 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22) (0.34) (0.56) (1.09) 
--Other 8.65 11.93 12.98 13.74 14.34 13.67 12.82 12.59 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.39) (0.44) (0.53) (0.69) (0.89) (1.67) 
--Unknown 0.62 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.02) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
 
Figure 36 provides additional detail, graphically segmenting alumni educators.  The 
largest segment represents teachers.  Teachers comprise 65% of alumni in year three and a 
smaller percentage each following year.  In year ten, 16% of alumni are teachers.  Because these 
estimates include alumni who return to teaching after a break, they are slightly higher than the 
most plausible estimates reported in chapter 4. 
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Figure 36.  Annual Employment of TFA Alumni in the Education Sector 
 
Figure 36 also manifests another key finding.  After year five, exits from teaching are 
largely mirrored by entrances into other PK-12 roles.  When the percentage of PK-12 teachers 
decreases by one point, the percentage of PK-12 “non-teachers” tends to increase by one point.  
In year six, 35% of alumni are teachers and 12% work in other PK-12 roles.  In year ten, the 
figures have nearly flipped:  16% of alumni are teachers and 28% work in other PK-12 roles.   
Unfortunately, at this level of zoom, the data become slightly less reliable.  Estimates of 
how many alumni work in PK-12 districts are exact, but more detailed estimates are not.  Table 
37 shows what percentage of alumni hold particular PK-12 positions.  The estimates for 
“teacher,” “AP or dean,” and “principal” are all slightly conservative.  That is because the 
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“unknowns” in the table report working at a PK-12 district but fail to report an interpretable job 
title.  Similarly, “possible teachers” report ambiguous titles, suggesting they might be teachers 
or might hold a non-teaching role.  The labels “instructional” and “operational” are catchalls 
that ignore professional rank.  These alumni include coordinators and specialists who report to 
principals as well as district leaders who support or oversee principals.  In some cases, 
instructional and operational staff may even operate at the level of principal or assistant 
principal but under an ambiguous title like “Director of Academics.”  Notably, in year ten 7% of 
alumni are principals and another 3% are assistant principals or deans.  An additional 16% of 
alumni are working in PK-12 districts in other non-teaching capacities. 
Table 37.  Annual Employment of TFA Alumni in PK-12 Schools & Districts 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
PK-12 district 68.35 55.49 50.46 46.69 46.53 45.89 45.55 43.43 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.45) (0.54) (0.66) (0.91) (1.25) (2.39) 
--Teacher 64.55 49.41 41.15 34.74 29.60 25.40 21.26 15.61 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.37) (0.42) (0.49) (0.65) (0.86) (1.27) 
--Possible teacher 0.58 1.01 1.09 1.47 1.23 1.89 2.54 1.73 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.27) (0.42) (0.64) 
--AP or dean 0.32 0.77 1.99 2.59 4.88 5.62 4.24 3.16 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.21) (0.33) (0.45) (0.53) (0.91) 
--Principal 0.23 0.24 0.76 1.34 2.38 3.26 6.52 7.17 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.23) (0.36) (0.66) (1.30) 
--Instructional 0.58 0.83 1.07 1.77 2.47 3.27 3.95 5.14 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.23) (0.35) (0.50) (1.08) 
--Operational 1.42 2.80 3.66 3.93 4.43 4.59 3.42 4.27 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.25) (0.31) (0.41) (0.47) (1.02) 
--Unknown 0.68 0.43 0.75 0.85 1.54 1.86 3.61 6.35 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.27) (0.50) (1.28) 
 
Alumni working outside the education sector 
The percentage of alumni working outside of education increases steadily over time.  In 
year three, 9% of alumni work in these other sectors.  In year ten, 32% do.  Further, the overall 
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slope of the shape in Figure 37 suggests that in later years, employment outside of education 
will continue to increase at a steady clip.     
This is possible, but earlier figures suggest otherwise.  In years six to ten, employment in 
education is nearly flat, only gently diminishing.  Therefore, increases in non-educational 
employment come from somewhere else.  Mostly, increasing employment outside education 
corresponds to decreasing graduate school enrollment—but this correspondence nears 
completion.  In year ten, just 4% of alumni are enrolled in graduate school, down from an apex 
of 22% in year five.  In short, by year ten few educators seem to become non-educators, and 
few graduate students remain.  In subsequent years, the percentage of alumni working outside 
education probably continues to increase but only gently.   
Figure 37.  Annual Employment of TFA Alumni in Sectors beside Education 
 
Figure 37 is also useful because it segments non-educational employment over time, 
focusing especially on three high-status sectors:  business, health, and law.   
Employment in the business sector peaks at 6%.  Contrary to some perceptions, 
employment in elite segments of business, namely banking and consulting, are particularly low.  
Around 1% of alumni are bankers, though in some years the percentage rounds to zero.  Across 
years, only 1 or 2% of alumni work as management consultants. 
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Employment in the health sector increases over time, reaching 10% in year ten—but 
fewer than half of these health workers are doctors.  The percentage of alumni who are doctors 
increases from 1% in year seven to 4% in year ten.  At that point, a few future doctors are 
probably still working their way through medical school.  However, because just 4% of alumni 
are graduate students in year ten, the number of additional doctors is likely small.   
Alumni do become lawyers at high rates.  In year three, 1% of alumni are already 
working as lawyers, meaning they probably held a law degree before starting Teach For 
America.  The percentage of alumni working as lawyers makes its largest jump in year six, from 
1% to 5%.  Year six is the first year an alumna can become a lawyer if she first finishes her two 
year commitment and second enrolls in a traditional law program.  In years seven to ten, the 
percentage of lawyers continues to rise, reaching 12% in year ten.  In subsequent years, this 
percentage may increase slightly, but again, only 4% of alumni are enrolled in graduate school in 
year ten. 
Another group of non-educators that may be of interest is the group working in public 
service.  This group includes alumni working in policy, government, social services, and non-
profits.  Across years, this group totals about 2 to 4% of all alumni.  Some of these alumni work 
on issues related to education and some spend part of their time working directly on education, 
but their main focus is something else.  Table 38 provides annual estimates across all years, and 
it further segments certain employment fields.   
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Table 38.  Annual Employment of TFA Alumni in Sectors beside Education 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Other sectors 9.01 11.52 11.65 17.00 21.78 25.74 27.57 32.26 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.36) (0.49) (0.62) (0.87) (1.19) (2.46) 
--Business 3.99 4.83 4.66 5.22 5.11 4.84 5.54 2.77 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.24) (0.30) (0.35) (0.45) (0.69) (0.79) 
----Banking 1.28 1.32 1.19 0.77 0.60 0.36 0.38 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (-) 
----Consulting 0.89 1.62 1.37 1.62 1.41 1.38 1.64 1.11 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.24) (0.34) (0.50) 
----HR 0.18 0.34 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (-) 
----Marketing (sales, 1.11 1.01 1.16 1.54 1.78 1.80 2.35 0.54 
PR, advising) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.30) (0.53) (0.35) 
----Other 0.53 0.53 0.69 1.10 1.08 1.06 0.96 1.12 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.25) (0.51) 
--Entertainment 0.44 0.64 0.74 0.50 0.52 0.85 0.79 1.77 
(arts, sports) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.21) (0.23) (0.66) 
--Health 0.76 1.01 0.85 0.71 1.95 3.76 5.12 9.67 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.21) (0.38) (0.59) (1.99) 
----Doctor 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.77 1.59 2.39 3.87 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.25) (0.42) (1.01) 
----Other 0.63 0.92 0.80 0.65 1.18 2.18 2.72 5.80 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.30) (0.43) (1.80) 
--Law (lawyer) 0.50 0.45 0.81 4.83 7.20 9.88 9.84 12.19 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.28) (0.39) (0.61) (0.81) (1.58) 
--Media (journalism, 0.49 0.64 0.77 1.18 1.19 0.83 0.59 1.12 
publishing, writing) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.51) 
--Miscellaneous 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.53 0.59 0.66 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20) (0.43) 
--Non-profit 0.71 1.62 1.36 1.26 1.90 2.53 2.38 0.58 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21) (0.31) (0.39) (0.37) 
--Policy (politics, 1.10 1.25 1.25 1.69 1.85 0.97 0.99 1.15 
government) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19) (0.25) (0.52) 
--Region 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.33 0.35 0.59 0.00 
 (-) (-) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.20) (-) 
--Social services 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.41 0.23 0.20 1.15 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.52) 
--STEM (science, 0.31 0.40 0.49 0.71 0.74 0.96 0.96 1.19 
tech, engineering) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (0.25) (0.54) 
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Conclusion 
For readers interested in how Teach For America alumni are employed, the current 
analysis yields several key takeaways.  First, contrary to popular suspicions, most alumni are 
educators, even as far out as year ten.  Second, the percentage of alumni working in education 
largely flattens from years six to ten, stabilizing in the low-sixties.  Third, the percentage of 
alumni working for PK-12 districts also largely flattens, stabilizing in the mid-forties.  This occurs 
because each year roughly the same percentage of alumni who exit teaching enter other PK-12 
roles.  Fourth, the percentage of alumni employed outside the education sector increases each 
year, reaching 32% in year ten.  That said, fewer alumni are employed in high status professions 
than TFA critics might suspect or that a certain brand of TFA supporter might desire.  True, more 
than 12% of alumni become practicing lawyers, but only 2 or 3% of alumni are bankers or 
consultants in any given year, and only about 4% become doctors.   
For an organization aimed at educational reform through leadership development, 
these numbers cut both ways.  On the one hand, the majority of alumni remain in the education 
sector, potentially working to improve and reform the sector from within.  On the other hand, a 
significant portion of alumni leave the education sector but not always for the positions of 
status or leadership ideal for agitating for education reform from the outside. 
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
Teach For America aspires to be both an alternative certification program and a 
“movement” for education reform.  The program recruits high achieving college graduates, 
helps them find jobs in schools serving high-poverty students, and provides teacher training and 
support.  Critics of the program suggest that corps members remain teachers for too short a 
time and that corps member turnover harms student achievement.  Supporters suggest that TFA 
attracts talent to both teaching and the education sector and that even corps members who 
leave teaching can add value to the movement for education reform, carrying their teaching 
experience with them to other sectors.  Given the large amount of contention surrounding the 
program, the rigorous research on career patterns of corps members is surprisingly sparse.  
I attempt to provide answers to three related questions: 
1. What are the occupations of alumni over time?   
2. How long do corps members remain teachers?    
3. What factors are related to corps member attrition? 
After a brief introductory chapter, I spend chapter 2 reviewing prior research.  I discuss 
the potential costs and harms of teacher turnover in general and corps member turnover in 
particular.  In general, teacher turnover seems to harm student achievement.  Teach For 
America teachers may mitigate some of these harms when they first enter the profession, since 
corps members seem to perform as well or better than other teachers.  For the same reason, 
however, the harms of corps members leaving the profession may be particularly high.  With 
regard to costs, corps members are especially expensive to recruit and support relative to other 
types of teachers—though their costs are borne by a wide range of governmental and 
philanthropic organizations. 
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In the literature review I also discuss prior research on rates and predictors of teacher 
turnover in general and corps member turnover in particular.  Turnover is related to various 
teacher-level and school-level factors, some more policy-amenable than others.  I highlight the 
work of Morgaen Donaldson and colleagues, who provide the best prior estimates on how long 
corps members remain teachers and what factors predict teacher exit from the profession. 
In chapter 3 I discuss my data and methods transparently and in great detail.  I argue, I 
hope convincingly, that my data are better than all data previously assembled to examine the 
occupations of corps members.  I combine data from TFA, the US DOE, NY State, NY City, and 
various CMOs operating in NYC.  This effort rewards me with a dataset that is rich in predictor 
variables and far more complete than any component dataset.  It includes the occupations of 
corps members who leave teaching as well as the occupations of corps members who continue 
teaching but outside of NY State.  The process of combining datasets does raise some concerns 
about bias.  Though the dataset is more complete than any prior dataset, certain types of corps 
members may be more likely than others to go missing in certain years.  Through rigorous 
methods, I attempt to address this concern in each analysis. 
In chapter 4 I use Kaplan-Meier functions to examine corps member retention or 
“survival” rates at their initial school, in NYC, and in the teaching profession.  I show that 
turnover follows a consistent pattern.  Turnover (from initial school, NYC teaching, and teaching 
in general) is lowest in year 1, highest in year 2, and then lower again in subsequent years, 
falling most dramatically in year 3 and for the most part, falling slightly in subsequent years.  To 
address missingness in the data, I present several models that make slightly different 
assumptions about whether missing corps members might in fact still be teachers.  The most 
plausible models suggest that 89.9% of corps members start a second year of teaching, 56.7 to 
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61.4% start a third, 41.5 to 45.2% start a fourth, and 32.1 to 35.8% start a fifth.  Chapter 3 also 
demonstrates the superiority of my dataset over prior datasets.  It does so by juxtaposing my 
final estimates with estimates I would have reached if I had access to only NYCDOE or NYSED 
data.   
In chapter 5 I explore predictors of attrition from the teaching profession.  To do this, I 
again use the Kaplan-Meier method, but this time I compare attrition across distinct values of 
each predictor variable.  I identify twelve variables associated with higher or lower teacher 
attrition, including time, school-level variables (charter, test scores), teacher assignment 
variables (special education), teacher demographic variables (gender, age, race, Pell Grant 
status), and other corps member credentials (college selectivity, college GPA, potential earnings, 
and whether education major).  Next, I conduct discrete-time survival analysis using logistic 
regression with full-information maximum likelihood estimation for missing data.  This 
technique allows me to ask which predictors are associated with attrition, controlling for other 
predictors.  The odds of attrition are lowest in year 1 and highest in year 2.  After year 2, the 
odds of attrition diminish each year.  After adjusting for other variables, the odds of attrition are 
higher for charter school teachers than for district teachers and higher for regular education 
teachers than for special education teachers.  Teacher demographics are also important.  Male 
teachers are more likely to exit teaching than females.  Asian teachers are more likely to exit 
than whites, blacks, or other people of color, while Hispanic teachers are less likely to exit.  
Corps members who start TFA when they are older than 25 and corps members who received 
Pell Grants in college are more likely than other corps members to exit the profession during 
their first year but less likely thereafter.  Corps members are more likely to leave teaching if they 
graduated from a more selective college, had a higher college GPA, or majored in a subject with 
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high potential earnings, while corps members who majored in education are less likely to leave 
teaching. 
In chapter 6 I examine the career paths of alumni, including alumni who leave teaching.  
I use weighted-adjustments and a raking procedure to adjust for non-response bias in the data.  
I find that alumni are more likely to remain in the education sector than might be expected.  In 
year 10, approximately 61% of alumni remain employed in the education sector (broadly 
defined).  Approximately 32% of alumni are employed in other sectors, 4% are enrolled in 
graduate school, and 3% are not currently employed.  Within the education sector, most alumni 
work in a preK-12 setting, but the percentage diminishes with time before settling in the mid-
forties for years 6 through 10.  Other alumni educators work at university settings or in 
miscellaneous supporting roles, like educational advocacy or educational publishing.  With each 
passing year, the percentage of alumni employed as teachers drops, but the percentage of 
alumni working in other school and district-based roles increases each year, reaching around 
25% of all corps members in year 10.  Alumni working outside the education sector are 
frequently lawyers but less frequently doctors or business people.  In year 10 the figures are 
12%, 4%, and 3% respectively.   
In short, I use this dissertation to provide Teach For America, its supporters, its critics, 
and the wider education community with empirical figures.  Ideally, these figures will supplant 
the rhetorical crutches that are often used in discussions about TFA:  anecdotes, un-enumerated 
generalizations, and estimates of teacher retention based on a single district.   
Of course, the figures presented in these pages are only estimates.  They are susceptible 
to inadequate data and inappropriate methods.  A critical reader will question both the 
generalizability and the accuracy of my estimates.  Regarding generalizability, all estimates are 
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based on a sample of corps members who begin their careers in NYC.  Corps members in NYC 
may differ from other TFA corps members, either because they differ from the start or because 
the experience of doing TFA in NYC is different from the experience of doing TFA elsewhere.  
These hypotheticals are reasonable, but the high concordance between my estimates and the 
estimates of Donaldson and colleagues suggests generalizability.  My survival estimates are 
highly similar to Donaldson and Johnson’s (2011), and I identify many of the same predictors of 
attrition (Donaldson, 2012; Donaldson & Johnson, 2010, 2011; Irizarry & Donaldson, 2012).   
As for the accuracy of my estimates, I take pains to make estimates as plausible as 
possible.  I begin by generating the best dataset to date on the careers of corps members.  To do 
this, I combine data from TFA, the US DOE, NY State, NY City, and various CMOs operating in 
NYC.  Compared to prior datasets, my dataset is bigger (tracking more corps members), longer 
(following corps members for more years), and more complete (identifying corps members’ 
employment in a higher percentage of years).  If the dataset has a flaw, it is the possibility of 
non-random missingness.  I use rigorous methods to address this possibility.  In chapter 4, I use 
the Kaplan-Meier method to estimate retention in teaching given censoring.  I generate a 
narrow range of plausible estimates by making various assumptions about when censoring 
should be considered attrition.  In chapter 5, I use logistic regression to identify predictors of 
corps member attrition, using full-information maximum likelihood to estimate parameters 
given missing data.  In chapter 6, I estimate the percentage of TFA alumni working in various 
occupations.  To protect against non-response bias, I use weighted adjustments.   
The resulting empirical estimates, not my comments on them, are this dissertation’s 
greatest value—but a short discussion is still in order.   
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With regards to Teach For America, I assume most funders and employers would agree 
with the following statement:  All else being equal, TFA would be a “better” or “even better” 
partner if student outcomes were higher and costs were lower.  The randomized control trials 
by Mathematica suggest that corps members perform as well and sometimes slightly better 
than other teachers (Clark et al., 2013, 2015b; Glazerman et al., 2006).  However, this 
performance comes at a cost of $41,700 per corps member, a cost that seems exorbitant over 
two years of teaching (Teach For America, 2014a).   
In my view, the key question for funders, stakeholders, and Teach For America is what 
corps members do after their two-year commitment to justify all the money that gets spent on 
them.  I show that the median corps member teaches a third year, and that more than 41% of 
corps members teach a fourth year.  These extra teaching years make the cost of training TFA 
corps members more palatable, especially since research suggests that teachers improve 
markedly in their first few years in the classroom (Clotfelter et al., 2007; Hanushek et al., 2005).  
Still, some critics will remain unsatisfied, wishing corps members taught longer. 
My findings suggest several ways that Teach For America might boost corps member 
retention.  Some strategies, like targeting lower-performing applicants, are obviously 
problematic, but other strategies deserve attention.  In particular, TFA should explore increasing 
the two-year commitment.  The elevated odds of attrition during year two—59% higher than in 
year 3, 350% higher than in year one—simply demand it.  Given the flack TFA catches for its 
two-year commitment, it would serve the organization well to either increase the commitment 
or make a strong, public, empirical case for why two years is appropriate.  If TFA has data that 
shows increasing the commitment to three years would diminish the quantity or quality of 
applicants, it should make that data public.  If TFA has no data on the subject, it should work 
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hard to collect it through surveys and focus groups of potential applicants, maybe even through 
pilot projects.   
Teach For America could pivot toward a three-year commitment in any number of small 
ways without fully committing.  It could ask graduate schools to grant corps members three-year 
deferrals rather than two.  It could increase programing and support for third year teachers, as it 
has in some regions.  It could pilot a three-year commitment in just a few regions and have 
candidates select those regions only if willing to make such a commitment.  Alternatively, TFA 
could ask candidates whether they would be willing to make a three-year commitment on the 
application, using that information as part of the admissions criteria.  Retention might even 
increase if corps members were asked to voluntarily recommit at a ceremony after their first 
year of teaching.  Of course, all these efforts might be for naught, but given the high rate of exit 
after year 2, some exploration seems necessary. 
According to Teach For America, funders and partners should expect a “movement” for 
education reform full of “lifelong leaders dedicated to the goal of educational opportunity for 
all” (Kopp, 2003, p. 1).  My dissertation sheds no light on whether non-educator alumni 
moonlight as educational advocates—but my dissertation does confirm that most TFA alumni 
stay educators for the long-haul.  In chapter 6 I estimate that ten years in, 60.9% of TFA alumni 
are employed in the education sector including 43.4% of alumni who are working for PK-12 
districts.  Absent TFA, many of these alumni say they would have chosen a different career.  
Thus, in addition to 3+ years of teaching, $41,700 seems to buy persistent human capital for the 
education sector, human capital that absent TFA would probably have gone elsewhere.  
Recruiting persistent talent seems like a good thing. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 39.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers at Placement School, 
Minimum Estimates (Model 1) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 82.0% 0.6% 80.7% 83.2% 3,661 660 327 
3 32.5% 0.8% 30.9% 34.1% 2,674 1,614 119 
4 16.9% 0.7% 15.5% 18.2% 941 453 48 
5 9.4% 0.6% 8.4% 10.5% 440 194 36 
6 6.1% 0.5% 5.3% 7.1% 210 73 34 
7 4.3% 0.4% 3.5% 5.2% 103 31 23 
8 2.8% 0.4% 2.1% 3.7% 49 17 14 
9 2.2% 0.4% 1.5% 3.1% 18 4 12 
10 1.1% 0.8% 0.2% 3.7% 2 1 1 
 
Table 40.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers in NYC Schools, Minimum 
Estimates (Model 2) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.8% 90.8% 3,661 371 359 
3 50.8% 0.9% 49.1% 52.5% 2,931 1,273 187 
4 34.5% 0.9% 32.8% 36.1% 1,471 474 97 
5 25.3% 0.8% 23.7% 26.9% 900 239 83 
6 18.8% 0.8% 17.4% 20.3% 578 148 117 
7 14.3% 0.7% 12.9% 15.8% 313 75 75 
8 11.5% 0.7% 10.1% 13.0% 163 32 53 
9 9.1% 0.8% 7.7% 10.8% 78 16 43 
10 7.7% 1.0% 5.9% 9.8% 19 3 16 
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Table 41.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers in NY State Schools, 
Dependent on Data Availability (Model 3: Only NYC District Data) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.6% 0.6% 88.4% 90.7% 2,764 288 128 
3 40.6% 1.0% 38.7% 42.5% 2,348 1,284 61 
4 24.1% 0.8% 22.4% 25.8% 1,003 408 34 
5 17.3% 0.8% 15.8% 18.8% 561 158 37 
6 12.9% 0.7% 11.5% 14.2% 366 94 70 
7 10.1% 0.7% 8.8% 11.4% 202 44 43 
8 8.0% 0.6% 6.8% 9.4% 115 23 39 
9 7.0% 0.7% 5.7% 8.4% 53 7 29 
10 5.7% 0.9% 4.2% 7.6% 17 3 14 
 
Table 42.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers in NY State Schools, 
Dependent on Data Availability (Model 4: Only NY State Data) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 84.2% 0.6% 82.9% 85.3% 3,661 580 313 
3 48.3% 0.9% 46.6% 50.0% 2,768 1,180 159 
4 33.0% 0.8% 31.4% 34.7% 1,429 452 89 
5 24.8% 0.8% 23.3% 26.4% 888 221 75 
6 18.8% 0.7% 17.4% 20.3% 592 142 113 
7 14.8% 0.7% 13.4% 16.3% 337 72 76 
8 11.0% 0.7% 9.6% 12.4% 189 49 56 
9 9.7% 0.7% 8.3% 11.2% 84 10 51 
10 7.1% 1.0% 5.3% 9.4% 23 6 17 
 
Table 43.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers in NY State Schools, 
Dependent on Data Availability (Model 5: All Available Data) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.8% 3,661 370 359 
3 51.0% 0.9% 49.3% 52.7% 2,932 1,269 187 
4 34.9% 0.9% 33.2% 36.5% 1,476 467 99 
5 25.7% 0.8% 24.1% 27.3% 910 240 85 
6 19.3% 0.8% 17.8% 20.8% 585 146 118 
7 14.8% 0.7% 13.3% 16.2% 321 75 78 
8 11.9% 0.7% 10.5% 13.5% 168 32 55 
9 9.4% 0.8% 7.9% 11.1% 81 17 45 
10 7.9% 1.0% 6.1% 10.1% 19 3 16 
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Table 44.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers, Plausible Estimates (Model 
6: If ambiguous title, failure assumed; if gap in teaching, failure assumed, if gap before failure, 
failure assumed) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.9% 3,661 368 359 
3 56.3% 0.9% 54.5% 57.9% 2,934 1,099 206 
4 41.0% 0.9% 39.3% 42.8% 1,629 441 106 
5 31.5% 0.9% 29.9% 33.2% 1,082 250 96 
6 24.4% 0.8% 22.8% 26.0% 736 167 137 
7 19.0% 0.8% 17.5% 20.6% 432 95 103 
8 15.2% 0.8% 13.6% 16.8% 234 47 70 
9 11.4% 0.9% 9.8% 13.2% 117 29 63 
10 8.2% 1.2% 6.1% 10.8% 25 7 18 
 
Table 45.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers, Plausible Estimates (Model 
7: If ambiguous title, teaching assumed; if gap in teaching, failure assumed, if gap before failure, 
failure assumed) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.9% 3,661 368 359 
3 56.7% 0.9% 54.9% 58.3% 2,934 1,086 209 
4 41.5% 0.9% 39.8% 43.3% 1,639 437 106 
5 32.1% 0.9% 30.5% 33.8% 1,096 248 97 
6 25.0% 0.8% 23.3% 26.6% 751 168 142 
7 19.6% 0.8% 18.1% 21.3% 441 94 106 
8 15.8% 0.8% 14.2% 17.5% 241 47 72 
9 11.9% 0.9% 10.3% 13.7% 122 30 65 
10 8.8% 1.2% 6.7% 11.4% 27 7 20 
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Table 46.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers, Plausible Estimates (Model 
8: If ambiguous title, teaching assumed; if gap in teaching, nothing assumed, if gap before 
failure, failure assumed) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.9% 3,661 368 359 
3 56.7% 0.9% 54.9% 58.3% 2,934 1,086 209 
4 41.5% 0.9% 39.8% 43.3% 1,639 437 90 
5 32.3% 0.9% 30.6% 34.0% 1,112 248 84 
6 25.3% 0.8% 23.7% 27.0% 780 168 149 
7 20.2% 0.8% 18.6% 21.8% 463 94 108 
8 16.6% 0.8% 15.0% 18.2% 261 47 78 
9 12.9% 0.9% 11.3% 14.7% 136 30 74 
10 10.1% 1.2% 7.9% 12.5% 32 7 25 
 
Table 47.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers, Plausible Estimates (Model 
9: If ambiguous title, teaching assumed; if gap in teaching, teaching assumed, if gap before 
failure, failure assumed) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.9% 3,661 368 359 
3 57.5% 0.9% 55.7% 59.1% 2,934 1,060 209 
4 43.2% 0.9% 41.5% 44.9% 1,665 413 107 
5 34.3% 0.9% 32.6% 36.0% 1,145 236 100 
6 27.1% 0.8% 25.4% 28.8% 809 170 152 
7 21.6% 0.8% 20.0% 23.3% 487 98 107 
8 17.5% 0.8% 15.9% 19.2% 282 54 85 
9 13.3% 0.9% 11.6% 15.1% 143 34 75 
10 9.8% 1.2% 7.6% 12.3% 34 9 25 
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Table 48.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers, Plausible Estimates (Model 
10: If ambiguous title, teaching assumed; if gap in teaching, teaching assumed, if gap before 
failure, imputed) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.9%    
3 61.4% 0.8% 59.7% 63.0%    
4 45.2% 0.9% 43.5% 47.0%    
5 35.8% 0.9% 34.1% 37.5%    
6 28.7% 0.9% 27.0% 30.4%    
7 23.1% 0.9% 21.4% 24.8%    
8 19.1% 0.9% 17.4% 20.9%    
9 14.9% 0.9% 13.1% 16.8%    
10 11.4% 1.3% 9.1% 14.1%    
Note:  Beginning total, attrition, and censored figures unavailable because cumulative survival, S.E.s and 95% CIs 
generated by averaging 100 simulations. 
 
Table 49.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers, Plausible Estimates (Model 
11: If ambiguous title, teaching assumed; if gap in teaching, teaching assumed, if gap before 
failure, nothing assumed) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.9% 3,661 368 647 
3 63.7% 0.9% 62.0% 65.4% 2,646 772 325 
4 51.5% 0.9% 49.6% 53.3% 1,549 297 175 
5 43.5% 1.0% 41.5% 45.4% 1,077 168 166 
6 37.4% 1.0% 35.4% 39.4% 743 104 184 
7 32.0% 1.1% 29.9% 34.0% 455 66 134 
8 28.6% 1.1% 26.4% 30.8% 255 27 98 
9 24.0% 1.3% 21.4% 26.6% 130 21 81 
10 21.4% 1.8% 17.9% 25.1% 28 3 25 
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Table 50.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Teachers, Plausible Estimates (Model 
12: If ambiguous title, teaching assumed; if gap in teaching, teaching assumed, if gap before 
failure, teaching assumed) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.9% 3,661 368 359 
3 66.3% 0.8% 64.7% 67.9% 2,934 772 268 
4 53.4% 0.9% 51.7% 55.2% 1,894 367 146 
5 45.5% 0.9% 43.7% 47.3% 1,381 206 143 
6 39.6% 0.9% 37.8% 41.4% 1,032 133 243 
7 34.5% 1.0% 32.6% 36.4% 656 85 164 
8 31.3% 1.0% 29.4% 33.3% 407 37 153 
9 28.0% 1.1% 25.9% 30.2% 217 23 124 
10 25.6% 1.4% 23.0% 28.4% 70 6 64 
 
Table 51.  Cumulative Retention of TFA Corps Members as Educators, Minimum Estimates 
(Model 13) 
Year 
Cumulative 
Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB 
Beginning 
Total Attrition Censored 
1 100.0%       
2 89.9% 0.5% 88.9% 90.9% 3,661 368 359 
3 65.7% 0.8% 64.1% 67.3% 2,934 791 218 
4 53.2% 0.9% 51.5% 54.9% 1,925 366 129 
5 45.1% 0.9% 43.3% 46.8% 1,430 219 145 
6 38.2% 0.9% 36.4% 40.0% 1,066 163 208 
7 34.2% 0.9% 32.3% 36.0% 695 73 185 
8 30.0% 1.0% 28.1% 31.9% 437 53 143 
9 25.9% 1.1% 23.8% 28.0% 241 33 134 
10 22.1% 1.4% 19.4% 24.9% 74 11 63 
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Table 52.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by School Level 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Primary 1 100.0%       
 2 91.1% 0.6% 89.8% 92.3% 2048 182 358 
 3 65.4% 1.1% 63.1% 67.6% 1508 426 312 
 4 52.3% 1.3% 49.7% 54.8% 770 154 129 
 5 43.6% 1.4% 40.8% 46.3% 487 81 94 
 6 37.3% 1.5% 34.4% 40.2% 312 45 89 
 7 32.7% 1.6% 29.6% 35.8% 178 22 66 
 8 28.7% 1.8% 25.2% 32.3% 90 11 33 
 9 23.1% 2.2% 18.9% 27.5% 46 9 25 
 10 21.2% 2.7% 16.1% 26.8% 12 1 11 
Middle 1 100.0%       
 2 87.3% 1.0% 85.2% 89.1% 1134 144 234 
 3 60.2% 1.6% 56.9% 63.3% 756 235 182 
 4 47.7% 1.8% 44.1% 51.3% 339 70 52 
 5 40.9% 1.9% 37.1% 44.7% 217 31 35 
 6 35.0% 2.0% 31.0% 39.0% 151 22 44 
 7 31.7% 2.2% 27.5% 35.9% 85 8 25 
 8 29.8% 2.3% 25.5% 34.3% 52 3 18 
 9 27.9% 2.5% 23.1% 32.9% 31 2 24 
 10 27.9% 2.5% 23.1% 32.9% 5 0 5 
High 1 100.0%       
 2 92.1% 1.2% 89.3% 94.2% 469 37 99 
 3 62.2% 2.5% 57.1% 66.9% 333 108 29 
 4 50.2% 2.7% 44.8% 55.3% 196 38 49 
 5 39.6% 2.9% 33.9% 45.2% 109 23 32 
 6 34.5% 3.1% 28.5% 40.5% 54 7 21 
 7 29.2% 3.6% 22.4% 36.3% 26 4 10 
 8 26.7% 4.0% 19.2% 34.8% 12 1 9 
 9 26.7% 4.0% 19.2% 34.8% 2 0 2 
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Table 53.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by School Type 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
District 1 100.0%       
 2 89.9% 0.6% 88.7% 91.0% 2796 282 389 
 3 61.5% 1.0% 59.6% 63.4% 2125 671 521 
 4 49.1% 1.1% 46.8% 51.3% 933 189 185 
 5 42.1% 1.2% 39.7% 44.5% 559 79 118 
 6 36.9% 1.3% 34.4% 39.4% 362 45 103 
 7 32.9% 1.4% 30.2% 35.7% 214 23 74 
 8 30.4% 1.5% 27.4% 33.4% 117 9 44 
 9 26.1% 1.9% 22.6% 29.8% 64 9 39 
 10 24.5% 2.4% 20.0% 29.2% 16 1 15 
Charter 1 100.0%       
 2 90.3% 1.0% 88.2% 92.1% 860 83 296 
 3 71.4% 1.9% 67.6% 74.8% 481 101 -129 
 4 57.6% 2.0% 53.7% 61.4% 509 98 17 
 5 47.5% 2.0% 43.7% 51.3% 394 69 54 
 6 39.6% 1.9% 35.8% 43.4% 271 45 62 
 7 31.9% 2.0% 28.0% 35.8% 164 32 49 
 8 26.5% 2.1% 22.5% 30.7% 83 14 28 
 9 20.1% 2.4% 15.6% 24.9% 41 10 26 
 10 12.0% 4.6% 4.9% 22.7% 5 2 3 
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Table 54.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Student Enrollment 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Lowest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 91.6% 0.9% 89.7% 93.2% 969 81 288 
 3 64.9% 1.8% 61.2% 68.3% 600 175 64 
 4 51.2% 2.0% 47.3% 55.1% 361 76 74 
 5 41.8% 2.1% 37.6% 45.9% 211 39 59 
 6 36.2% 2.3% 31.8% 40.7% 113 15 47 
 7 32.7% 2.5% 27.7% 37.7% 51 5 18 
 8 29.2% 3.0% 23.5% 35.1% 28 3 16 
 9 25.9% 4.0% 18.4% 34.1% 9 1 6 
 10 25.9% 4.0% 18.4% 34.1% 2 0 2 
Middle 50% 1 100.0%       
 2 90.0% 0.7% 88.5% 91.4% 1656 165 195 
 3 63.2% 1.3% 60.7% 65.6% 1296 386 263 
 4 51.0% 1.4% 48.2% 53.7% 647 125 90 
 5 43.7% 1.5% 40.8% 46.6% 432 62 71 
 6 37.0% 1.6% 33.9% 40.0% 299 46 79 
 7 32.5% 1.6% 29.3% 35.7% 174 21 59 
 8 29.0% 1.8% 25.6% 32.6% 94 10 31 
 9 24.1% 2.1% 20.1% 28.3% 53 9 31 
 10 22.3% 2.6% 17.3% 27.6% 13 1 12 
Highest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 89.3% 1.0% 87.2% 91.1% 963 103 175 
 3 62.4% 1.7% 59.0% 65.7% 685 206 175 
 4 49.1% 2.0% 45.1% 52.9% 304 65 67 
 5 39.4% 2.2% 35.1% 43.6% 172 34 37 
 6 34.3% 2.3% 29.8% 38.9% 101 13 26 
 7 27.7% 2.5% 22.8% 32.7% 62 12 21 
 8 24.8% 2.8% 19.6% 30.4% 29 3 10 
 9 21.7% 3.2% 15.8% 28.2% 16 2 12 
 10 21.7% 3.2% 15.8% 28.2% 2 0 2 
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Table 55.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by School Free and Reduced Lunch 
Population 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Lowest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 91.6% 1.0% 89.5% 93.3% 832 70 213 
 3 68.7% 1.8% 65.0% 72.2% 549 137 37 
 4 53.2% 2.1% 49.0% 57.1% 375 85 56 
 5 43.4% 2.2% 39.1% 47.6% 234 43 44 
 6 39.0% 2.2% 34.6% 43.3% 147 15 33 
 7 34.2% 2.3% 29.7% 38.8% 99 12 38 
 8 31.4% 2.5% 26.6% 36.4% 49 4 21 
 9 28.8% 2.9% 23.2% 34.6% 24 2 16 
 10 28.8% 2.9% 23.2% 34.6% 6 0 6 
Middle 50% 1 100.0%       
 2 90.5% 0.7% 89.0% 91.8% 1758 167 335 
 3 62.9% 1.3% 60.4% 65.3% 1256 383 257 
 4 50.8% 1.4% 47.9% 53.5% 616 119 80 
 5 42.8% 1.5% 39.9% 45.8% 417 65 88 
 6 35.1% 1.6% 31.9% 38.2% 264 48 87 
 7 30.2% 1.7% 26.8% 33.6% 129 18 41 
 8 26.3% 1.9% 22.6% 30.1% 70 9 22 
 9 21.6% 2.3% 17.3% 26.2% 39 7 26 
 10 18.0% 3.8% 11.3% 25.9% 6 1 5 
Highest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 89.2% 1.0% 87.0% 91.0% 922 100 103 
 3 61.1% 1.7% 57.7% 64.4% 719 226 195 
 4 49.0% 2.0% 45.1% 52.8% 298 59 88 
 5 40.6% 2.2% 36.2% 44.9% 151 26 31 
 6 36.3% 2.4% 31.7% 40.9% 94 10 26 
 7 31.9% 2.6% 26.9% 37.0% 58 7 23 
 8 29.6% 2.9% 24.1% 35.3% 28 2 12 
 9 23.3% 4.0% 16.0% 31.3% 14 3 6 
 10 23.3% 4.0% 16.0% 31.3% 5 0 5 
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Table 56.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by School Test Scores 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Lowest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 87.8% 1.1% 85.5% 89.8% 902 110 154 
 3 58.5% 1.8% 54.9% 61.9% 638 213 206 
 4 44.1% 2.2% 39.8% 48.3% 219 54 52 
 5 36.7% 2.4% 32.0% 41.3% 113 19 30 
 6 29.2% 2.6% 24.1% 34.5% 64 13 24 
 7 23.8% 3.1% 18.1% 30.0% 27 5 6 
 8 22.3% 3.2% 16.4% 28.9% 16 1 9 
 9 18.6% 4.3% 11.0% 27.7% 6 1 2 
 10 18.6% 4.3% 11.0% 27.7% 3 0 3 
Middle 50% 1 100.0%       
 2 89.6% 0.8% 87.9% 91.0% 1514 158 174 
 3 62.9% 1.3% 60.3% 65.4% 1182 352 289 
 4 50.3% 1.5% 47.3% 53.2% 541 108 129 
 5 43.7% 1.6% 40.5% 46.9% 304 40 81 
 6 37.5% 1.8% 34.0% 41.0% 183 26 39 
 7 32.7% 1.9% 29.0% 36.6% 118 15 48 
 8 28.6% 2.2% 24.2% 33.0% 55 7 18 
 9 23.8% 2.7% 18.7% 29.2% 30 5 19 
 10 19.8% 4.3% 12.3% 28.7% 6 1 5 
Highest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 93.6% 1.0% 91.3% 95.4% 565 36 138 
 3 70.4% 2.2% 65.9% 74.4% 391 97 -46 
 4 56.5% 2.3% 51.8% 60.9% 340 67 9 
 5 46.7% 2.3% 42.1% 51.2% 264 46 23 
 6 40.2% 2.3% 35.7% 44.7% 195 27 56 
 7 34.5% 2.4% 29.8% 39.2% 112 16 34 
 8 30.6% 2.5% 25.7% 35.6% 62 7 19 
 9 27.2% 2.8% 21.9% 32.7% 36 4 24 
 10 27.2% 2.8% 21.9% 32.7% 8 0 8 
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Table 57.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Whether Multi-subject Teacher 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Not Multi-subject teacher 1 100.0%       
 2 93.0% 0.5% 91.9% 93.9% 2512 177 217 
 3 65.0% 1.0% 63.0% 66.9% 2118 637 419 
 4 52.1% 1.1% 49.9% 54.3% 1062 210 208 
 5 44.1% 1.2% 41.8% 46.5% 644 99 118 
 6 38.5% 1.3% 36.1% 41.0% 427 54 131 
 7 33.9% 1.4% 31.2% 36.6% 242 29 84 
 8 31.0% 1.5% 28.1% 34.0% 129 11 54 
 9 28.1% 1.8% 24.7% 31.6% 64 6 42 
 10 26.4% 2.4% 21.8% 31.1% 16 1 15 
Multi-subject teacher 1 100.0%       
 2 95.7% 1.0% 93.1% 97.3% 392 17 70 
 3 72.8% 2.5% 67.6% 77.3% 305 73 50 
 4 58.4% 2.9% 52.4% 63.8% 182 36 22 
 5 47.5% 3.1% 41.3% 53.5% 124 23 33 
 6 40.6% 3.4% 33.9% 47.1% 68 10 20 
 7 36.3% 3.6% 29.2% 43.4% 38 4 18 
 8 31.7% 4.4% 23.4% 40.4% 16 2 5 
 9 21.2% 5.8% 11.2% 33.3% 9 3 5 
 10 21.2% 5.8% 11.2% 33.3% 1 0 1 
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Table 58.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Whether Special Ed Teacher 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Not special educator 1 100.0%       
 2 93.0% 0.5% 91.8% 94.0% 2264 159 164 
 3 63.8% 1.0% 61.7% 65.8% 1941 609 295 
 4 50.4% 1.2% 48.1% 52.6% 1037 218 177 
 5 42.2% 1.2% 39.8% 44.6% 642 104 115 
 6 36.6% 1.3% 34.2% 39.1% 423 56 131 
 7 32.1% 1.4% 29.5% 34.8% 236 29 84 
 8 29.3% 1.5% 26.4% 32.2% 123 11 46 
 9 25.7% 1.8% 22.3% 29.2% 66 8 43 
 10 25.7% 1.8% 22.3% 29.2% 15 0 15 
Special education 1 100.0%       
 2 94.5% 0.9% 92.5% 96.0% 640 35 123 
 3 74.7% 1.9% 70.8% 78.2% 482 101 174 
 4 64.6% 2.4% 59.7% 69.1% 207 28 53 
 5 55.4% 2.9% 49.5% 60.8% 126 18 36 
 6 49.2% 3.3% 42.6% 55.5% 72 8 20 
 7 44.8% 3.7% 37.5% 51.8% 44 4 18 
 8 40.7% 4.3% 32.2% 49.0% 22 2 13 
 9 34.9% 6.5% 22.5% 47.5% 7 1 4 
 10 17.4% 12.8% 1.9% 46.4% 2 1 1 
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Table 59.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Gender 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Female 1 100.0%       
 2 90.7% 0.6% 89.5% 91.8% 2649 246 489 
 3 65.8% 1.0% 63.8% 67.8% 1914 525 275 
 4 53.2% 1.1% 50.9% 55.4% 1114 214 162 
 5 45.4% 1.2% 43.1% 47.7% 738 108 134 
 6 39.7% 1.2% 37.3% 42.1% 496 62 132 
 7 34.5% 1.3% 31.9% 37.1% 302 40 101 
 8 31.0% 1.4% 28.2% 33.9% 161 16 62 
 9 24.7% 1.8% 21.3% 28.3% 83 17 50 
 10 21.6% 2.6% 16.8% 26.8% 16 2 14 
Male 1 100.0%       
 2 88.2% 1.0% 86.0% 90.0% 1007 119 196 
 3 56.7% 1.7% 53.2% 60.0% 692 247 117 
 4 44.1% 1.9% 40.4% 47.7% 328 73 40 
 5 35.9% 1.9% 32.1% 39.7% 215 40 38 
 6 28.6% 2.0% 24.8% 32.4% 137 28 33 
 7 22.9% 2.0% 19.0% 27.0% 76 15 22 
 8 18.8% 2.2% 14.7% 23.3% 39 7 10 
 9 17.1% 2.3% 12.9% 21.8% 22 2 15 
 10 13.7% 3.6% 7.6% 21.5% 5 1 4 
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Table 60.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Age 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censoring 
25-years-old and younger 1 100.0%       
 2 90.4% 0.5% 89.3% 91.4% 3289 316 613 
 3 62.7% 0.9% 60.9% 64.5% 2360 722 344 
 4 49.9% 1.0% 47.9% 51.9% 1294 264 137 
 5 42.0% 1.1% 39.9% 44.1% 893 142 158 
 6 35.8% 1.1% 33.7% 38.0% 593 87 152 
 7 30.6% 1.1% 28.3% 32.8% 354 52 117 
 8 26.8% 1.2% 24.4% 29.2% 185 23 70 
 9 22.7% 1.5% 19.9% 25.6% 92 14 62 
 10 19.9% 2.3% 15.6% 24.5% 16 2 14 
Over 25-years-old 1 100.0%       
 2 81.0% 2.9% 74.5% 86.0% 179 34 42 
 3 73.1% 3.5% 65.4% 79.4% 103 10 32 
 4 65.9% 4.2% 56.9% 73.5% 61 6 10 
 5 58.6% 4.9% 48.4% 67.5% 45 5 12 
 6 54.4% 5.4% 43.4% 64.2% 28 2 13 
 7 46.1% 7.1% 31.9% 59.1% 13 2 4 
 8 46.1% 7.1% 31.9% 59.1% 7 0 1 
 9 23.0% 10.0% 7.2% 44.0% 6 3 2 
 10 0.0%    1 1 0 
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Table 61.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Pell Grant Status 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censoring 
Not grant recipient 1 100.0%       
 2 90.5% 0.6% 89.2% 91.7% 2098 199 396 
 3 64.3% 1.2% 61.9% 66.5% 1503 436 244 
 4 51.8% 1.3% 49.3% 54.3% 823 159 137 
 5 42.4% 1.4% 39.7% 45.1% 527 96 112 
 6 35.2% 1.4% 32.4% 38.0% 319 54 117 
 7 30.9% 1.6% 27.9% 34.1% 148 18 78 
 8 26.2% 2.0% 22.3% 30.3% 52 8 44 
 9        
 10        
Grant recipient 1 100.0%       
 2 89.9% 1.1% 87.6% 91.9% 746 75 189 
 3 73.7% 1.8% 70.0% 77.1% 482 87 98 
 4 59.8% 2.2% 55.3% 64.0% 297 56 47 
 5 51.8% 2.4% 46.9% 56.4% 194 26 46 
 6 45.9% 2.6% 40.7% 50.9% 122 14 40 
 7 41.1% 2.9% 35.4% 46.7% 68 7 35 
 8 36.4% 3.6% 29.3% 43.5% 26 3 23 
 9        
 10        
 
  
 201 
 
 
Table 62.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Race 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censoring 
White 1 100.0%       
 2 90.1% 0.6% 88.9% 91.3% 2380 235 403 
 3 63.2% 1.1% 61.0% 65.2% 1742 521 234 
 4 51.5% 1.2% 49.1% 53.7% 987 183 133 
 5 43.3% 1.2% 40.8% 45.6% 671 107 112 
 6 36.9% 1.3% 34.4% 39.4% 452 66 125 
 7 31.1% 1.4% 28.5% 33.8% 261 41 89 
 8 26.9% 1.5% 24.0% 29.8% 131 18 45 
 9 22.5% 1.7% 19.2% 26.0% 68 11 44 
 10 20.8% 2.3% 16.4% 25.5% 13 1 12 
Black 1 100.0%       
 2 90.4% 1.7% 86.5% 93.2% 303 29 79 
 3 69.1% 3.0% 62.7% 74.6% 195 46 46 
 4 57.7% 3.6% 50.3% 64.3% 103 17 13 
 5 51.4% 3.8% 43.6% 58.6% 73 8 16 
 6 44.0% 4.2% 35.8% 52.0% 49 7 10 
 7 34.4% 4.6% 25.6% 43.4% 32 7 12 
 8 31.8% 4.9% 22.4% 41.5% 13 1 8 
 9 23.8% 7.8% 10.6% 40.0% 4 1 2 
 10 23.8% 7.8% 10.6% 40.0% 1 0 1 
Hispanic 1 100.0%       
 2 94.4% 1.4% 90.8% 96.6% 266 15 63 
 3 76.8% 2.9% 70.5% 81.9% 188 35 38 
 4 63.4% 3.6% 55.9% 70.1% 115 20 19 
 5 53.4% 4.0% 45.2% 61.0% 76 12 15 
 6 48.0% 4.3% 39.3% 56.1% 49 5 16 
 7 44.5% 4.6% 35.3% 53.3% 28 2 10 
 8 41.8% 5.1% 31.7% 51.5% 16 1 5 
 9 33.4% 6.7% 20.9% 46.4% 10 2 5 
 10 33.4% 6.7% 20.9% 46.4% 3 0 3 
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Table 62.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Race (continued) 
Asian 1 100.0%       
 2 90.1% 1.7% 86.1% 92.9% 302 30 63 
 3 50.4% 3.2% 43.9% 56.6% 209 92 27 
 4 33.1% 3.3% 26.7% 39.5% 90 31 16 
 5 25.4% 3.3% 19.2% 32.0% 43 10 11 
 6 21.9% 3.4% 15.6% 28.9% 22 3 5 
 7 21.9% 3.4% 15.6% 28.9% 14 0 3 
 8 21.9% 3.4% 15.6% 28.9% 11 0 3 
 9 13.7% 4.3% 6.6% 23.3% 8 3 4 
 10 0.0%    1 1 0 
Other person of color 1 100.0%       
 2 89.5% 1.7% 85.7% 92.3% 342 36 55 
 3 62.4% 2.8% 56.5% 67.7% 251 76 37 
 4 46.1% 3.1% 39.9% 52.1% 138 36 17 
 5 40.1% 3.2% 33.8% 46.4% 85 11 18 
 6 33.7% 3.3% 27.2% 40.2% 56 9 9 
 7 30.1% 3.4% 23.6% 36.9% 38 4 9 
 8 26.5% 3.6% 19.8% 33.7% 25 3 11 
 9 21.7% 4.3% 14.0% 30.5% 11 2 6 
 10 14.5% 6.6% 4.7% 29.5% 3 1 2 
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Table 63.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by College Selectivity 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censoring 
Non-competitive 1 100.0%       
 2 71.4% 17.1% 25.8% 92.0% 7 2 1 
 3 71.4% 17.1% 25.8% 92.0% 4 0 3 
 4        
 5        
 6        
 7        
 8        
 9        
 10        
Less competitive 1 100.0%       
 2 90.9% 5.0% 74.4% 97.0% 33 3 10 
 3 68.2% 9.6% 45.6% 83.0% 20 5 2 
 4 57.7% 10.6% 34.7% 75.1% 13 2 1 
 5 57.7% 10.6% 34.7% 75.1% 10 0 3 
 6 49.5% 11.9% 25.3% 69.7% 7 1 3 
 7 49.5% 11.9% 25.3% 69.7% 3 0 1 
 8 49.5% 11.9% 25.3% 69.7% 2 0 1 
 9 0.0%    1 1 0 
 10        
Competitive 1 100.0%       
 2 88.1% 1.9% 83.7% 91.4% 277 33 65 
 3 74.3% 2.9% 68.1% 79.5% 179 28 39 
 4 61.7% 3.6% 54.3% 68.3% 112 19 18 
 5 55.9% 3.8% 48.1% 63.1% 75 7 16 
 6 46.3% 4.3% 37.6% 54.5% 52 9 17 
 7 42.7% 4.7% 33.5% 51.6% 26 2 10 
 8 42.7% 4.7% 33.5% 51.6% 14 0 6 
 9 37.4% 6.5% 25.0% 49.8% 8 1 6 
 10 37.4% 6.5% 25.0% 49.8% 1 0 1 
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Table 63.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by College Selectivity (continued) 
Very competitive 1 100.0%       
 2 89.5% 1.3% 86.5% 91.8% 532 56 104 
 3 67.6% 2.2% 63.0% 71.7% 372 91 74 
 4 56.2% 2.6% 51.0% 61.0% 207 35 46 
 5 49.5% 2.8% 43.9% 54.8% 126 15 24 
 6 42.1% 3.0% 36.1% 47.9% 87 13 20 
 7 35.1% 3.3% 28.7% 41.5% 54 9 14 
 8 28.3% 3.6% 21.4% 35.6% 31 6 11 
 9 28.3% 3.6% 21.4% 35.6% 14 0 10 
 10 21.2% 6.7% 9.9% 35.3% 4 1 3 
Highly competitive 1 100.0%       
 2 91.2% 0.9% 89.1% 92.8% 928 82 176 
 3 66.8% 1.7% 63.4% 70.0% 670 179 87 
 4 55.1% 1.9% 51.3% 58.7% 404 71 46 
 5 48.0% 2.0% 44.0% 51.8% 287 37 51 
 6 41.5% 2.1% 37.4% 45.5% 199 27 59 
 7 35.2% 2.2% 30.9% 39.6% 113 17 41 
 8 32.7% 2.4% 28.0% 37.4% 55 4 20 
 9 25.3% 3.1% 19.5% 31.5% 31 7 19 
 10 20.2% 5.2% 11.3% 31.1% 5 1 4 
Most competitive 1 100.0%       
 2 89.9% 0.7% 88.4% 91.2% 1860 188 327 
 3 58.7% 1.3% 56.2% 61.1% 1345 467 181 
 4 45.2% 1.3% 42.6% 47.8% 697 160 90 
 5 36.4% 1.4% 33.7% 39.1% 447 87 77 
 6 31.3% 1.4% 28.5% 34.0% 283 40 65 
 7 26.5% 1.5% 23.7% 29.4% 178 27 55 
 8 22.9% 1.6% 19.9% 26.1% 96 13 33 
 9 18.3% 1.8% 15.0% 22.0% 50 10 29 
 10 16.7% 2.3% 12.5% 21.4% 11 1 10 
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Table 64.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by GPA 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Lowest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 90.9% 0.9% 88.8% 92.5% 951 87 188 
 3 65.6% 1.7% 62.1% 68.8% 676 188 113 
 4 53.2% 1.9% 49.3% 56.8% 375 71 52 
 5 43.9% 2.0% 39.9% 47.8% 252 44 40 
 6 39.4% 2.1% 35.3% 43.5% 168 17 38 
 7 34.9% 2.2% 30.6% 39.2% 113 13 33 
 8 32.3% 2.3% 27.8% 36.9% 67 5 23 
 9 29.0% 2.6% 24.0% 34.2% 39 4 26 
 10 29.0% 2.6% 24.0% 34.2% 9 0 9 
Middle 50% 1 100.0%       
 2 90.4% 0.7% 88.9% 91.6% 1819 175 349 
 3 64.1% 1.2% 61.6% 66.5% 1295 376 197 
 4 51.7% 1.4% 49.0% 54.4% 722 140 101 
 5 43.9% 1.4% 41.0% 46.7% 481 73 91 
 6 37.6% 1.5% 34.7% 40.6% 317 45 85 
 7 32.4% 1.6% 29.3% 35.6% 187 26 67 
 8 27.2% 1.8% 23.7% 30.8% 94 15 36 
 9 20.9% 2.2% 16.7% 25.4% 43 10 24 
 10 13.9% 3.6% 7.8% 21.8% 9 3 6 
Highest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 88.5% 1.1% 86.2% 90.4% 877 101 147 
 3 59.2% 1.8% 55.6% 62.7% 629 208 79 
 4 46.1% 1.9% 42.2% 49.8% 342 76 47 
 5 39.5% 2.0% 35.6% 43.4% 219 31 40 
 6 32.1% 2.1% 28.1% 36.1% 148 28 42 
 7 25.5% 2.2% 21.3% 29.9% 78 16 23 
 8 23.5% 2.3% 19.2% 28.1% 39 3 13 
 9 18.4% 2.7% 13.4% 24.0% 23 5 15 
 10 18.4% 2.7% 13.4% 24.0% 3 0 3 
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Table 65.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Earning Potential 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censored 
Lowest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 89.4% 0.9% 87.6% 91.0% 1219 129 226 
 3 67.6% 1.5% 64.6% 70.4% 864 211 140 
 4 59.4% 1.6% 56.2% 62.5% 513 62 88 
 5 52.4% 1.7% 48.9% 55.7% 363 43 71 
 6 45.9% 1.9% 42.1% 49.5% 249 31 62 
 7 39.4% 2.1% 35.3% 43.4% 156 22 58 
 8 35.2% 2.3% 30.7% 39.8% 76 8 29 
 9 29.8% 2.8% 24.4% 35.4% 39 6 29 
 10 29.8% 2.8% 24.4% 35.4% 4 0 4 
Middle 50% 1 100.0%       
 2 90.4% 0.7% 89.0% 91.7% 1887 181 366 
 3 62.2% 1.2% 59.7% 64.6% 1340 418 196 
 4 46.1% 1.4% 43.4% 48.7% 726 188 79 
 5 37.5% 1.4% 34.7% 40.2% 459 86 74 
 6 31.7% 1.4% 28.9% 34.5% 299 46 79 
 7 27.7% 1.5% 24.8% 30.6% 174 22 56 
 8 24.2% 1.6% 21.2% 27.4% 96 12 34 
 9 17.9% 1.9% 14.4% 21.8% 50 13 30 
 10 15.4% 2.9% 10.2% 21.5% 7 1 6 
Highest 25% 1 100.0%       
 2 89.3% 1.6% 85.7% 91.9% 391 42 67 
 3 55.4% 2.8% 49.8% 60.6% 282 107 36 
 4 44.2% 2.9% 38.5% 49.8% 139 28 26 
 5 37.5% 3.0% 31.6% 43.3% 85 13 22 
 6 32.2% 3.2% 26.1% 38.5% 50 7 18 
 7 23.2% 3.7% 16.4% 30.7% 25 7 3 
 8 20.1% 3.8% 13.3% 28.0% 15 2 6 
 9 20.1% 3.8% 13.3% 28.0% 7 0 2 
 10 16.1% 4.7% 8.2% 26.3% 5 1 4 
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Table 66.  Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Cumulative Retention in the Teaching Profession at the Start of Year X by Whether Education Major 
 Year Cumulative Survival S.E. 95% LB 95% UB Beginning Total Attrition Censoring 
Not education major 1 100.0%       
 2 89.8% 0.5% 88.8% 90.8% 3436 350 624 
 3 62.5% 0.9% 60.6% 64.2% 2462 750 362 
 4 49.6% 1.0% 47.7% 51.6% 1350 277 184 
 5 41.8% 1.0% 39.7% 43.8% 889 141 161 
 6 35.9% 1.1% 33.8% 38.0% 587 82 154 
 7 30.6% 1.1% 28.4% 32.9% 351 52 117 
 8 27.2% 1.2% 24.8% 29.7% 182 20 65 
 9 22.2% 1.5% 19.4% 25.1% 97 18 60 
 10 18.7% 2.2% 14.5% 23.3% 19 3 16 
Education major 1 100.0%       
 2 93.2% 1.7% 88.9% 95.8% 220 15 61 
 3 78.9% 3.1% 72.0% 84.4% 144 22 30 
 4 70.4% 3.8% 62.2% 77.1% 92 10 18 
 5 62.7% 4.4% 53.5% 70.5% 64 7 11 
 6 51.8% 5.0% 41.5% 61.1% 46 8 11 
 7 46.0% 5.5% 35.1% 56.2% 27 3 6 
 8 38.3% 6.1% 26.6% 50.0% 18 3 7 
 9 33.6% 7.0% 20.5% 47.1% 8 1 5 
 10 33.6% 7.0% 20.5% 47.1% 2 0 2 
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APPENDIX C 
This appendix provides alternate specifications of the model presented in chapter 6.  As 
detailed in that chapter, model 1 provides minimum estimates.  Each year, alumni are listed by 
their profession if it is known.  Otherwise, alumni are listed as “unknown.”   
Model 1.  Minimum Estimates 
Table 67.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members, an Overview 
 Percentages 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,934 n=2,646 n=2,442 n=2,149 n=1,651 n=1,189 n=720 n=280 
Education sector 73.04 62.13 56.47 51.79 50.39 46.93 45.56 39.64 
Other sector 6.88 8.81 8.85 12.19 15.63 17.33 18.33 18.57 
Graduate school 7.94 13.68 16.42 13.31 9.93 6.56 4.72 2.50 
Unemployed 1.43 1.17 1.15 1.77 1.15 1.60 1.81 1.79 
Unknown 10.70 14.21 17.12 20.94 22.90 27.59 29.58 37.50 
 
Table 68.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in the Education Sector 
 Percentages 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,934 n=2,646 n=2,442 n=2,149 n=1,651 n=1,189 n=720 n=280 
Education sector 73.04 62.13 56.47 51.79 50.39 46.93 45.56 39.64 
--PK-12 district 65.30 51.63 45.41 40.34 38.58 35.83 34.03 29.29 
--University 0.68 1.36 1.35 1.40 1.51 1.77 2.92 2.86 
--Other 6.58 9.11 9.71 10.05 10.30 9.34 8.61 7.50 
--Unknown 0.48 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 69.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in PK-12 Schools & Districts 
 Percentages 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,934 n=2,646 n=2,442 n=2,149 n=1,651 n=1,189 n=720 n=280 
PK-12 district 65.30 51.63 45.41 40.34 38.58 35.83 34.03 29.29 
--Teacher 62.54 46.94 38.29 31.60 26.41 21.61 17.64 12.86 
--Possible teacher 0.44 0.79 0.86 1.12 0.91 1.35 1.67 1.07 
--AP or dean 0.14 0.57 1.52 1.86 3.51 3.95 2.92 1.79 
--Principal 0.17 0.19 0.57 0.98 1.70 2.19 4.31 4.29 
--Instructional 0.44 0.64 0.82 1.30 1.82 2.27 2.78 3.21 
--Operational 1.06 2.15 2.78 2.89 3.21 3.20 2.36 2.50 
--Unknown 0.51 0.34 0.57 0.60 1.03 1.26 2.36 3.57 
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Table 70.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in Sectors beside Education 
 Percentages 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,934 n=2,646 n=2,442 n=2,149 n=1,651 n=1,189 n=720 n=280 
Other sectors 6.88 8.81 8.85 12.19 15.63 17.33 18.33 18.57 
--Business 3.07 3.74 3.56 3.68 3.57 3.20 3.47 1.79 
----Banking 0.99 1.02 0.90 0.56 0.42 0.25 0.28 0.00 
----Consulting 0.68 1.25 1.02 1.16 1.03 0.93 1.11 0.71 
----HR 0.14 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.00 
----Marketing (sales, 0.85 0.79 0.90 1.07 1.21 1.09 1.25 0.36 
PR, advising)         
----Other 0.41 0.42 0.53 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.69 0.71 
--Entertainment 0.34 0.49 0.57 0.37 0.36 0.50 0.56 1.07 
(arts, sports)         
--Health 0.58 0.79 0.66 0.51 1.39 2.52 3.33 4.29 
----Doctor 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.55 1.09 1.53 2.14 
----Other 0.48 0.72 0.61 0.47 0.85 1.43 1.81 2.14 
--Law (lawyer) 0.37 0.34 0.61 3.54 5.21 6.64 6.53 7.86 
--Media (journalism, 0.37 0.49 0.57 0.84 0.85 0.59 0.42 0.71 
publishing, writing)         
--Miscellaneous 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.34 0.42 0.36 
--Non-profit 0.55 1.17 1.02 0.93 1.39 1.77 1.67 0.36 
--Policy (politics, 0.82 0.94 0.94 1.16 1.33 0.67 0.69 0.71 
government)         
--Region 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.24 0.25 0.42 0.00 
--Social services 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.30 0.17 0.14 0.71 
--STEM (science, 0.24 0.30 0.37 0.51 0.55 0.67 0.69 0.71 
tech, engineering)         
 
Model 2.  Implausible Estimates 
 
Model 2 provides implausible estimates reached through naïve surveying.  The 
estimates fail to account for significant response bias:  although teachers and non-teachers 
seem to respond to the main internet survey at similar rates, the professions of teachers in NYC 
are recovered using administrative data.  The professions of other alumni are not. 
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Table 71.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members, an Overview 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Education sector 81.79 72.42 68.13 65.51 65.36 64.81 64.69 63.43 
 (0.25) (0.35) (0.43) (0.53) (0.64) (0.86) (1.16) (2.24) 
Other sector 7.71 10.26 10.67 15.42 20.27 23.93 26.04 29.71 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.28) (0.40) (0.54) (0.76) (1.06) (2.12) 
Graduate school 8.89 15.95 19.81 16.83 12.88 9.06 6.71 4.00 
 (0.18) (0.29) (0.37) (0.42) (0.45) (0.51) (0.60) (0.91) 
Unemployed 1.60 1.37 1.38 2.24 1.49 2.21 2.56 2.86 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.26) (0.38) (0.77) 
 
Table 72.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in the Education Sector 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Education sector 81.79 72.42 68.13 65.51 65.36 64.81 64.69 63.43 
 (0.25) (0.35) (0.43) (0.53) (0.64) (0.86) (1.16) (2.24) 
--PK-12 district 73.13 60.18 54.79 51.03 50.04 49.48 48.32 46.86 
 (0.28) (0.39) (0.46) (0.56) (0.67) (0.90) (1.21) (2.32) 
--University 0.76 1.59 1.63 1.77 1.96 2.44 4.14 4.57 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.19) (0.28) (0.48) (0.97) 
--Other 7.37 10.62 11.71 12.71 13.35 12.89 12.23 12.00 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.30) (0.37) (0.46) (0.60) (0.79) (1.51) 
--Unknown 0.53 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.02) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
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Table 73.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in PK-12 Schools & Districts 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
PK-12 district 73.13 60.18 54.79 51.03 50.04 49.48 48.32 46.86 
 (0.28) (0.39) (0.46) (0.56) (0.67) (0.90) (1.21) (2.32) 
--Teacher 70.04 54.71 46.20 39.96 34.25 29.85 25.05 20.57 
 (0.29) (0.39) (0.46) (0.54) (0.64) (0.82) (1.05) (1.88) 
--Possible teacher 0.50 0.93 1.04 1.41 1.18 1.86 2.37 1.71 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.24) (0.37) (0.60) 
--AP or dean 0.15 0.66 1.83 2.35 4.56 5.46 4.14 2.86 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.12) (0.17) (0.28) (0.41) (0.48) (0.77) 
--Principal 0.19 0.22 0.69 1.24 2.20 3.02 6.11 6.86 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12) (0.20) (0.31) (0.58) (1.17) 
--Instructional 0.50 0.75 0.99 1.65 2.36 3.14 3.94 5.14 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.20) (0.31) (0.47) (1.03) 
--Operational 1.18 2.51 3.36 3.65 4.16 4.41 3.35 4.00 
 (0.07) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.27) (0.37) (0.44) (0.91) 
--Unknown 0.57 0.40 0.69 0.77 1.34 1.74 3.35 5.71 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15) (0.23) (0.44) (1.08) 
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Table 74.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in Sectors beside Education 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Other sectors 7.71 10.26 10.67 15.42 20.27 23.93 26.04 29.71 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.28) (0.40) (0.54) (0.76) (1.06) (2.12) 
--Business 3.44 4.36 4.30 4.65 4.63 4.41 4.93 2.86 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.28) (0.37) (0.52) (0.77) 
----Banking 1.11 1.19 1.09 0.71 0.55 0.35 0.39 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (-) 
----Consulting 0.76 1.45 1.24 1.47 1.34 1.28 1.58 1.14 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) (0.30) (0.49) 
----HR 0.15 0.31 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (-) 
----Marketing (sales, 0.95 0.93 1.09 1.35 1.57 1.51 1.78 0.57 
PR, advising) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.32) (0.35) 
----Other 0.46 0.48 0.64 0.94 0.94 1.05 0.99 1.14 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.24) (0.49) 
--Entertainment 0.38 0.57 0.69 0.47 0.47 0.70 0.79 1.71 
(arts, sports) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.21) (0.60) 
--Health 0.65 0.93 0.79 0.65 1.81 3.48 4.73 6.86 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.33) (0.51) (1.17) 
----Doctor 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.71 1.51 2.17 3.43 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.22) (0.35) (0.84) 
----Other 0.53 0.84 0.74 0.59 1.10 1.97 2.56 3.43 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.25) (0.38) (0.84) 
--Law (lawyer) 0.42 0.40 0.74 4.47 6.76 9.18 9.27 12.57 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.23) (0.34) (0.52) (0.70) (1.54) 
--Media (journalism, 0.42 0.57 0.69 1.06 1.10 0.81 0.59 1.14 
publishing, writing) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.19) (0.49) 
--Miscellaneous 0.42 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.55 0.46 0.59 0.57 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) (0.35) 
--Non-profit 0.61 1.37 1.24 1.18 1.81 2.44 2.37 0.57 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.28) (0.37) (0.35) 
--Policy (politics, 0.92 1.10 1.14 1.47 1.73 0.93 0.99 1.14 
government) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17) (0.24) (0.49) 
--Region 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.31 0.35 0.59 0.00 
 (-) (-) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.19) (-) 
--Social services 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.24 0.39 0.23 0.20 1.14 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.49) 
--STEM (science, 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.65 0.71 0.93 0.99 1.14 
tech, engineering) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.17) (0.24) (0.49) 
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Model 3.  Weighted Estimates, Adjusted for Non-Teacher Non-Response 
 
Model 3 corrects the non-response bias of model 2.  It does so by first, identifying the 
number of teachers working in NYC each year, second, estimating employment totals for the 
remaining population, and third, combining the two sets of estimates together.   
Table 75.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members, an Overview 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Education sector 78.44 69.19 65.14 62.59 62.95 62.47 62.62 61.14 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.48) (0.58) (0.69) (0.92) (1.23) (2.37) 
Other sector 9.13 11.47 11.67 16.73 21.67 25.51 27.57 31.57 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.36) (0.48) (0.61) (0.85) (1.15) (2.28) 
Graduate school 10.53 17.82 21.67 18.26 13.78 9.66 7.10 4.25 
 (0.30) (0.38) (0.44) (0.49) (0.52) (0.58) (0.68) (1.01) 
Unemployed 1.90 1.53 1.51 2.43 1.60 2.35 2.71 3.04 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.30) (0.43) (0.86) 
 
Table 76.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in the Education Sector 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Education sector 78.44 69.19 65.14 62.59 62.95 62.47 62.62 61.14 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.48) (0.58) (0.69) (0.92) (1.23) (2.37) 
--PK-12 district 68.17 55.51 50.55 46.89 46.57 46.12 45.29 43.54 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.44) (0.54) (0.66) (0.89) (1.21) (2.32) 
--University 0.90 1.77 1.78 1.92 2.10 2.60 4.39 4.86 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22) (0.32) (0.54) (1.08) 
--Other 8.73 11.86 12.81 13.79 14.28 13.75 12.95 12.75 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.37) (0.44) (0.53) (0.68) (0.88) (1.66) 
--Unknown 0.63 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.02) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
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Table 77.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in PK-12 Schools & Districts 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
PK-12 district 68.17 55.51 50.55 46.89 46.57 46.12 45.29 43.54 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.44) (0.54) (0.66) (0.89) (1.21) (2.32) 
--Teacher 64.51 49.41 41.14 34.88 29.69 25.19 20.65 15.61 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.36) (0.42) (0.49) (0.62) (0.75) (1.25) 
--Possible teacher 0.59 1.03 1.14 1.53 1.26 1.98 2.51 1.82 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.28) (0.41) (0.67) 
--AP or dean 0.18 0.74 2.00 2.55 4.87 5.82 4.39 3.04 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.16) (0.21) (0.33) (0.46) (0.54) (0.86) 
--Principal 0.23 0.25 0.76 1.34 2.35 3.22 6.47 7.29 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.23) (0.35) (0.65) (1.30) 
--Instructional 0.59 0.84 1.08 1.79 2.52 3.34 4.18 5.46 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.24) (0.36) (0.53) (1.14) 
--Operational 1.40 2.81 3.68 3.96 4.45 4.71 3.55 4.25 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.26) (0.31) (0.42) (0.49) (1.01) 
--Unknown 0.68 0.44 0.76 0.83 1.43 1.86 3.55 6.07 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.27) (0.49) (1.19) 
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Table 78.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in Sectors beside Education 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Other sectors 9.13 11.47 11.67 16.73 21.67 25.51 27.57 31.57 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.36) (0.48) (0.61) (0.85) (1.15) (2.28) 
--Business 4.07 4.87 4.70 5.04 4.96 4.71 5.22 3.04 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.29) (0.33) (0.42) (0.59) (0.86) 
----Banking 1.31 1.33 1.19 0.77 0.59 0.37 0.42 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (-) 
----Consulting 0.90 1.62 1.35 1.60 1.43 1.36 1.67 1.21 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.23) (0.34) (0.55) 
----HR 0.18 0.34 0.27 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (-) 
----Marketing (sales, 1.13 1.03 1.19 1.47 1.68 1.61 1.88 0.61 
PR, advising) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.20) (0.25) (0.36) (0.39) 
----Other 0.54 0.54 0.70 1.02 1.01 1.11 1.04 1.21 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21) (0.27) (0.55) 
--Entertainment 0.45 0.64 0.76 0.51 0.50 0.74 0.84 1.82 
(arts, sports) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.17) (0.24) (0.67) 
--Health 0.77 1.03 0.86 0.70 1.93 3.72 5.01 7.29 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.21) (0.38) (0.58) (1.30) 
----Doctor 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.76 1.61 2.30 3.64 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.25) (0.40) (0.94) 
----Other 0.63 0.94 0.81 0.64 1.18 2.11 2.71 3.64 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.29) (0.43) (0.94) 
--Law (lawyer) 0.50 0.44 0.81 4.85 7.22 9.78 9.81 13.36 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.28) (0.39) (0.59) (0.78) (1.69) 
--Media (journalism, 0.50 0.64 0.76 1.15 1.18 0.87 0.63 1.21 
publishing, writing) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.55) 
--Miscellaneous 0.50 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.59 0.50 0.63 0.61 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.21) (0.39) 
--Non-profit 0.72 1.53 1.35 1.28 1.93 2.60 2.51 0.61 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21) (0.32) (0.41) (0.39) 
--Policy (politics, 1.09 1.23 1.24 1.60 1.85 0.99 1.04 1.21 
government) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.27) (0.55) 
--Region 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.34 0.37 0.63 0.00 
 (-) (-) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.21) (-) 
--Social services 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.42 0.25 0.21 1.21 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.55) 
--STEM (science, 0.32 0.39 0.49 0.70 0.76 0.99 1.04 1.21 
tech, engineering) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.20) (0.27) (0.55) 
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Model 4.  Weighted Estimates, Adjusted for Non-Teacher Non-Response and Non-Response by 
Race 
 
Model 4 mimics model 3 but further corrects for non-response bias by race.  It does so 
through weighted adjustments.  The estimates for models 3 and 4 are extremely similar to the 
estimates presented in chapter 6. 
Table 79.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members, an Overview 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Education sector 78.53 69.30 65.31 62.45 63.02 62.42 62.79 60.71 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.47) (0.58) (0.69) (0.93) (1.25) (2.28) 
Other sector 9.01 11.47 11.59 16.91 21.74 25.59 27.70 32.35 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.35) (0.48) (0.61) (0.86) (1.18) (2.19) 
Graduate school 10.57 17.69 21.55 18.18 13.65 9.74 6.89 4.04 
 (0.30) (0.38) (0.44) (0.49) (0.51) (0.59) (0.66) (0.95) 
Unemployed 1.89 1.54 1.56 2.46 1.60 2.26 2.62 2.90 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.29) (0.41) (0.81) 
 
Table 80.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in the Education Sector 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Education sector 78.53 69.30 65.31 62.45 63.02 62.42 62.79 60.71 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.47) (0.58) (0.69) (0.93) (1.25) (2.28) 
--PK-12 district 68.37 55.57 50.56 46.83 46.57 45.98 45.44 43.38 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.45) (0.54) (0.66) (0.90) (1.23) (2.25) 
--University 0.89 1.75 1.78 1.91 2.14 2.75 4.53 4.83 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22) (0.34) (0.56) (1.07) 
--Other 8.65 11.93 12.96 13.71 14.31 13.68 12.82 12.50 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.38) (0.44) (0.53) (0.68) (0.88) (1.61) 
--Unknown 0.62 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.02) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
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Table 81.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in PK-12 Schools & Districts 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
PK-12 district 68.37 55.57 50.56 46.83 46.57 45.98 45.44 43.38 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.45) (0.54) (0.66) (0.90) (1.23) (2.25) 
--Teacher 64.56 49.48 41.23 34.84 29.61 25.48 21.20 15.54 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.37) (0.42) (0.48) (0.65) (0.81) (1.24) 
--Possible teacher 0.58 1.01 1.10 1.48 1.23 1.90 2.53 1.69 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.26) (0.40) (0.62) 
--AP or dean 0.32 0.76 2.00 2.60 4.90 5.62 4.23 3.23 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.21) (0.33) (0.45) (0.52) (0.91) 
--Principal 0.23 0.24 0.75 1.33 2.38 3.25 6.53 7.17 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.23) (0.36) (0.65) (1.28) 
--Instructional 0.58 0.83 1.08 1.79 2.47 3.27 3.93 5.07 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.23) (0.35) (0.49) (1.05) 
--Operational 1.42 2.81 3.66 3.94 4.43 4.60 3.39 4.31 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.25) (0.31) (0.41) (0.47) (0.90) 
--Unknown 0.68 0.44 0.75 0.85 1.55 1.86 3.63 6.37 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.27) (0.50) (1.24) 
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Table 82.  Annual Employment of TFA Corps Members in Sectors beside Education 
 Percentages (and percentage SEs) 
 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
 n=2,620 n=2,270 n=2,024 n=1,699 n=1,273 n=861 n=507 n=175 
Other sectors 9.01 11.47 11.59 16.91 21.74 25.59 27.70 32.35 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.35) (0.48) (0.61) (0.86) (1.18) (2.19) 
--Business 3.99 4.82 4.66 5.21 5.12 4.82 5.60 2.82 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.24) (0.29) (0.34) (0.43) (0.64) (0.79) 
----Banking 1.28 1.31 1.18 0.77 0.60 0.35 0.40 0.00 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (-) 
----Consulting 0.88 1.60 1.36 1.60 1.41 1.37 1.68 1.13 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23) (0.34) (0.51) 
----HR 0.18 0.34 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (-) 
----Marketing (sales, 1.11 1.02 1.16 1.54 1.79 1.79 2.35 0.56 
PR, advising) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.28) (0.45) (0.36) 
----Other 0.53 0.54 0.69 1.10 1.08 1.06 0.98 1.13 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.16) (0.20) (0.25) (0.51) 
--Entertainment 0.45 0.63 0.73 0.50 0.47 0.68 0.80 1.77 
(arts, sports) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.23) (0.64) 
--Health 0.76 1.03 0.86 0.71 1.95 3.77 5.07 9.57 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.21) (0.38) (0.58) (1.30) 
----Doctor 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.77 1.59 2.37 3.80 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.25) (0.40) (0.98) 
----Other 0.63 0.93 0.81 0.65 1.18 2.18 2.69 5.78 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.30) (0.43) (0.91) 
--Law (lawyer) 0.50 0.44 0.80 4.81 7.24 9.93 9.93 12.38 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.28) (0.39) (0.59) (0.78) (1.53) 
--Media (journalism, 0.49 0.63 0.77 1.15 1.20 0.83 0.59 1.13 
publishing, writing) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.51) 
--Miscellaneous 0.49 0.53 0.49 0.53 0.59 0.52 0.59 0.66 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20) (0.40) 
--Non-profit 0.71 1.62 1.35 1.26 1.90 2.53 2.37 0.56 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21) (0.31) (0.39) (0.36) 
--Policy (politics, 1.09 1.23 1.23 1.67 1.79 0.96 0.99 1.13 
government) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.51) 
--Region 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.33 0.35 0.59 0.00 
 (-) (-) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.20) (-) 
--Social services 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.25 0.41 0.24 0.20 1.13 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.51) 
--STEM (science, 0.31 0.39 0.48 0.69 0.74 0.95 0.99 1.21 
tech, engineering) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (0.25) (0.53) 
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